A Comparison of Rejuvenation Hazards & Compatibility

A Comparison of Rejuvenation Hazards & Compatibility
Glen J. Bertini & Richard K. Brinton
Novinium, Inc.
Abstract: Over two decades have elapsed since the commercial
introduction of the first solid dielectric enhancement technology
or chemical rejuvenation. During those years, silane injection
has proven itself as an important tool to enhance the reliability of
aging infrastructure. There are some risks associated with
rejuvenation. Some of those risks are shared with replacement.
Some risks are unique to injection. This document examines the
risks of chemical rejuvenation utilizing the two most widespread
commercial injection methods and materials for URD cables.
INTRODUCTION
From 1984 through 2010, approximately 100 million feet of
medium voltage underground power cable were treated with
available injection technologies as shown in Figure 1. As
demonstrated by [5], injection is typically a fraction of the cost
of replacement, and the economics are almost always in favor
of rejuvenation. Undoubtedly, the favorable economics of
rejuvenation fueled the rapid growth depicted in Figure 1.
The first five years of commercial injections utilized a
continuous feed of acetophenone. While no cables treated
with acetophenone ever failed in service, this technical success
was not matched by commercial acceptance, largely because
of the fugitive nature of acetophenone and the safety and
economic penalties imposed by the need for an ongoing
maintenance requirement to re-supply fluid to an energized
cable. In 1989, a silicone fluid phenylmethyldimethoxysilane
(PMDMS) invented by Vincent [6] and referred to as “CC1”
in Figure 1 was introduced. Along with this new fluid a new
way of injecting fluid referred to as UPR in Figure 1 or
unsustained pressure rejuvenation was also introduced.
Because of its water reactivity and propensity to condense to a
larger molecule, the new CC1 fluid largely eliminated the
need for a continual supply of fluid, at least for about 10 years
at lower temperatures. The unsustained pressure rejuvenation
(UPR) process provide for an injection period and postinjection soak period.
The soak period mitigated the
undersupply of fluid to URD (URD cables are underground
residential distribution cables and are generally less than 4/0
AWG in size) cables by providing additional fluid to the
strand interstices over a 60 to 120 period.
About 5 years later in 1994, Bertini, Vincent, et al, improved
on the CC1 technology when they introduced an additive
called trimethylmethoxysilane (TMMS) in [7]. The CC2
advancement solved an uneven radial fluid distribution issue
suffered by CC1 as shown by [7]. It was also demonstrated in
[7] that 30%w of the TMMS was preferred in the formulation
together with 70%w of the CC1 fluid (i.e. PMDMS) to achieve
optimum fluid distribution and dielectric performance. This
reformulation together with the approval by the FERC
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) and the RUS (Rural
Utility Service) of the capital treatment of fluid injection were
the foundation for the rapid growth of injection at the turn of
the century. This growth faltered after 2002 when it came to
light in [3] and [16] that the CC2 technology could cause
methanolic corrosion of aluminum strands. In 2005, CC3 was
introduced and the concentration of the TMMS was reduced
by a factor of 6 to about 5%w, ostensibly to reduce the
likelihood of corrosion of aluminum strands outlined in [15]
experienced by the CC2 chemistry discussed in [3] and [16].
However, this would also lead to less uniform radial diffusion
and slow the post-treatment increase in dielectric performance.
14
Estimated Annual Injection Rates
12
P011
U733
Improved UPR
U732 & SPR
10
CC3
8
FERC/RUS
6
4
Acetophenone
CC2
CC1 & UPR
A second commercially significant technology, referred to as
U732 and described in [22], includes the field-proven short
and medium term technology similar to CC, and includes
completely new materials, which are designed to be safer to
use and provide much longer life extension. The U732
technology was injected for the first time in February 2006.
Along with the fluid, a new injection paradigm, sustained
pressure rejuvenation (SPR), was also introduced. SPR
eliminated the soak period and provided a more rapid increase
in post-injection dielectric performance.
2
0
Figure 1. Annual injection (millions of cable feet) compiled from
dozens of industry sources including [1], [2], [3] and [4]
demonstrate the growing importance of cable rejuvenation
technology.
Novinium Engineering Document
January 19, 2011
The P011 technology was first offered in 2007. P011 utilizes
the same PMDMS material as the CC family of fluids, but
uses acetophenone in place of the flammable TMMS and
introduced an improved catalyst package.
These two
improvements to the older CC fluid provide superior postinjection reliability, longer life, and a higher flash point (less
flammable). A complete history down to the chemical
component level for all rejuvenation formulations is in [23].
contact with accessories like terminations and splices.
Fluids applied with UPR unavoidably make intimate
contact with these components, because of the injection
method.
3. CC3 fluid has a flash point lower than jet fuel A. U732
and P011 fluids have much higher flash points making
them substantially less prone to ignition. Flash point
measurement conditions are not necessarily reflective of
normal job site operating conditions.
4. U732 fluids have no known carcinogens or reproductive
toxins present in the fluid. P011 fluid includes a small
amount of benzene – a known carcinogen and
reproductive toxin.
5. With SPR injection, fluid is typically introduced at 100300 psig (6.8-20.4 bar). This pressure quickly decays as
fluid diffuses from the strands. There are no reservoirs
of flammable or combustible fluid left attached to the
cable. UPR with soak sometimes utilizes initial injection
pressures up to 500 psig, but is more typically injected at
about 15 psig. A reservoir of pressurized (typically
about 12 psig) fluid is left attached to the cable for 60 or
more days. UPR without soak avoids the multi-month
soak period.
Table 1. Four fluids and three injection paradigms define
the universe (12 boxes) of rejuvenation options for medium
voltage cables. Warranties between 20 and 40 years
supplied by the technology suppliers provide guidance on
the long term performance of each choice. Technology
combinations with asterisks (boxes 1, 4, 5 & 6) should only
be applied in non-demanding applications. Blackened
combinations in the CC3 column (boxes 2 & 3) are not
available for commercial reasons.
Blackened
combinations in the U733 column (boxes 10 & 11) are not
available for technical reasons. The dark orange squares
(boxes 4 & 7) are typically used only in special
circumstances. The six combinations with light-colored
backgrounds (boxes 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 12) represent
commercially significant alternatives.
Fluid
Cable Injection
Paradigm
CC3
P011
UPR with soak
1
UPR without soak
2
5
SPR (soakless)
3
6
20*
4
20*
20*
25*
U732
7
8
9
40
25
40
U733
10
11
12
40
In 2008, an improved method of performing unsustained
pressure rejuvenation was introduced that eliminated the need
for soak periods. In 2009, an improved fluid designated U733,
for use in high temperature feeder cable applications, was
introduced. The matrix of four fluids and three injection
paradigms is shown in Table 1.
ASSESEMENT METHOD
There are two types of risk, which are considered in this
analysis. They are: Risk to equipment and risk to human
beings. Risk to equipment is the product of the probability of
an event occurring and an assessment of the consequences,
should the event occur. This equipment risk is defined by
Equation 1.
The balance of this paper examines the operational risks of the
four
most
commercially
important
fluid/paradigm
combinations, namely …




Requipment = Pevent x Cequipment
Table 1, box 1: CC3 fluid and “UPR with soak” injection
paradigm (hereinafter UPR/CC3),
Table 1, box 5: P011 fluid and “UPR without soak”
injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/P011)
Table 1, box 9: U732 fluid and “SPR” injection paradigm
(hereinafter SPR/U732), and
Table 1, box 8: U732 fluid and “UPR without soak”
injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/U732) …
(1)
Personnel risk is the product of the probability of an event
occurring, the probability that people will be present within an
event perimeter when the event occurs, and an assessment of
the consequences, should the event occur while people are
within the event perimeter. The personnel risk is defined by
Equation 2.
Rpersonnel = Pevent x Ppersonnel x Cpersonnel
… technologies as commonly applied to URD cables with 19
or fewer strands, excluding uncompressed 4/0 conductors.
The P011 fluid choice shares most of the same risks as the
U732 fluid. In fact the composition of both CC3 fluid and
P011 fluid are between 90 and 95% phenylmethyldimethoxysilane.
(2)
It is often not possible to determine values for equations (1)
and (2) with a great deal of precision. Accordingly, ranges for
each value are chosen by the risk assessment engineer to
provide a semi-quantitative perspective. This exercise is
useful, not because the absolute values of risks calculated by
equations (1) and (2) have any specific meaning, but rather
because the relative values of two or more risks can be
compared, so that risk mitigation resources can be applied to
the greatest risks first.
There are five primary differences between the four
approaches, which will be examined in detail.
1. SPR technology is applied with a single visit to the
cable, compared to 3 or more visits for the “UPR with
soak” approach and 2 or more visits with the “UPR
without soak approach.”
2. SPR technology is delivered with injection hardware
specifically designed to prevent fluid from coming in
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the values for equipment
consequence, personnel consequence, event probability, and
personnel-present probability utilized in this analysis. The
values in Table 2 and 3 are typical casualty losses in U.S.
dollars. While dollars may not adequately represent the
2
human loss for catastrophic risks, they do provide a somewhat
objective measure that society places on such incidents and
allows a comparison between dissimilar risks. The probability
values in Table 4 and Table 5 employed by this paper were
first used by the author in the 1990s while employed by
UTILX Corporation. The factual data for the UPR/CC3
technology are found in [8]. The principal author of [8] is also
a co-author of this work.
Risk scenarios are arranged in a taxonomy in Addendum A. A
summary compilation of all risk assessments is provided in
Addendum B. The Addendum B summary includes a table
that compares risks for boxes 1, 5, 8, and 9 of Table 1, and a
graph which compares boxes 1 and 9 of Table 1.
Addendum C is a compilation of the following items for each
identified risk scenario:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Table 2. Equipment Consequence
Value
0
103
2x103
5x103
Qualitative
None
Low
Medium
High
104
Very High
Examples
No outages
Blow fuse or trip breaker
Destroy components and fuse
Destroy transformer
Destroy circuit owner/customer
property
e.
f.
g.
h.
Table 3. Personnel Consequence
Value Qualitative
Examples
0
None
No injuries
103
Low
Cuts, bruises, scrapes
Sprains, 1st degree burns, MeOH
4
10
Medium
exposure, chemical fumes/irritation
Broken bones, 2nd degree burns,
5
10
High
flashes to eye
Life
3rd degree burns, electric shock,
6
10
threatening toxic exposure
Scenario name and scope
Discussion of circumstances that give rise to the risk
Experience anecdotes
Probability that the event will occur and that personnel
will be present within the event horizon, if event occurs.
Consequences to equipment and people, if they suffer an
event, in U.S. Dollars.
Probability mitigation tactics to lower the probability
that an event will occur.
Consequence mitigation tactics to reduce damage to
property or people when an event does occur.
Risk assessment is the multiplication of the values in
Equation (1) and Equation (2) to calculate semiquantitative risk values in U.S. Dollars for both
equipment and personnel.
All anecdotal experiences recounted in the UPR/CC3 column
are understood to be as of the publication date of [8], which is
August 2001, unless specifically indicated otherwise. All
other anecdotal experiences recounted by the authors of this
work are understood to be as of the publication date on page 1
of this document unless noted otherwise.
DIFFERENCES
When UPR/CC3 technology is applied to 7-strand or 19-strand
URD cables, at least three visits (items 2, 4 and 5 below) are
required to manipulate energized or potentially energized high
voltage equipment. Depending upon the circumstances, more
visits such as items 1, 3, and 6 below may be required.
