June 2014 Houghton Street, OLD M3. 111

June 2014
London School of Economics
Phone: +569 746 954 89
Houghton Street, OLD M3. 111
[email protected]
London WC2 A2A, UK
Ph. D. Economics and Finance , Columbia University GSB
M. Phil., Columbia University GSB
M.Sc. in Economics, Universidad de los Andes
B.A., Mathematics, Universidad de los Andes
B.A., Cum Laude, Economics, Universidad de los Andes
Research Experience
Assistant Professor in Finance, London School of Economics
Research Assistant Columbia University GSB
Specialized Professional, Banco de la Republica Colombia
Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes
Junior Researcher, Banco de la Republica Colombia
Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes
Empirical Corporate Finance, Entrepreneurial Finance, Private Equity and Innovation
Corporate Finance
Conferences and Seminar Presentations
Summer Conference University of Washington, EFA, NBER
Innovation, Gerzensee, LBS Conference Private Equity, Banco
de la Republica Colombia, Oxford Said Business School,
Internal seminar LSE, Frontiers of Finance ConferenceWarwick University
Copenhagen Business School, Duke University, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Harvard
Business School, Wharton, London School of Economics, London
Business School, Foster Business School, Federal Reserve Board,
Universidad de Chile
9th Annual Corporate Finance Conference Washington University in
St. Louis Ph. D. Poster Session, New York FED/NYU Stern
Conference on the Role of Private Equity in the U.S Economy, 5th
Annual Searle Center Conference on Innovation and Entrepreneurship.
USPTO-Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation-Northwestern
University, Columbia GSB Finance, Universidad de los Andes
Business, Universidad de los Andes Economics, Universidad Católica
de Chile Business, Universidad Católica de Chile Economics,
Columbia Ph D. Finance
“On the Benefits and Costs of Job Reallocation in Colombia”, Revista Desarrollo y
Sociedad No.57, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE).
This article measures gross creation, destruction, and reallocation of jobs inside the
Colombian Manufacturing Industry between 1982 and 1998. We characterize job reallocation
as a source of adjustment both in productivity dynamics and on workers welfare. Consistent
with previous research, we find evidence of productivity enhancing factor reallocation.
However, we also find evidence of significant welfare losses for displaced workers. Our most
novel results are the negative effect of displacement, sector change and unemployment
duration on post-job-change wages. The event of sector change seems to spur considerable
sector specific skills losses which offset any potential positive effects of sector change, such
as the purge of the displacement stigma. In brief, our results show that on balance,
depreciation and stigma effects dominate productive search outcomes in the determination of
post-unemployment wages. We conclude that at least a fraction of job reallocation is socially
“Liquidity Adjusted Value-at-Risk in Colombia” with Daniel Osorio, Financial Stability
Report, Central Bank of Colombia, March 2007
“A Liquidity-Risk Measurement, Monitoring and Regulation Proposal for Colombia”
with Daniel Osorio, Financial Stability Report, Central Bank of Colombia, September
Research Papers
“Venture Capital and the Diffusion of Knowledge”
I estimate the impact of venture capital (VC) on knowledge diffusion by comparing patent
citations before and after companies secure VC. I find that a patent’s citations increase
following VC financing, particularly those made by other companies also financed by the
same VC investor. Instrumental variables estimates exploiting variation in the assets of
pension funds that allocate capital to VC suggest a causal interpretation of the findings. I
argue that by certifying commercial value, VC facilitates knowledge diffusion and thus
generates an externality on innovation. The findings help explain why VC is more effective
in stimulating innovation than corporate R&D.
“CEO contract horizon and innovation” joint with Moqi Xu
Recent theoretical literature shows that commitment to long-term contracts is essential to
motivate innovation in firms. Long contract horizons reduce managerial short-termism and
increase investments in longer-term projects. An unexplored empirical prediction of this
literature is that innovation exhibits a cyclical pattern reflecting changes in managers’
incentives along the life-span of the contract. When contracts start, long horizons set
incentives to explore and invest in untested projects. As contracts near expiration, however,
managers shift focus into exploiting existing innovation. We test this prediction by exploring
the relation between CEO contract horizon and innovation. Based on a sample of 1,430 handcollected employment contracts, we find evidence consistent with the prediction: CEOs with
more time to contract expiration produce higher quality and more general innovations, as
measured by standard patent-based metrics such as citation count and generality. Consistent
with long contract horizons allowing exploratory research, we find that the increase in
innovation quality is accompanied by greater variety of patents both in terms of technology
and citations, as well as larger investments in R&D. Our findings suggest that recent
proposals to reduce entrenchment with legal upper limits on contract length, for example in
the UK or Switzerland, can have negative real consequences.
Work in progress
“Information, Credit and Investment” joint with Daniel Osorio
This paper explores a natural experiment to study the effect of public negative information
about potential borrowers on access to credit and investment decisions. The experiment is
made possible by the Colombian government’s decision to erase public information on past
delinquent borrowers in 2008. This change in the public credit registry is used to identify the
effect on access to credit using a difference-in-differences methodology that compares
potential borrowers whose negative information was erased from the public registry, with
potential borrowers who were not affected by the law. For the sample of borrowers that are
firms, we estimate the elasticity of investment to new credit.
“Business Accelerators: evidence from Start-Up Chile” joint with Michael Leatherbee
This article explores whether business accelerators affect the subsequent performance of
start-ups by studying the case of Start-Up Chile (SUP), an accelerator promoted by the
Chilean government since late 2010. In SUP, selected participants receive a grant for
U$40,000 (equity free), a one year work visa (i.e., the programme is open to Chilean and
non-Chilean teams), and a space to work and interact with other teams for six months. On
average, 800 businesses apply every four months for a total of 100 coveted spots in the
program. All applications are evaluated by external judges, and the 100 companies with the
best scores are selected by SUP. Using proprietary data on the characteristics of applicants
and the ranking of external judges, we estimate the causal effect of SUP, by exploiting the
discrete jump in the probability of selection around the 100-th company. Based on extensive
web searches and surveys, we find little evidence that participation in SUP affects company