Table 4. Event Probability
Value
Qualitative
Examples
0.00% Not possible Does not occur
0.05%
Ultra-low
Less than 0.1%
0.50%
Very low
More than 0.1%, less than 1%
5%
Low
More than 1.0%, less than 10%
50%
Medium
More than 10%, less than 100%
100%
High
Virtually every injected cable
1. Utilities sometimes pre-install special injection elbows.
2. Air flow testing and injection set up.
3. If blocked splices are to be replaced, a visit is required on
another day to change the splice.
4. Vacuum tank removal, typically a day or two after the
injection is initialized. If the fluid takes longer to transit
the cable, the vacuum tank is checked on multiple
occasions.
5. Soak tank removal and injection cap or plug removal, 60
to 120 days after the vacuum tank removal (if
remembered).
6. For many 35kV large interface elbow installations,
another outage must be taken to remove the injection
plugs from both cable ends.
Table 5. Personnel Present Probability
Value
Qualitative
Examples
0% Not possible Personnel not present
5%
Unlikely
Less than 10%
35% Quite likely More than 10%, less than 50%
75%
Likely
More than 50%, less than 80%
90% Very Likely More than 80%, but not certain
100%
Certain
100% probability
Potentially energized bottles are left connected to terminations
for a 60 to 120 day soak period. During that soak period,
3
20 years. In fact a large subset of the cables injected with the
UPR/CC3 paradigm has been and continue to be injected at
moderate pressure. See for example [26] and [27], which
demonstrate that pressures as high as 400 to 500 psig have
been routinely utilized.
utility trouble-workers and line-workers may encounter
unusual and potentially dangerous situations. Unfortunately,
each encounter with high voltage runs the risk of accidental
electrical contact. SPR/U732 and SPR/P011 technologies
require a single visit and a single switching operation. There
is no potentially energized equipment left near terminations.
The difference between the two paradigms is whether or not
the injection pressure, once introduced, is bled to a soak
pressure as in unsustained pressure rejuvenation, or sustained
and allowed to decay to zero through permeation in the
sustained pressure rejuvenation paradigm. The UPR with soak
paradigm leaves the cable under a soak pressure for at least 60
days, and in some cases 120 days or more. The soak pressure
is typically about 10 to 20 psig, plus head pressure, plus vapor
pressure. The vapor pressure can exceed 50 psig as suggested
in [27] for cables operating at emergency overload conditions.
Figure 2 provides experimental measurements of typical decay
rates for the SPR paradigm. In contrast to CC3 fluid, the
vapor pressure of U732 fluid is less than 2 psig even at 130°C.
The UPR/CC3 technology utilizes injection elbows with ports
described in [9], [10], and [11]. These ports create momentary
openings to an energized conductor, as permanent shielded
caps are substituted for injection caps on energized
components. These open ports have been known to flash over
and create hazards to employees. Fire and explosion hazards
are described in [12] and [13]. There are mitigating
technologies described by [12] and [13], which remain
unimplemented to date. The open port flashover problem is so
acute on 35kV circuits that the ports are no longer operated
while the cable is energized. Instead as indicated in visit 6
above, another outage is taken to remove the caps. With
SPR/U732 technology, injection is typically completed in
minutes on de-energized cable and components. There is no
open port to energized components. With UPR/U732 and
UPR/P011 technology the soak period is eliminated and the
elbow flashover issue is solved with a reticular flash preventer
(RFP) described in [31]. In [32] the open port flashover
voltage is demonstrated to be 39% higher with an RFP present
than the identical injection elbow without an RFP present.
500
Pressure Decay (1/0 cable at 25°C)
30 psig
450
240 psig
400
480 psig
Pressure (psig)
350
Fire and explosion requires three components: fuel, oxygen,
and a source of ignition. Unfortunately, in the out-of-soil
portion of a medium voltage distribution environment, both
oxygen and ignition sources are ubiquitous. Not all fuels are
equal when it comes to the ease of ignition. The ease of
ignition is measured as a flash point. Flash point measurement
conditions are not necessarily reflective of normal job site
operating conditions. However, the higher the flash point, the
less likely the fluid will ignite. According to the current
material safety data sheet (MSDS) of the CC fluid [33], its
flash point is 13°C (55°F), well below the flash point of jet
fuel A. Materials with these low flash points are rated by the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) as flammable.
U732 fluids have flash points in excess of 61°C (142°F) and
are not rated as flammable by the U.S. DOT {49 CFR
173.115-120} or the U.S. OSHA {29 CFR 1910.1200(c)}.
300
250
200
150
100
50
Elapsed Time (days)
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Figure 2. Measured pressure decay in 1/0 cable at 25°C.
Typical tailored injection pressures utilized by the SPR
paradigm typically lie between 100 and 300 psig.
SUMMARY
Circuit owners have the option of choosing from three very
different injection paradigms. Even the riskiest injection
paradigm is inherently less risky than replacement. This fact,
together with the inherently lower cost of injection compared
to replacement, makes injection a safe and capital efficient
choice. Choosing between injection paradigms is not a simple
subject. This paper considers 40 distinct risks summarized in
a hierarchal structure in Addendum A. On average, each risk
requires over a page of analysis to make a thorough
comparison.
P011 fluid (from [34]) includes small amounts of the
carcinogen, developmental toxin, and male reproductive toxin
benzene. Since August 2008, [14] no longer lists benzene as a
contaminant in CC3 fluid. U732 and U733 technologies
include no known carcinogens, developmental toxins, or
reproductive toxins from [35] and [36] respectively.
The 31 non-trivial risks of Addendum A are tabulated and
plotted in Addendum B, so that the relative ranking of the
risks and the comparisons between the three paradigms can be
quickly compared. Trivial risks are 9 of the 40 identified risks
where both the equipment risk values and the personnel risk
Many of the risk eliminations and reductions enjoyed by the
sustained pressure rejuvenation (SPR) paradigm stem from the
consistent use of moderate pressures to inject cables. The use
of moderate pressures to inject cables has been in use for over
4
8. Bertini, “Injection Hazard Analysis”, updated August 13,
2001. Downloaded from www.utilx.com web site on
December 30, 2002.
9. Borgstrom & Stevens, “Separable Connector Access Port
and Fittings”, U.S. Patent 4,946,393.
10. Borgstrom, Bertini & Meyer, “Removable Media Injection
Fitting”, U.S. Patent 5,082,449.
11. Muench, et al, “High Voltage Electrical Connector with
Access Cavity and Inserts for Use Therewith”, U.S. Patent
6,332,785.
12. Bertini & Stagi, “Method and Apparatus of Blocking
Pathways Between a Power Cable and the Environment”, U.S.
Patent 6,517,366.
13. Bertini & Stagi, “Method and Apparatus of Blocking
Pathways Between a Power Cable and the Environment”, U.S.
Patent 6,929,492.
14. CableCURE/XL MSDS dated 05/14/2005, downloaded by
author 01/12/2006 & available from the authors on request.
The most current MSDS is available from the supplier’s web
site at www.utilx.com/pdfs/MSDS_XL_08_06_08.pdf.
15. Stagi, “The Evolution of Cable Injection Technology”,
2004 Fall ICC, Subcommittee A.
16. Brüggemann et al, “Influence of Electrochemical Effects
on Vented Tree Initiation in Accelerated Tests”, Jicable 2003 International Conference on Insulated Power Cables, 2003.
17. Bertini & Vincent, “Cable Rejuvenation Mechanisms”,
ICC, Sub. A, March 14, 2006.
18. Bertini, “Improving Post-treatment Reliability:
Eliminating Fluid-Component compatibility Issues”, ICC DG
C26D, Nov. 1, 2005.
19. Bertini & Vincent, “Rejuvenation Reformulated”, ICC
SubA, May 8, 2007.
20. Bertini & Theimer, “High Pressure Power Cable
Connector”, U.S. Patent 7,195,504, Mar. 27, 2007.
21. Bertini & Theimer, “High Pressure Power Cable
Connector”, U.S. Patent App. 2007-0169954, July 26, 2007.
22. Bertini, “New Developments in Solid Dielectric Life
Extension Technology”, IEEE ISEI, Sept. 2004.
23. Bertini & Vincent, “History and Status of Silicone
Injection Technology”, ECNE 2007 Fall Engineering &
Operations Conference, October 4, 2007.
24. Cook, Goudie, et al, “Electrical Cable Restoration Fluid”,
International PCT Application WO 2006/119196 A1.
25. Bertini & Richardson, “Silicone Strand-Fill: A New
Material and Process”, ICC, spring 1990, Appendix III-B.
26. Jenkins, “Submarine Cable Rescued with Silicone-Based
Fluid,” spring 2000, ICC, p.336-353.
27. Van Horn, personal correspondence to author, dated
November 7, 2005, “UTILX has for years treated power
cables with pressures … sometimes even exceeding 500 psi.”
The full text of the letter is available from the authors upon
request.
28. Logsdan v. Indiana Michigan Power Company (AEP),
Court of Appeal of Indiana, Dec. 5, 2006.
values are less than one dollar. There are at least two
significant conclusions from the Addendum B summary.
First, utilizing the SPR paradigm and U732 fluid together
eliminates entire classes of risks. The 31 non-trivial risks of
the “unsustained pressure; flammable fluid” paradigm are
reduced to 19. Utilizing U732 fluid or P011 fluid and the
UPR no soak paradigm together also eliminates entire classes
of risks, but not as many as are possible with SPR.
Second, the 19 remaining non-trivial risks of the SPR/U732
paradigm are reduced by substantial factors over the earlier
approach in all but four cases. For those remaining four cases
the risks are essentially identical. Using U732 or P011 fluids
with the UPR no-soak-paradigm also mitigate risks, but not to
the same extent as the SPR/U732 approach.
Risk managers now have a tool to make objective assessments
of risk, since all comparisons were written by proponents of
the respective paradigms utilizing largely the same methods,
and in fact, share a common author.
The continual reduction of risks of all types remains the goal
of the authors. Further improvements in methods and
materials will continue to be forthcoming. This analysis
facilitates the focusing of engineering and research efforts on
those risks, which are greatest, and minimizing expenditure of
resources on risks, which are of lesser significance.
Addendum D includes a revision history to this Rejuvenation
Hazard Analysis.
Additional information is available from [39] including a
comprehensive bibliography of almost all publically available
test data.
REFERENCES
1. Tarpey, "Cost Effective Solution to URD Reliability: Cable
Rehabilitation”, Pennsylvania Electric Association T&D
Committee Meeting, May 8, 1990.
2. Bertini & Chatterton, “Dielectric Enhancement
Technology”, IEEE Electrical Insulation Magazine,
March/April 1994-Vol.10, No.2, pp 17-22.
3. Bertini, "Failures in Silicone-Treated German Cables Due
to an unusual Methanol-Aluminum Reaction", ICC meeting
minutes, October, 29 2002, p. 1104.
4. Bertini, "Injection Supersaturation in Underground
Electrical Cables", U.S. Patent 6,162,491.
5. Bertini, “Advancements in Cable Rejuvenation
Technology”, IEEE/PES 1999 Summer Meeting, Reliability
Centered Maintenance, July 21, 1999.
6. Vincent & Meyer, “Restoring Stranded Conductor
Electrical Cable”, U.S. Patent 4,766,011.
7. Bertini, Vincent et al, "Method for enhancing the
dielectrical strength of a cable using a fluid mixture", U.S.
Patent 5,372,841.
5
29. CableCURE/SD MSDS dated 01/12/2006, downloaded by
author 11/21/2007 & available online at www.utilx.com.
30. Bertini, Keitges, & Vincent, “Considerations for Injecting
Cables with High Conductor Temperature”, ICC SubA, Nov.
11, 2009.
31. Bertini & Brinton, “Rehabilitation: The 3R’s”, ICC SubA,
October 28, 2008.
32. CTL Test Report 09-143, Electrical Tests on Novinium
200 A Load Break Injection Elbows, August 26, 2009. This
test report is available at:
http://www.novinium.com/pdf/papers/CTL09-143.pdf .
33. CableCURE/XL fluid MSDS dated 08/06/2008,
downloaded by author & available online at www.utilx.com.
34. Perficio™ 011 fluid MSDS dated 09/11/2009, at
www.novinium.com/pdfs/MSDS/MSDS_Perficio_011.pdf.
35. Ultrinium™ 732 fluid MSDS dated 10/21/2009, at
www.novinium.com/pdfs/MSDS/MSDS_Ultrinium_732.pdf.
36. Ultrinium™ 733 fluid MSDS dated 09/11/2009, at
www.novinium.com/pdfs/MSDS/MSDS_Ultrinium_733.pdf.
37. Bertini & Vincent, “Advances in Chemical Rejuvenation:
Extending Medium Voltage Cable Life 40 Years,” Jicable ‘07,
pp. 615-617.
38. Bertini & Vincent, “Acid-Catalyzed Dielectric
Enhancement Fluid and Cable Restoration Method Employing
Same,” U.S. Patent Application Publication 2008/0173467,
Jul. 24, 2008.
39. Bertini & Vincent, “History and Status of Silicone
Injection Technology with Bibliography,” WEI Spring 2008
Underground/Overhead Electric Distribution Meeting, April 3,
2008.
Authors
Glen J. Bertini is the President, CEO and Chairman of
Novinium, Inc. He has spent over two decades working with
cable rejuvenation technol-ogy beginning with its development at Dow Corning
in 1985 and continuing
through its comercialization and growth to over
100 million feet of cable
rejuvenated so far. Mr.
Bertini was employed by
Dow Corning, a silicon
chemical manufacturer, as
a development engineer,
where he focused on the
thermodynamics of multi-component systems and was part of
a small team that developed and commercialized the first cable
rejuvenation products. With over 40 articles published on the
subject of cable rejuvenation technology including the very
first Injection Hazard Analysis, reference [8], which provides
much of the foundation for this updated analysis. Mr. Bertini
holds a total of 25 patents on cable rejuvenation and related
technologies and has 6 more patents pending. In 1992, he was
co-recipient of the prestigious R&D 100 award for cable
rejuvenation. In 2006 Mr. Bertini and Novinium won the
$100,000 Zino Zillionaire Investment Forum award for the
best investment opportunity in the Pacific Northwest. In 2010
Mr. Bertini was awarded the Puget Sound Engineering
Council, Engineer of the Year Award. Mr. Bertini holds a
B.S. in Chemical Engineering from Michigan Technological
University, is a Senior Member of the AIChE, an IEEE
Fellow, a voting member of the ICC, and a licensed
professional engineer.
Richard K. Brinton is the Vice
President of Business Development
of Novinium.
He has been
responsible for introducing cable
rejuvenation to utilities around the
world. Brinton has over 30 years
experience
in
business
development in the Americas,
Europe, Asia, and Australia. He
has focused his career on the
worldwide introduction of new
technologies and has gained
worldwide experience in industrial
processes, machine tools, robotics,
and construction.
Mr. Brinton
holds a B.S. in Industrial Engineering and a B.A. Liberal Arts
from the Pennsylvania State University, is a Senior Member of
the IEEE, a voting member of the ICC, and is a licensed
professional engineer.
6
7
8
Addendum B. Injection Hazard Ranking
$100
UPR - CC3
SPR - U732
1.3
3.4.2
1.1
Equipment Risk
2.3.3.2.1
1.1
2.4.2
$10
2.3.3.1.3.1.2
2.3.3.1.3.2
2.4.5.6 2.3.3.1.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
3.3
2.2.4
2.4.1 3.3
$1
2.3.3.2.2(A)
1.4
2.3.3.2.4
2.3.3.1.3.1.1
2.3.3.2.1
2.3.3.1.1.3
2.3.3.1.4
2.3.3.1.2.2
2.3.3.1.1.2
2.4.5.6
$1
2.3.3.2.3
3.1
3
1
3.1
2.4.4
2.4.1
241
2.3.3.1.1.2
2
33112
2.3.3.1.2.1
$10
2.2.1
2.3.3.1.1.3
2.3.3.1.4 2.3.3.1.3.1.1 1.2
3.2.1
2.4.5.2
$100
2.2.1
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.2
$1,000
Personnel Risk
Where a hazard exists for both injection
paradigms within the plotted space,
identical risks are circled and nonidentical risks are linked by a curved line.
Those risks associated with the “UPR –
CC3” paradigm, which lack associated
circles
i l or curved
d arrows, do
d not have
h
corresponding non-trivial risks within the
“SPR – U732” paradigm. Risks that fall
on or near the x-axis or the y-axis have
values less than or equal to $1. Where
data values overlap, data points are
arbitrarily “nudged” to facilitate
readability. Only conventional inside-out
injection is plotted.
2.2.3
$10,000
$100,000
Addendum B.
Injection Hazard Ranking
Hazard
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2.1
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3.1.1.1
2.3.3.1.1.2
2.3.3.1.1.3
2.3.3.1.2.1
2.3.3.1.2.2
2.3.3.1.3.1.1
2.3.3.1.3.1.2
2.3.3.1.3.2
2.3.3.1.4
2.3.3.2.1
2.3.3.2.2(A)
2.3.3.2.3
2.3.3.2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5.1
2.4.5.2
2.4.5.3
2.4.5.4
2.4.5.5
2.4.5.6
3.1
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.3
3.4.1
3.4.2
Electrical contact
Vacuum tank contact/flash
Feed tank contact/flash
Injection port flashover
HVFI flashover
Environmental
Toxicological - Inhalation
Chemical, Oral
Chemical, Skin
Chemical, Eyes
Storage
Transport
Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, DB
Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, duct
Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, manhole
Fire/Explosion, inject, splice, DB
Fire/Explosion, inject, splice, manhole
Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., monitored
Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., low P
Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., soak
Fire/Explosion, inject, term (riser)
Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, mechanical
Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, electrical
Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, procedural
Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, thermal
Chemical compatibility, termination (riser)
Chemical compatibility, cold-shrink splice
Chemical compatibility, dielectric gloves
Chemical compatibility, EPDM/EPR components
Chemical compatibility, cable connectivity/ampacity
Chemical compatibility, cable insulation
Chemical compatibility, conductor shield
Chemical compatibility, insulation shield
Chemical compatibility, jacket
Chemical compatibility, conductor
Dig-in
Driving accidents (job site)
Driving accidents (non-job site)
Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, etc.)
Hydraulic failure, cable
Hydraulic failure, component
UPR with soak - CC3
Equipment
Personnel
Risk
Risk
UPR without soak P011
Equipment
Personnel
Risk
Risk
UPR without soak U732
Equipment
Personnel
Risk
Risk
SPR - U732
Equipment
Personnel
Risk
Risk
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
50
1
50
3
1
1
1
5
3
5
2
2
2
1
3
25
3
6
3
5
11
6
1
1
1
3
5
1
1
1
1
50
$ 50,000
$
175
$
25
$
500
$
$
$
375
$
$ 5,000
$
1
$
$
$
$
1
$
25
$
1
$
25
$
375
$
2
$
2
$
25
$
250
$
175
$
500
$
175
$
25
$
1
$
$
25
$
$
25
$
$
25
$
25
$
1
$
450
$
500
$
500
$
5
$
1
$
1
33
1
5
1
1
1
1
3
1
5
1
1
1
13
1
1
1
10
4
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
5
$ 33,333
$
175
$
3
$
$
1
$
$
375
$
$
500
$
1
$
$
$
$
1
$
13
$
1
$
5
$
$
1
$
$
13
$
125
$
9
$
5
$
$
3
$
1
$
$
1
$
$
$
$
25
$
13
$
1
$
450
$
333
$
500
$
5
$
$
1
33
1
5
1
1
1
1
3
1
5
1
1
1
13
1
1
1
10
4
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
5
$ 33,333
$
175
$
3
$
$
1
$
$
188
$
$
5
$
1
$
$
$
$
1
$
13
$
1
$
5
$
$
1
$
$
13
$
125
$
88
$
5
$
$
3
$
1
$
$
18
$
$
$
$
25
$
13
$
1
$
450
$
333
$
500
$
5
$
$
1
17
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
-
$ 16,667
$
$
$
$
1
$
$
168
$
$
5
$
1
$
$
$
$
1
$
13
$
1
$
3
$
41
$
$
$
13
$
175
$
$
$
$
2
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
13
$
13
$
1
$
450
$
167
$
500
$
5
$
1
$
-
Addendum C. Analysis of Risk Scenarios
Abbreviations used in this Addendum C.
CB
CC
CPM
FOSH
HVFI
IHA
IPA
MSDS
NRI
P011
PMDMS
PE
PPE
psi
RCRA
RF
SCBA
SD
SPR
TIPT
TDR
TMMS
U732
U733
UPR
®
CableCURE /CB fluid is a platinum-cure dimethylsiloxane gel. CableCURE is a registered trademark of UTILX Corporation.
CableCURE fluid based upon PMDMS. CC1 (A.k.a. 2-2614) is PMDMS plus about 0.2% TIPT catalyst. CC2 and CC3 are also
known as CableCURE/XL are about 70% PMDMS & 30% TMMS and 95% PMDMS & 5% TMMS respectively, in each case, with
about 0.2% TIPT catalyst.
CableCURE Procedures Manual promulgated by UTILX Corporation.
Field Operations Safety Handbook promulgated by UTILX Corporation.
High Voltage Fluidic Interface – a proprietary device designed to allow fluid flow between energized and grounded devices.
Injection Hazard Analysis (Reference [8])
Isopropyl alcohol
Material Safety Data Sheet
Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions available at www.novinium.com/instructions.aspx.
Fluid composed of about 92%w PMDMS, 5%w iso-octanol, 2.5%w Tinuvin™ 123, 0.2%w ferrocene, and 0.1%w
dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA).
Phenylmethyldimethoxysilane
Polyethylene (whether or not cross-linked)
Personal Protective Equipment
Unit of pressure: pounds force per square inch. “psia” are absolute pressures and “psig” are gauge pressures.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Radio Frequency (cable and splice locating equipment)
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Strand desiccant utilized as part of the CableCURE process. SD is approximately 95%w IPA and 5%w TMMS. SD is sometimes
referred to as CableCURE/SD.
Sustained Pressure Rejuvenation is a patent pending process where injection fluid retains significant residual pressure at the end
of the injection to improve reliability. The pressure decays asymptotically to zero.
Titanium(IV) isopropoxide or tetraisopropyltitanate, a catalyst used at 0.2%w in all CC formulations.
Time Domain Reflectometer (Radar)
Trimethylmethoxysilane, a fast diffuse and flammable component of CC2 and CC3 fluid.
Fluid composed of about <60%w tolylethylmethyldimethoxysilane, <70%w cyanobutylmethyldimethoxysilane, <12%w isolauryl
alcohol, <5%w Tinuvin® 123, <3%w Tinuvin® 1130, <3%w ferrocene, <3%w geranylacetone, <4%w Irgastab® Cable KV10, and
~0.1%w dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA).
Fluid composition same as U732, except that methoxysilanes are 2-ethylhexoxy analogs.
Unsustained pressure rejuvenation releases pressure to close to zero when injection is complete. UPR is performed with a soak
period when CC fluids are used and is generally performed without a soak when U732 fluid is used.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
11
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
1
Electrical
Electrical
Electrical
Electrical
1.1
Electrical, Accidental contact
Electrical, Accidental contact
Electrical, Accidental contact
Electrical, Accidental contact
1.1a
As in [8], the injection equipment
causes or contributes to an
electrical contact.
Injection equipment causes or
contributes to an electrical
contact.
Injection equipment causes or
contributes to an electrical
contact.
The injection equipment causes
or contributes to an electrical
contact.
1.1b
As per [8], the injection
equipment interferes with the
operations of authorized line
personnel, causing equipment
such as TDR or RF equipment to
come in contact with energized
equipment. Line workers error in
routine switching or blanketing
Injection equipment interferes
with the operations of authorized
line personnel, causing
equipment such as TDR or RF
equipment to come in contact
with energized equipment. Line
workers error in routine switching
or blanketing
Injection equipment interferes
with the operations of authorized
line personnel, causing
equipment such as TDR or RF
equipment to come in contact
with energized equipment. Line
workers error in routine switching
or blanketing
There are no injection devices to
obstruct line workers during TDR
or RF testing. No conductive
injection equipment ever comes
in the vicinity of energized
devices; TDR or RF location
equipment is connected to
energized equipment; line
workers error in routine
switching or blanketing.
Because of the single-visit single
switch injection paradigm the
total number of visits to
energized equipment is reduced
at least 3-fold for 15/25kV and
4-fold for 35kV compared to the
other paradigms.
1.1c
Five incidents were referenced by
the service supplier in [8]
through 2001. There have been
multiple incidents since 2001,
including a fatality in 2002
documented in [28]. The
incidents are: (1) A flinging
vacuum cord which contacted a
live-front primary voltage
termination. Blankets were not
installed over the energized
equipment. The technician was
injured. (2) In 1993, the alligator
clip that connected a TDR to a
grounded live-front connection
swung into an exposed,
energized, and uncovered
primary bus when it was removed
by a non-journeyman-lineman
technician. Circuit protection
operated and there was no other
damage or injury as a result of
the incident. (3) A journeymanlineman injector placed a probe
wrench onto an energized elbow
probe with apparent disregard for
established grounding
No such incidences have ever
been experienced as of the date
of this document’s publication.
No such incidences have ever
been experienced as of the date
of this document’s publication.
No such incidences have ever
been experienced as of the date
of this document’s publication.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
12
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
procedures. As a consequence,
the injector suffered burns to a
hand and a foot. (4) A
subcontractor journeymanlineman slipped on wet leaves
while attempting to reach for his
hot gloves. He made contact
with a transformer. (5) A
journeyman-lineman injector was
injured when one of his
teammates reenergized a deenergized line without alerting
the victim or anyone else on the
crew.
1.1d
From [8], “ultra-low” – based
upon past experience the
probability is 1 in 10,000 cable
sections treated. It is “certain”
that personnel will be present
when the event occurs.
A minimum of 1/3 fewer visits
than the UPR with soak, because
only one visit is made to the
transformer compared to 3 to 6.
A minimum of 1/3 fewer visits
than the UPR with soak, because
only one visit is made to the
transformer compared to 3 to 6.
A minimum of 3 times less than
UPR with soak, because only one
visit is made to the transformer
compared to 3 to 6 visits.
1.1e
From [8], equipment
consequences are “low”.
Personnel consequences are “life
threatening”.
Equipment consequences are
“low”. Personnel consequences
are “life threatening”.
Equipment consequences are
“low”. Personnel consequences
are “life threatening”.
Equipment consequences are
“low”. Personnel consequences
are “life threatening”.
1.1f
According to [8], the FOSH was
changed to exclude nonjourneyman line worker from
inside a 4-foot radius of any
exposed energized equipment.
Other safety improvements
implemented after the second
incident described above include:
Additional training for
journeymen line worker, required
installation of blankets on
exposed energized equipment,
and a requirement that all new
injection personnel are
journeymen line workers.
Further, training is centralized
under the leadership of a
journeyman line worker and all
qualifications are confirmed with
appropriate due diligence.
Routine field auditing is used to
enforce switching and other
safety procedures. Finally, a
warning tag was developed,
which warns line personnel of the
Elimination of the soak reduces
the exposure by 1/3.
Elimination of the soak reduces
the exposure by 1/3.
All injection is performed on
deenergized equipment.
Novinium procedures, including
safety procedures, are available
for review on-line. There is no
need to warn other utility
personnel of special or unusual
dangers, because injection
equipment is not left on
energized cables.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
13
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
presence of potentially energized
injection equipment.
1.1g
From [8], enforce the use of PPE
and safe work practices.
Novinium uses rigorous field
verification procedures to change
unsafe behaviors before they lead
to an incident. This behaviorbased safety program is
sometimes referred to as a
“below-zero” safety culture.
Novinium uses rigorous field
verification procedures to change
unsafe behaviors before they lead
to an incident. This behaviorbased safety program is
sometimes referred to as a
“below-zero” safety culture.
Novinium uses rigorous field
verification procedures to
change unsafe behaviors before
they lead to an incident. This
behavior-based safety program
is sometimes referred to as a
“below-zero” safety culture.
1.1h
Risk (50,50000)
Requipment=0.05●103=50
Rpersonnel=0.05●1●106=50k
Risk (33,33333)
Requipment=0.05●2/3●103=33
Rpersonnel=0.05●2/3●1.0●106=33k
Risk (33,33333)
Requipment=0.05●2/3●103=33
Rpersonnel=0.05●2/3●1.0●106=33k
Risk (17,16667)
Requipment=0.05/3●103=17
Rpersonnel=0.05/3●1.0●106=17k
1.2
Electrical, Vacuum tank
contact/flash
Electrical, Vacuum tank
contact/flash
Electrical, Vacuum tank
contact/flash
Electrical, Vacuum tank
contact/flash
1.2a
As described in [8], vacuum
receiving vessels collect water
along with ionic contaminants,
organic impurities, and solids
such as aluminum oxide and
carbon black, which are flushed
from the cable interstices. The
vacuum vessel and attached
tubing also accept vapors and
gasses from the energized cable.
From Paschen’s Law, the
dielectric strength of low pressure
gasses is less than it would be for
atmospheric or higher pressure
gasses. The gas may become
ionized and glows like a
florescent light bulb. The vacuum
tank, associated tubing, and
fittings are potentially energized
and represent an electrical
contact risk. Additionally, the
vacuum tank is necessarily in
direct contact, or in close
proximity to the ground wires,
and hence a flash is possible to
ground.
Vacuum receiving vessels collect
water along with ionic
contaminants, organic impurities,
and solids such as aluminum
oxide and carbon black, which are
flushed from the cable interstices.
The vacuum vessel and attached
tubing also accept vapors and
gasses from the energized cable.
From Paschen’s Law, the
dielectric strength of low pressure
gasses is less than it would be for
atmospheric or higher pressure
gasses. The gas may become
ionized and glows like a
florescent light bulb. The vacuum
tank, associated tubing, and
fittings are potentially energized
and represent an electrical
contact risk. Additionally, the
vacuum tank is necessarily in
direct contact, or in close
proximity to the ground wires,
and hence a flash is possible to
ground.
Vacuum receiving vessels collect
water along with ionic
contaminants, organic impurities,
and solids such as aluminum
oxide and carbon black, which are
flushed from the cable interstices.
The vacuum vessel and attached
tubing also accept vapors and
gasses from the energized cable.
From Paschen’s Law, the
dielectric strength of low pressure
gasses is less than it would be for
atmospheric or higher pressure
gasses. The gas may become
ionized and glows like a
florescent light bulb. The vacuum
tank, associated tubing, and
fittings are potentially energized
and represent an electrical
contact risk. Additionally, the
vacuum tank is necessarily in
direct contact, or in close
proximity to the ground wires,
and hence a flash is possible to
ground.
Vacuum tanks are not connected
to energized devices.
1.2b
As described in [8], there are two
ways that current may be
conducted to ground. Initially,
there is some capacitive flow
when the vacuum tank is in
proximity to a ground, such as
the soil, a ground conductor, or a
human hand. Over time,
tracking, dielectric degradation,
There are two ways that current
may be conducted to ground.
Initially, there is some capacitive
flow when the vacuum tank is in
proximity to a ground, such as
the soil, a ground conductor, or a
human hand. Over time,
tracking, dielectric degradation,
or a physical defect may open a
There are two ways that current
may be conducted to ground.
Initially, there is some capacitive
flow when the vacuum tank is in
proximity to a ground, such as
the soil, a ground conductor, or a
human hand. Over time,
tracking, dielectric degradation,
or a physical defect may open a
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
14
Code
1.2c
1.2d
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
or a physical defect may open a
direct path to the interior and
allow current to flow directly from
the energized conductor and to
the ground nearest the breach.
Such an arc may damage the
eyes of line personnel, or initiate
a cascade of failures including
fires and/or, in unusual
circumstances, an explosion.
As described in [8], there are
sometimes “light displays”
observed in the dielectric tubing.
This is caused by the ionization of
the vapors and gasses inside the
vessel and the flow of capacitive
current from the energized
conductor to the nearest ground
plane. There have been
documented cases of tubing
failure where the tubing is in
intimate contact with a ground
wire. In [8], it was also reported
that at least 5 failures occurred at
Energy’s New Orleans unit when
vacuum tanks were submerged in
water. Two similar failures
occurred at PG&E. Finally, [8]
indicated that a gloveless
subcontractor employee touched
a vacuum tank and received a
high impedance discharge
through his body.
direct path to the interior and
allow current to flow directly from
the energized conductor and to
the ground nearest the breach.
Such an arc may damage the
eyes of line personnel, or initiate
a cascade of failures including
fires and/or, in very unusual
circumstances, an explosion.
direct path to the interior and
allow current to flow directly from
the energized conductor and to
the ground nearest the breach.
Such an arc may damage the
eyes of line personnel, or initiate
a cascade of failures including
fires and/or, in very unusual
circumstances, an explosion.
There have been no observed
incidents.
There have been no observed
incidents.
Less than 10% of URD cables
have conductive water in the
strands. The probability of
dielectric or mechanical failure is
thus “ultra-low”. The probability
that personnel will be present
when conductive fluid in the
tubing is “quite likely”. Typically
the injection time is 18 hours.
This time increases, 1) when the
run is long, 2) where there is
significant water in the strands,
3) where strands are corroded, or
4) where strands are compressed
or compact. Injection personnel
typically check the vacuum tank
18-24 hours after the initiation of
Less than 10% of URD cables
have conductive water in the
strands. The probability of
dielectric or mechanical failure is
thus “ultra-low”. The probability
that personnel will be present
when conductive fluid in the
tubing is “quite likely”. Typically
the injection time is 18 hours.
This time increases, 1) when the
run is long, 2) where there is
significant water in the strands,
3) where strands are corroded, or
4) where strands are compressed
or compact. Injection personnel
typically check the vacuum tank
18-24 hours after the initiation of
As described in [8], less than
10% of URD cables have
conductive water in the strands.
Modern vacuum tanks have
predominantly plastic fittings
which lower the probability of a
direct pathway to ground. The
probability of dielectric or
mechanical failure is thus “ultralow”. The probability that
personnel will be present when
conductive fluid in the tubing is
“quite likely”. Typically the
injection time is 18 hours. This
time increases, 1) when the run
is long, 2) where there is
significant water in the strands,
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
15
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
3) where strand desiccant is not
used, 4) where strands are
corroded, or 5) where strands are
compressed or compact.
Injection personnel typically
check the vacuum tank 18-24
hours after the initiation of fluid
flow.
fluid flow.
fluid flow.
1.2e
As described in [8], the typical
outcome from a catastrophic
failure of a vacuum tank and its
associated tubing is a tripped
system protection devices and
destroyed injection equipment.
The equipment consequence is
“medium”. The consequences of
line personnel coming into
contact with energized devices is
“life threatening”.
The typical outcome from a
catastrophic failure of a vacuum
tank and its associated tubing
would be a tripped system
protection devices and it can
destroy injection equipment. The
equipment consequence is
“medium”. The consequences of
line personnel coming into
contact with energized devices is
“life threatening”.
The typical outcome from a
catastrophic failure of a vacuum
tank and its associated tubing
would be a tripped system
protection devices and it can
destroy injection equipment. The
equipment consequence is
“medium”. The consequences of
line personnel coming into
contact with energized devices is
“life threatening”.
1.2f
According to [8], the following
two steps have been
implemented to reduce the
probability that current flow as a
result of contact with a vacuum
tank or its associated tubing will
be significant:
• A layer of dielectric plastic
separates the effluent fluids
(liquids, gasses, and vapors)
from line personnel to prevent
any significant electrical current
from flowing. Equipment is
designed to tolerate full system
voltage for at least 24 hours.
• A strand desiccant, composed
of anhydrous isopropyl alcohol
(IPA) and water reactive low
viscosity silanes (along with
titanium(IV) isopropoxide catalyst
to facilitate the reaction with
water), is used to reduce the
conductivity of effluent fluids.
These materials solubilize water
into the organo-silane phase,
where the water, in the presence
of the titanium catalyst, rapidly
reacts with the silanes. The
silanes oligomerize to an alcohol
soluble dielectric fluid. Ionic
The following steps have been
implemented to reduce the
probability that current flow as a
result of contact with a vacuum
tank or its associated tubing will
be significant:
• A layer of dielectric plastic
separates the effluent fluids
(liquids, gasses, and vapors)
from line personnel to prevent
any significant electrical current
from flowing. Equipment is
designed to tolerate full system
voltage for at least 24 hours.
• The magnitude of the maximum
current flow is limited by the
small inside diameter of the
tubing.
• A warning tag is used to alert
utility line personnel of the
presence of potentially energized
injection equipment. The tag
provides brief safety instructions.
Line personnel should avoid
touching injection equipment.
The following steps have been
implemented to reduce the
probability that current flow as a
result of contact with a vacuum
tank or its associated tubing will
be significant:
• A layer of dielectric plastic
separates the effluent fluids
(liquids, gasses, and vapors)
from line personnel to prevent
any significant electrical current
from flowing. Equipment is
designed to tolerate full system
voltage for at least 24 hours.
• The magnitude of the maximum
current flow is limited by the
small inside diameter of the
tubing.
• A warning tag is used to alert
utility line personnel of the
presence of potentially energized
injection equipment. The tag
provides brief safety instructions.
Line personnel should avoid
touching injection equipment.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
16
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
contaminates have a lower
solubility in IPA than in the water
and thus precipitate. The
precipitated ionic contaminates
originally present in the water are
unable to carry current or
transmit electrical potential. The
magnitude of the maximum
current flow is limited by the
small inside diameter of the
tubing. Finally, a warning tag is
used to alert utility line personnel
of the presence of potentially
energized injection equipment.
The tag provides brief safety
instructions. Line personnel
should avoid touching injection
equipment.
1.2g
According to [8], the maximum
current flow is limited by the
small diameter of the tubing and
the use of strand desiccant. It is
imperative that line personnel are
made aware that all vacuum
equipment may be energized up
to line potential. Further, they
must be trained to use the
following tools and PPE when
handling vacuum tanks: Hot
stick, dielectric gloves rated for
system voltage, flame retardant
clothing, and tinted safety
glasses.
The maximum current flow is
limited by the small diameter of
the tubing. It is imperative that
line personnel are made aware
that all vacuum equipment may
be energized up to line potential.
Further, they must be trained to
use the following tools and PPE
when handling vacuum tanks:
Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated
for system voltage, flame
retardant clothing, and tinted
safety glasses.
The maximum current flow is
limited by the small diameter of
the tubing. It is imperative that
line personnel are made aware
that all vacuum equipment may
be energized up to line potential.
Further, they must be trained to
use the following tools and PPE
when handling vacuum tanks:
Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated
for system voltage, flame
retardant clothing, and tinted
safety glasses.
1.2h
Risk (1,175)
Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175
Risk (1,175)
Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175
Risk (1,175)
Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1
Rpersonnel = 0.0005●0.35x106=175
1.3
Electrical, Feed tank
contact/flash
Electrical, Feed tank
contact/flash
Electrical, Feed tank
contact/flash
Electrical, Feed tank
contact/flash
1.3a
As described in [8], backward
flow or diffusion occurs in the
tubing from the feed tank used to
supply fluid to energized
terminations during the soak
period. Injection equipment may
therefore become energized and
create an electrical hazard.
A backward flow or diffusion may
occur within the tubing and the
feed tank used to supply fluid to
the energized terminations.
Injection equipment may
therefore become energized and
create an electrical hazard.
A backward flow or diffusion may
occur within the tubing and the
feed tank used to supply fluid to
the energized terminations.
Injection equipment may
therefore become energized and
create an electrical hazard.
No feed tanks are connected to
energized devices.
A feed tank and its associated
As explained by [8], a feed tank
tubing are utilized to deliver U732
and its associated tubing are
fluid to energized terminations.
utilized to deliver PMDMS/TMMS
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
1.3b
17
A feed tank and its associated
tubing are utilized to deliver U732
fluid to energized terminations.
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
and SD to energized
terminations. While flow is
proceeding rapidly, the dielectric
properties of the fluids make the
probability of injection equipment
becoming energized, low.
However, when 1) the flow rate
decreases on very long runs, 2)
on runs with slow-flowing splices,
3) on runs with excessive water
in the strands, and 4) on all runs
when the cable is placed into
soak mode by the installation of a
plug at the outlet of the cable,
the flow can come to a virtual
halt, or even reverse, as the
cable temperature cycles and the
feed tank temperature cycles.
Such temperature cycles cause
fluid pressure changes as the
fluids expand and contract and
the cable or feed tank physically
expand and contract.
While flow is proceeding rapidly,
the dielectric properties of the
fluids make the probability of
injection equipment becoming
energized, low. However, when
1) the flow rate decreases on
very long runs, 2) on runs with
slow-flowing splices, and 3) on
runs with excessive water in the
strands, the flow can come to a
virtual halt, or even reverse, as
the cable temperature cycles and
the feed tank temperature cycles.
Such temperature cycles cause
fluid pressure changes as the
fluids expand and contract and
the cable or feed tank physically
expand and contract.
While flow is proceeding rapidly,
the dielectric properties of the
fluids make the probability of
injection equipment becoming
energized, low. However, when
1) the flow rate decreases on
very long runs, 2) on runs with
slow-flowing splices, and 3) on
runs with excessive water in the
strands, the flow can come to a
virtual halt, or even reverse, as
the cable temperature cycles and
the feed tank temperature cycles.
Such temperature cycles cause
fluid pressure changes as the
fluids expand and contract and
the cable or feed tank physically
expand and contract.
1.3c
According to [8], feed fittings
have failed in about seven cases
where submerged transformers
flooded after major rainfalls.
Approximately 10% of feed tanks
failed in these conditions until the
injection service supplier
introduced improved container
dielectrics to separate fluids from
the surrounding ground planes.
In one case, a failure occurred as
a result, when an injection cap
was removed and a small amount
of contaminated fluid dripped
from an unplugged Elastimold
injection port.
No feed tank failures have
occurred.
No feed tank failures have
occurred.
1.3d
According to [8], flooded
transformers are encountered on
less than 1% of injected cables
during the injection or soak
phase. The event probability is
“very low”. The probability that
personnel will be present when
the failure occurs and be exposed
to an underwater flash is
“unlikely”.
Flooded transformers are
encountered on less than 0.1% of
injected cables during injection.
The event probability is “ultra
low”. The probability that
personnel will be present when
the failure occurs and be exposed
to an underwater flash is
“unlikely”.
Flooded transformers are
encountered on less than 0.1% of
injected cables during injection.
The event probability is “ultra
low”. The probability that
personnel will be present when
the failure occurs and be exposed
to an underwater flash is
“unlikely”.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
18
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
1.3e
According to [8], the
consequences to the equipment
are “low” as circuit protection
prevents consequential damage.
Because the fault occurs
submerged in the water and
much of the fault energy is
absorbed, the consequences to
personnel are ranked as
“medium”.
The consequences to the
equipment are “low” as circuit
protection prevents consequential
damage. Because the fault
occurs submerged in the water
and much of the fault energy is
absorbed, the consequences to
personnel are ranked as
“medium”.
The consequences to the
equipment are “low” as circuit
protection prevents consequential
damage. Because the fault
occurs submerged in the water
and much of the fault energy is
absorbed, the consequences to
personnel are ranked as
“medium”.
1.3f
According to [8], a warning tag
was deployed in 1998 to warn
utility line personnel of the
presence of potentially energized
injection equipment and to
provide safety instructions. Line
personnel are discouraged from
touching injection equipment.
A warning tag is attached to warn
utility line personnel of the
presence of potentially energized
injection equipment and to
provide safety instructions. Line
personnel are discouraged from
touching injection equipment.
A warning tag is attached to warn
utility line personnel of the
presence of potentially energized
injection equipment and to
provide safety instructions. Line
personnel are discouraged from
touching injection equipment.
1.3g
According to [8], line personnel
are required to use hot sticks,
rubber gloves, and other
appropriate PPE when handling
potentially energized injection
equipment. Additionally to protect
from arc flash and possible
chemical fires or explosions, line
personnel must wear flame retardant clothing and tinted glasses.
Line personnel are required to
use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and
other appropriate PPE when
handling potentially energized
injection equipment. Additionally
to protect from arc flash and
possible chemical fires or
explosions, line personnel must
wear flame retar-dant clothing
and tinted glasses.
Line personnel are required to
use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and
other appropriate PPE when
handling potentially energized
injection equipment. Additionally
to protect from arc flash and
possible chemical fires or
explosions, line personnel must
wear flame retar-dant clothing
and tinted glasses.
1.3h
Risk (50,25)
Requipment=0.05●103=50
Rpersonnel=0.05●0.05●104=25
Risk (5,2.5)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●104=2.5
Risk (5,2.5)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●104=2.5
1.4
Electrical, Injection port
flashover
Electrical, Injection port
flashover
Electrical, Injection port
flashover
Electrical, Injection port
flashover
1.4a
An injection cap (see [9] and
[10]) or plug (see [11]) is
removed from a dead-front
device such as an elbow, while
the cable is energized and the
conductor flashes to ground as
described in [12] and [13].
(Author: While the IHA identified
this risk, there was no discussion
provided in the 2001 document.
Excerpts of patent document [13]
are pasted directly into the
discussion where appropriate.)
A Reticular Flash Preventer (RFP)
is installed in the injection port to
prevent flashover. See [31] for a
complete description of the RFP
and [32] for test results.
A Reticular Flash Preventer (RFP)
is installed in the injection port to
prevent flashover. See [31] for a
complete description of the RFP
and [32] for test results.
This scenario is not possible with
this injection paradigm.
1.4b
Directly from patent [13] at
column 1, line 45:
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
19
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
“After injection of the remediation
fluid is complete, the injection
plug is withdrawn from the
injection port and is 40 replaced
with a sealing plug. Between the
time that the injection plug is
removed, and the sealing plug is
installed, the injection port is
open, and the energized
conductor of the cable is
exposed. Because of the
remediation fluid's low viscosity it
is likely to empty out of the open
injection port. Although there is
no direct electrical connection
between the conductor and the
grounded exterior of the cable
elbow, there is the danger of an
indirect electrical connection
being established between the
conductor and the grounded
exterior of the elbow.
One such indirect pathway may
be formed by contaminants that
have become entrained in the
remediation fluid. Contaminated
fluid can be drawn from the
injection port as the injection
plug is withdrawn or may simply
flow out under the force of
gravity, thereby creating partial
discharging or even a complete
conductive pathway to the
ground plane.
A second indirect pathway is
created by source molecules such
as those found in low viscosity
remediation fluid, water or other
contaminants which may be
present in the conductor. Source
molecules, also referred to as
particles, can ionize or form an
aerosol, which may become
charged in the high-voltage field.
These ionized or charged particles
may then accelerate towards the
ground plane creating a dynamic
and conductive aerial pathway.
These two known conductive
pathways, as well as any other
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
20
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
conductive pathway established
between the conductor and the
ground plane, can degrade or
destroy the injection elbow.
Therefore, a need exists to create
a barrier to block the conductive
pathway between the conductive
portion of the cable and the
ground plane to increase the life
expectancy of the injection
elbow.”
1.4c
The authors are aware of
numerous cases where flash-over
has occurred. These cases drove
the development of the U.S.
Patents 6,517,366 and
6,929,492. The interested reader
should contact the injection
service supplier for a full
accounting of actual incidents.
1.4d
The event probability is
unacceptably high on 35kV
systems, so these systems are no
longer operated energized. The
event probability on 15 and 25 kV
systems is “ultra-low.” The
probability that any personnel will
be present when the failure
occurs and exposed to a flash is
“certain.”
1.4e
The consequences to the
equipment are “high” as
transformers and bushing may be
damaged or destroyed, and the
event could precipitate a fire or
explosion. The consequences to
personnel are ranked “life
threatening.”
1.4f
Energized switching of 35kV
systems has been suspended. To
the author’s knowledge, the
inventions of U.S. Patents
6,517,366 and 6,929,492 remain
unimplemented by the injection
service supplier. The interested
reader should inquire with the
injection service supplier to
determine, if any mitigation steps
have been implemented.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
21
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
1.4g
Line personnel are required to
use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and
other appropriate PPE when
handling injection caps and plugs.
Additionally to protect from arc
flash, line personnel must wear
flame retardant clothing and
tinted glasses. The interested
reader should inquire with the
injection service supplier to
determine, if any other
consequence mitigation steps
have been implemented.
1.4h
Risk (2.5,500)
Requipment= 0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500
1.5
1.5a
1.5b
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
HVFI flashover
HVFI flashover
HVFI flashover
HVFI flashover
HVFI are proprietary devices
unavailable to users of CC3 fluid
HVFI are proprietary devices available to for use whenever live-front devices are to be connected to feed
or vacuum tanks for extended periods.
Since the late 1980s it has been standard practice in fluid rejuvenation to connect dielectric tubing,
typically nylon or polyethylene, to energized cables with the unsustained pressure rejuvenation (UPR)
paradigm. In fact, over 100 million feet have been injected in this way. In typical underground
residential distribution UPR applications, tubing is connected to a feed end of a cable and an outlet end.
These two tubes are connected to a feed bottle and receiving bottle respectively. Both bottles are
primarily plastic dielectric with some metal fittings. The tubing and connected bottles are termed
“potentially energized,” as it is at least theoretically possible that they are not at ground potential. In
practice they would almost always be very close to ground potential. On the inlet side, dielectric fluid
flows into a dielectric tube and the possibility that the tubing/fluid system will conduct electricity is
generally small. The exception is when a feed bottle is left connected for a long period of time in what is
called a “soak period.” During the soak period the flow of fluid into the cable is very close to zero and
may flow backwards as the connected cable cycles in temperature from a cycling load. More problematic
is the outlet side that begins the injection process as a course vacuum. Typically within 24 hours the
vacuum decays and the gas phase transitions to a liquid. In the worst case the liquid could be water
displaced from the strand interstices, but is more likely dielectric enhancement fluid or a desiccant fluid.
The outlet fluids also transport conductive particles such as carbon black and ions. The tubing and the
connected tanks are allowed to float electrically and for the sake of safety are handled by line personnel
as though they are energized.
Occasionally it is desirable to operate injection equipment over extended time periods and the HVFI was
introduced to add an additional layer of safety. The illustration nearby shows a typical arrangement of an
HVFI on a pole excluding mechanical support hardware. The top portion of the HVFI is connected by a
conductive metal tube to the cable injection adapter and is at system voltage. The bottom portion of the
HVFI is connected to the system ground and to a feed or receiving tank located within a metallic
enclosure. The enclosure is bonded to the system neutral. External stress control on the HVFI is
analogous to that of a live-front termination.
A high voltage fluidic interface or HVFI is a component which electrically isolates the necessarily high
voltage injection devices utilized with live-front terminations such as an injection adaptor, which must be
in contact with the conductor, from those injection tanks and tubes which must be hydraulically
connected. In other words the HVFI allows hydraulic communication, but interrupts electrical
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
22
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
communication between the
cable’s injection interface and the
bottles to which they are
connected. Up-to-date instructions
for the installation and operation of
HVFI devices are available online
at: NRI 69.
The Figure 2 provides HVFI design
details. The external design is a
35kV life-front cable termination
(3M QT-III-7686-S-8 skirted
termination), which meets or
exceeds the IEEE 48-2009
standards. The internal
components begin with 6.7 meters
(22 ft) of 1/8” OD nylon tubing and
a 0.073” ID with a total volume of
about 18.1 ml. The tubing enters
the top of the HVFI, is wound in a
descending outer helix, then an
ascending inner helix, and finally
down the axis to the bottom where
it exits. The tubing is positioned
on a polyethylene board with over
120 tube positioning cutouts
alternating between the inner helix
and the outer helix. The board is
secured to the two aluminum end
pieces and within a high density
polyethylene tube. The volume
outside of the 1/8” tubing and
inside of the 2.5” body tube is
filled with degassed dimethyl
silicone RTV liquid, which sets to a
permanent non-flowing gel. The
aluminum end caps include
dedicated electrical connections to
the system voltage at the top and
to the system ground at the
bottom. The end caps include
securing hardware so that the HVFI
may be installed in a manner
similar to a post insulator. Unlike
a post insulator, the hardware
needs only to support the HVFI.
Hydraulic-pneumatic swage-type
connections are also on each end
cap and mate with ¼” aluminum or
copper tubing. The tube at the top
of the HVFI is connected to the
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
23
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
injection adaptor. The tube at the bottom of the HVFI is attached to a feed bottle on the inlet cable end
and to a receiving bottle on the outlet cable end. On the outlet cable end a three-way ball valve is
attached to the top of the HVFI as shown in the Typical Installation Arrangement, so that a side stream of
fluid can be introduced into the HVFI.
During operation on the inlet cable end the fluid flow is initiated prior to the cable being re-energized. On
the inlet side the tubing is filled with dielectric fluid 100% of the time. On the outlet cable end there are
two stages of operation with the cable energized. Prior to the cable being energized a course vacuum
(about 25 in Hg) is applied to the receiving tank, which is connected to the HVFI, associated tubing, and
the cable. The majority of the air is removed from the system. At least 50 ml of low volatility, low
viscosity, low surface energy, dielectric fluid (Ultrinium™ 732 fluid) is introduced into the top of the HVFI
at the three-way valve. The fluid flushes through the 6.7 meters of tubing. The majority of the 50 ml of
fluid introduced flushes through the entire HVFI as the total volume within the tubing is about 18 ml. The
HVFI traps several ml of the fluid in the tubing coils with two mechanisms. First, because of the low
surface energy of the fluid it coats the tubing walls. Second, in the ascending inner coil fluid is drawn
upward by weak shear forces as the low pressure air slowly flows toward the vacuum source, but gravity
exerts a downward force on the fluid. An equilibrium is established where fluid flows upward in the coil
near the tube axis, but flows downward in the coil near the inside diameter of the tube. The perpetual
presence of the dielectric fluid blocks the path of any electrical field resisting ionization and repairs any
microscopic damage that might occur if there were partial discharges. The shear length of tubing and
thickness of the insulation layers including both the thickness of the nylon tubing and the surrounding
dimethyl silicone gel make the HVFI tolerant of partial discharge. The cable can now be energized and
Stage I begins. In this stage the tubing is filled with a mixture of air at 25 in Hg vacuum and dielectric
fluid. Stage II begins when dielectric fluid reaches the HVFI and the tubing becomes filled with dielectric
fluid.
Standards
There are no industry standards for high voltage fluidic interfaces.
Some guidance on qualification testing can be found by reviewing
appropriate standards for devices that include similar functions as the
HVFI. Appropriate engineering judgment is required for the
application of these other standards as many dimensions of those
standards will not be relevant to the design and operation of a HVFI.
IEEE 48 – IEEE Standard for Test procedures and Requirements for
Alternating-Current Cable Terminations Used on Shielded Cables
Having … Extruded Insulation Rated 2.5kV through 500 kV
As implied by the title, the scope of IEEE 48 includes only cable
terminations and hence does not apply to an HVFI, which does not
terminate a cable. However, the performance of the exterior of the
HVFI is analogous to the exterior of a termination. In fact, the
exterior of the HVFI is an IEEE 48 complaint terminator. It is a 3M
QT-III-7686-S-8 and has passed all of the IEEE 48 requirements as
per 3M’s product data sheet, “3M™ Cold Shrink Silicone Rubber
Termination Kit QT-III, 7620-S, 7680-S and 7690-S Series 5 - 34.5
kV. Test requirements include dielectric (7.1.1) and pressure leak
tests (7.1.2).
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
24
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Testing
In addition to the design testing performed for IEEE 48 of the HVFI external components, additional
testing was undertaken at Powertech Laboratories by John Vandermaar (Manger, High Voltage
Laboratory) and Kal Abdolall (Senior Research Physicist) at the behest of BC Hydro and in cooperation
with Novinium on the HVFI assembly. The researchers concluded (Oct. 12, 2007), “In our opinion this
unit is suitable for this application.” The measurements and tests undertaken were done in accordance
with the requirements of IEEE Std. 48-1996 for 25 kV insulation class equipment are outlined below:

The HVFI passed the AC dry withstand
test at 65 kV for one minute.

The HVFI passed the AC wet withstand
test at 60 kV for 10 seconds.

The HVFI passed the impulse withstand
test at 150 kV (3 positive and 3 negative
impulse waveforms).

The HVFI was energized at 14.4 kV for
6.75 hours. There was no measurable
increase in temperature above ambient
on the surface of the HVFI.
The HVFI tan delta is 3.75 and does not seem to
affect the performance of the unit, as reflected by
the low leakage current (see figure nearby) and no
measurable rise of temperature after 6.75 hrs at
14.4 kV was observed.
1.5c
Two HVFI units were placed in service on a crossing of Desolation Sound in British Columbia on October
15, 2007. Both terminations are within 100 meters of an ocean sound subject to high winds and salt
spray. The “Pollution Severity Level” is “Heavy.” (i.e. Areas generally close to the coast and exposed to
coastal spray or to strong winds carrying sand and salt, and subjected to regular condensation.) It took
approximately 100 days for fluid to flow from the inlet side HVFI to the outlet side HVFI. The HVFI units
have remained in continuous use to the day of this writing, January 19, 2011, which is over three years
with perfect performance. The Desolation Sound crossing is a worst case scenario in that typical
deployments of the HVFI would be of much shorter duration.
1.5d
The event probability is “ultra-low.” The probability that any personnel will be present if a HVFI were to
fail is “unlikely.”
1.5e
The consequences to the equipment are “low” as circuit protection will likely operate if a flashover were to
occur. The consequences to personnel if present are ranked “low” as the HVFI is at the pole top and fully
grounded.
1.5f
The HVFI is a probability mitigation device which is designed to reduce the risk of flashover.
1.5g
The HVFI is a consequence mitigation device which is designed to carry all fault current to ground so that
normal circuit protection will operate in the event of a flashover.
1.5h
Risk (2.5,500)
Requipment= 0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●103=0.025
2
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
Chemical
2a
The scope of 2 is limited to the
incremental risks associated with
injection of cables to restore
The scope of 2 is limited to the
incremental risks associated with
injection of cables to restore
The scope of 2 is limited to the
incremental risks associated with
injection of cables to restore
The scope of 2 is limited to the
incremental risks associated with
injection of cables to restore
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
25
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
dielectric performance.
dielectric performance.
dielectric performance.
dielectric performance.
2.1
Chemical, Environmental
Chemical, Environmental
Chemical, Environmental
Chemical, Environmental
2.1a
Fluid is spilled into the
environment.
Fluid is spilled into the
environment.
Fluid is spilled into the
environment.
Fluid is spilled into the
environment.
2.1b
While fluid can be spilled in
shipment, such spills are beyond
the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1
focuses upon the case where fluid
is spilled from fluid delivery
equipment. Fluid spills can be
further classified as
uncontaminated and
contaminated. The former, being
the case for unused fluid and the
later being the case where the
fluid has passed through the
cable where it may have picked
up a wide variety of substances.
Effluent samples have been
analyzed by Dow Corning and
Phillips Environmental and may
be classified RCRA hazardous
wastes. The injection supplier
has always cleaned up spills of
fluid whether or not they include
contamination.
While fluid can be spilled in
shipment, such spills are beyond
the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1
considers the case where fluid is
spilled from fluid delivery
equipment. Fluid spills can be
further classified as
uncontaminated and
contaminated. The former, being
the case for unused fluid and the
later being the case where the
fluid has passed through the
cable where it may have picked
up a wide variety of substances.
Injection equipment utilized by
this paradigm is generally not left
unattended. Both the probability
of a leak and the magnitude of a
leak are mitigated in comparison
to unattended operation. By
policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up
and the contaminated soil and
cleanup materials are disposed of
as required by local and national
law.
While fluid can be spilled in
shipment, such spills are beyond
the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1
considers the case where fluid is
spilled from fluid delivery
equipment. Fluid spills can be
further classified as
uncontaminated and
contaminated. The former, being
the case for unused fluid and the
later being the case where the
fluid has passed through the
cable where it may have picked
up a wide variety of substances.
Injection equipment utilized by
this paradigm is generally not left
unattended. Both the probability
of a leak and the magnitude of a
leak are mitigated in comparison
to unattended operation. By
policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up
and the contaminated soil and
cleanup materials are disposed of
as required by local and national
law.
While fluid can be spilled in
shipment, such spills are beyond
the scope of 2.1. This section
2.1 considers the case where
fluid is spilled from fluid delivery
equipment. Fluid spills can be
further classified as
uncontaminated and
contaminated. The former,
being the case for unused fluid
and the later being the case
where the fluid has passed
through the cable where it may
have picked up a wide variety of
substances. Injection equipment
utilized by this paradigm is
generally not left unattended.
Both the probability of a leak
and the magnitude of a leak are
mitigated in comparison to
unattended operation. By
policy, any fluid spill is cleaned
up and the contaminated soil
and cleanup materials are
disposed of as required by local
and national law.
2.1c
As described in [8], the
maximum size of a fluid spill is
limited to the size of the feed
tank. For 7-strand and 19-strand
URD applications, less than 1
gallon is available. Drop size
spills are not unusual during dayto-day injection operations.
Spills involving the entire
contents of a feed tank have not
been reported, except when a
catastrophic failure of an injection
device occurs. See 2.3.3.1.
The maximum fluid spill is the
size of the feed tank. For 7strand and 19-strand URD
applications, less than 1 gallon is
generally available. Drop size
spills are possible occurrences in
the day-to-day operations of
injection. A spill of a large
portion of fluid in a feed tank
occurred on a single occasion
when a hydraulic fitting failed.
The maximum fluid spill is the
size of the feed tank. For 7strand and 19-strand URD
applications, less than 1 gallon is
generally available. Drop size
spills are possible occurrences in
the day-to-day operations of
injection. A spill of a large
portion of fluid in a feed tank
occurred on a single occasion
when a hydraulic fitting failed.
The maximum fluid spill is the
size of the feed tank. For 7strand and 19-strand URD
applications, less than 1 gallon is
generally available. Drop size
spills are possible occurrences in
the day-to-day operations of
injection. A spill of a large
portion of fluid in a feed tank
occurred on a single occasion
when a hydraulic fitting failed.
2.1d
As outlined in [8], small, dropsize spills occur frequently. Spills
of up to one gallon occur several
times each year. The event
probability is “medium”.
Typically, injection personnel are
The event probability overall is
“very low”. Typically, injection
personnel are “quite likely” to be
present when a spill occurs.
The event probability overall is
“very low”. Typically, injection
personnel are “quite likely” to be
present when a spill occurs.
The event probability overall is
“very low”. Typically, injection
personnel are “likely” to be
present when a spill occurs.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
26
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
“likely” to be present when a spill
occurs.
2.1e
As explained in [8], there are not
substantive environmental
consequences (as defined by
RCRA) of spills of one gallon or
less of uncontaminated PMDMS
and TMMS, or of IPA with silanes.
From [8], “Worst case simulated
spills were made by Dow Corning
and the samples were submitted
to an environmental laboratory.
The spills were not RCRA
reportable. State and local laws
may be different than the Federal
RCRA statute.” Spills of
contaminated fluid onto soil are
cleaned up and disposed of
properly.
There are no significant
environmental consequences (as
defined by RCRA) of spills of one
gallon or less of pure Ultrinium™
fluid. Worst case simulated spills
of similar materials were made by
Dow Corning and the samples
were submitted to an
independent environmental
laboratory. The spills were not
RCRA reportable. State and local
laws may be different than the
Federal RCRA statute. As a
matter of Novinium policy, spills
of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are
cleaned up
There are no significant
environmental consequences (as
defined by RCRA) of spills of one
gallon or less of pure Ultrinium™
fluid. Worst case simulated spills
of similar materials were made by
Dow Corning and the samples
were submitted to an
independent environmental
laboratory. The spills were not
RCRA reportable. State and local
laws may be different than the
Federal RCRA statute. As a
matter of Novinium policy, spills
of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are
cleaned up
There are no significant
environmental consequences (as
defined by RCRA) of spills of one
gallon or less of pure Ultrinium™
fluid. Worst case simulated
spills of similar materials were
made by Dow Corning and the
samples were submitted to an
independent environmental
laboratory. The spills were not
RCRA reportable. State and
local laws may be different than
the Federal RCRA statute. As a
matter of Novinium policy, spills
of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are
cleaned up and disposed of
properly.
2.1f
As described in [8], the quick
disconnect fitting with automatic
shut-off valves were introduced
to reduce drop-size spills. The
service supplier's CPM requires
injection personnel to excavate,
properly dispose of, and replace
any contaminated soil, even
though there is no Federal
requirement to do so. Even at
low concentrations, the silane
mixture and the methyl alcohol
by-product of its reaction with
water have objectionable odors.
The service supplier’s hazard
communication program,
including the on-site availability
of MSDS sheets along with the
easily recognized odor, results in
recognition by the people likely to
be exposed to the vapors.
Novinium rejuvenation
instructions require injection
personnel to excavate, properly
dispose of, and replace any
contaminated soil, even though
there is no Federal requirement
to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the
methyl alcohol by-product of its
reaction with water have
distinctive odors even at low
vapor concentrations. Novinium’s
hazard communication program,
including the availability of the
MSDS sheets both online and on
the job site, and the distinctive
sweet odor of the Novinium
fluids, result in cognizance by the
people likely to be exposed to the
vapors.
Novinium rejuvenation
instructions require injection
personnel to excavate, properly
dispose of, and replace any
contaminated soil, even though
there is no Federal requirement
to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the
methyl alcohol by-product of its
reaction with water have
distinctive odors even at low
vapor concentrations. Novinium’s
hazard communication program,
including the availability of the
MSDS sheets both online and on
the job site, and the distinctive
sweet odor of the Novinium
fluids, result in cognizance by the
people likely to be exposed to the
vapors.
Novinium rejuvenation
instructions require injection
personnel to excavate, properly
dispose of, and replace any
contaminated soil, even though
there is no Federal requirement
to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the
methyl alcohol by-product of its
reaction with water have
distinctive odors even at low
vapor concentrations.
Novinium’s hazard
communication program,
including the availability of the
MSDS sheets both online and on
the job site, and the distinctive
sweet odor of the Novinium
fluids, result in cognizance by
the people likely to be exposed
to the vapors.
2.1g
According to [8], bacteria in the
soil metabolize mixtures of
PMDMS and TMMS to water,
carbon dioxide, and silicon
dioxide (sand). Contaminated
fluid and soil with contaminated
fluid must be disposed of at RCRA
permitted facilities.
Novinium fluids are metabolized
by bacteria in the soil or
decompose abiotically to water,
carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide
(sand), iron oxide, and other
harmless compounds. Soil
contaminated with fluid and
contaminated fluid must be
disposed of at RCRA permitted
Novinium fluids are metabolized
by bacteria in the soil or
decompose abiotically to water,
carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide
(sand), iron oxide, and other
harmless compounds. Soil
contaminated with fluid and
contaminated fluid must be
disposed of at RCRA permitted
Novinium fluids are metabolized
by bacteria in the soil or
decompose abiotically to water,
carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide
(sand), iron oxide, and other
harmless compounds. Soil
contaminated with fluid and
contaminated fluid must be
disposed of at RCRA permitted
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
27
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
facilities as per Novinium policy.
facilities as per Novinium policy.
SPR – U732
facilities as per Novinium policy.
Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of
environmental contamination are
very close to zero when the
Novinium Rejuvenation
Instructions are followed.)
2.1h
Risk (0, 0) (Note: Following CPM
procedures, the risks of
environmental contamination are
virtually zero. As discussed in (b),
there are potential environmental
consequences, if contaminated
fluids spills are not cleaned up.
Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of
environmental contamination are
very close to zero when the
Novinium Rejuvenation
Instructions are followed.)
Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of
environmental contamination are
very close to zero when the
Novinium Rejuvenation
Instructions are followed.)
2.2
Chemical, Toxicological
Chemical, Toxicological
Chemical, Toxicological
Chemical, Toxicological
2.2a
Accidental contact with CC3 fluid.
Accidental contact with P011
fluids.
Accidental contact with U732
fluids.
Accidental contact with U732
fluid.
2.2b
It would be unusual for injectors
or line personnel to have other
than incidental contact with
rejuvenation fluids. This section
identifies the risks where contact
is made for any reason.
It would be unusual for injectors
or line personnel to have other
than incidental contact with
rejuvenation fluids. This section
identifies the risks where contact
is made for any reason.
It would be unusual for injectors
or line personnel to have other
than incidental contact with
rejuvenation fluids. This section
identifies the risks where contact
is made for any reason.
It would be unusual for injectors
or line personnel to have other
than incidental contact with
rejuvenation fluids. This section
identifies the risks where contact
is made for any reason.
2.2c
There are no carcinogens listed in
the most current version of the
CC3 fluid MSDS.
P011 includes less than 0.01%w
of the carcinogen and male
reproductive toxin benzene [34].
Long term exposure to benzene
by inhalation or skin contact may
cause cancer, damage male
reproductive organs, or be a
developmental toxin to a
developing fetus.
There are no known carcinogens,
male reproductive toxins, or
developmental toxins in U732
fluids.
There are no known carcinogens,
male reproductive toxins, or
developmental toxins in U732
fluids.
2.2.1
Chemical, Inhalation
Chemical, Inhalation
Chemical, Inhalation
Chemical, Inhalation
2.2.1a
During a spill of fluid into a
confined or unconfined space an
injector may breathe some of the
vapors from the CC3 mixture
composed primarily of PMDMS
and TMMS.
During a spill of fluid into a
confined or unconfined space an
injector may breathe some of the
vapors from the P011 mixture
composed primarily of PMDMS
and isolauryl alcohol.
During a spill of fluid into a
confined or unconfined space an
injector may breathe some of the
vapors from U732 fluid.
During a spill of fluid into a
confined or unconfined space an
injector may breathe some of
the vapors from U732 fluid.
2.2.1b
In [8], it is explained that
delivery equipment is designed to
keep the fluid and its vapors
inside the container. If an
accidental spill were to occur, the
fluid reacts with moisture in the
environment and liberates methyl
alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or
methanol. Methyl alcohol is a
common component of
oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.) Like
ethyl alcohol, which can cause
intoxication, methyl alcohol has a
Fluid delivery equipment is
designed to keep the fluid, and its
vapors, within the container. If
an accidental spill does occur, the
fluid will react with moisture in
the environment. The result of
that reaction is the formation of
methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.) Like
ethyl alcohol, which can cause
intoxication, methyl alcohol has a
Fluid delivery equipment is
designed to keep the fluid, and its
vapors, within the container. If
an accidental spill does occur, the
fluid will react with moisture in
the environment. The result of
that reaction is the formation of
methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.) Like
ethyl alcohol, which can cause
intoxication, methyl alcohol has a
Fluid delivery equipment is
designed to keep the fluid, and
its vapors, within the container.
If an accidental spill does occur,
the fluid will react with moisture
in the environment. The result
of that reaction is the formation
of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.) Like
ethyl alcohol, which can cause
intoxication, methyl alcohol has
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
28
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
similar effect. Large doses of
approximately 1 ounce or more of
methyl alcohol may lead to
blindness or death. Inhalation of
1 ounce of methyl alcohol would
require prolonged exposure.
similar effect. Large doses of
approximately 1 ounce of methyl
alcohol may lead to blindness or
death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of
methyl alcohol would require
prolonged exposure.
similar effect. Large doses of
approximately 1 ounce of methyl
alcohol may lead to blindness or
death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of
methyl alcohol would require a
prolonged exposure.
a similar effect. Large doses of
approximately 1 ounce of methyl
alcohol may lead to blindness or
death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of
methyl alcohol would require a
prolonged exposure.
2.2.1c
As described in [8], methyl
alcohol concentrations were
measured in a confined space in a
mock spill. The experiment
demonstrated SCBA is required
for clean up.
On a unit weight basis, P011
fluids produce about 5% less
methanol than PMDMS/TMMS
mixtures. From [34], PMDMS
includes less than 0.01%w of the
carcinogen and male reproductive
toxin benzene. Long term
exposure to benzene by
inhalation or skin contact may
cause cancer or damage male
reproductive organs. The vapor
pressure of P011 fluid is lower
than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures.
SCBA is required for spill cleanup
in confined spaces.
On a unit weight basis, U732
fluids produce about 30% less
methanol than PMDMS/TMMS
mixtures. No known carcinogens
or male reproductive toxins are
present. The vapor pressure of
U732 fluid is at least an order of
magnitude less than
PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is
required for spill cleanup in
confined spaces.
On a unit weight basis, U732
fluids produce about 30% less
methanol than PMDMS/TMMS
mixtures. No known
carcinogens or male
reproductive toxins are present.
The vapor pressure of U732 fluid
is at least an order of magnitude
less than PMDMS/TMMS
mixtures. SCBA is required for
spill cleanup in confined spaces.
2.2.1d
As outlined in [8], spills greater
than a few drops have been
uncommon. Two instances were
reported in confined spaces and
SCBA was required. The event
ranking is “ultra-low” and the
personnel present ranking is
“likely”.
Spills of any size have been
uncommon at Novinium. The
event ranking is “ultra-low” and
the personnel present ranking is
“likely”.
Spills of any size have been
uncommon at Novinium. The
event ranking is “ultra-low” and
the personnel present ranking is
“likely”.
Spills of any size have been
uncommon at Novinium. The
event ranking is “ultra-low” and
the personnel present ranking is
“likely”.
2.2.1e
As recounted in [8], no damage
to equipment or injury to
personnel has been experienced.
Prolonged exposure to methyl
alcohol vapors may cause
blindness or death. The
equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
No damage to equipment or
injury to personnel has been
experienced. Prolonged exposure
to methanol vapors may cause
blindness or death. The
equipment ranking is “not
possible”. From [34], prolonged
exposure to benzene by
inhalation may cause cancer or
damage to male reproductive
organs. The equipment ranking
is “not possible”, the personnel
ranking is “life threatening”.
No damage to equipment or
injury to personnel has been
experienced. Prolonged exposure
to methanol vapors may cause
blindness or death. The
equipment ranking is “not
possible”. Because there is 30%
less methanol, the vapor pressure
is lower and there is no known
carcinogen or male reproductive
toxins present. The personnel
ranking is ½ that of the other
paradigm.
No damage to equipment or
injury to personnel has been
experienced. Prolonged
exposure to methanol vapors
may cause blindness or death.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”. Because there is 30%
less methanol, the vapor
pressure is lower and there is no
known carcinogen or male
reproductive toxins present. The
personnel ranking is ½ that of
the other paradigm.
2.2.1f
From [8], equipment is designed
to limit the maximum flow rate of
fluid. This reduces the size of
spills during attended portions of
operations. Flow-restricting
orifices and very small diameter
tubing restrict fluid flow.
All Novinium injection equipment
is designed with flow rate
restricting features. Injection
adaptors and injection tools are
typically operated at one-third of
their design pressures. All
injection adaptors seal fluid inside
All Novinium injection equipment
is designed with flow rate
restricting features. Injection
adaptors and injection tools are
typically operated at one-third of
their design pressures. All
injection adaptors seal fluid inside
All Novinium injection equipment
is designed with flow rate
restricting features. Injection
adaptors and injection tools are
typically operated at one-third of
their design pressures. All
injection adaptors seal fluid
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
29
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Injection tanks are over-designed
to make leaks less likely.
of the cable and are inspected for
leaks before replacing elbows or
splices.
of the cable and are inspected for
leaks before replacing elbows or
splices.
inside of the cable and are
inspected for leaks before
replacing elbows or splices.
2.2.1g
Use SCBA and aggressive
ventilation in confined spaces.
Use SCBA and ample ventilation
in confined spaces.
Use SCBA and ample ventilation
in confined spaces.
Use SCBA and ample ventilation
in confined spaces.
2.2.1h
Risk (0,375)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106=375
Risk (0,375)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106= 375
Risk (0,188)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106/2=188
Risk (0,188)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=.0005●0.75●106/2=188
2.2.2
Chemical, Oral
Chemical, Oral
Chemical, Oral
Chemical, Oral
2.2.2a
Ingestion or CC3 fluid (PMDMSTMMS mixture). While the IHA
[8] identified this risk, there was
no discussion provided in the
2001 document.
Ingestion of P011 fluid.
Ingestion of U732 fluid.
Ingestion of U732 fluid.
2.2.2b
If CC3 fluid is consumed, the fluid
will react with water in the
stomach and generate methyl
alcohol. (Also known as wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.)
Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms
similar to intoxication with ethyl
alcohol. Large doses of methyl
alcohol may cause blindness or
death. For a typical man, a large
dose would require ingestion of
about 3 ounces of the
PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which
upon reaction with water yields
about an ounce of methyl alcohol.
If P011 fluid is consumed, the
fluid will react with water in the
stomach and generate methyl
alcohol. (Also known as wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.)
Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms
similar to intoxication with ethyl
alcohol. Large doses of methyl
alcohol may cause blindness or
death. For a typical man, a large
dose would require ingestion of
about 3 ounces of Perficio fluid,
which upon reaction with water
yields about an ounce of methyl
alcohol.
If U732 fluid is consumed, the
fluid will react with water in the
stomach and generate methyl
alcohol. (Also known as wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.)
Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms
similar to intoxication with ethyl
alcohol. Large doses of methyl
alcohol may cause blindness or
death. For a typical man, a large
dose would require ingestion of
about 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid,
which upon reaction with water
yields about an ounce of methyl
alcohol.
If U732 fluid is consumed, the
fluid will react with water in the
stomach and generate methyl
alcohol. (Also known as wood
alcohol or methanol. Methyl
alcohol is a common component
of oxygenated gasoline and
windshield washer solvent.)
Methyl alcohol imparts
symptoms similar to intoxication
with ethyl alcohol. Large doses
of methyl alcohol may cause
blindness or death. For a typical
man, a large dose would require
ingestion of about 4 ounces of
Ultrinium fluid, which upon
reaction with water yields about
an ounce of methyl alcohol.
2.2.2c
There has very likely never been
an incident of ingestion as the
fluid has an extremely bitter
taste.
There has never been an incident
of ingestion, because the fluid
has an extremely bitter taste.
There has never been an incident
of ingestion, because the fluid
has an extremely bitter taste.
There has never been an
incident of ingestion, because
the fluid has an extremely bitter
taste.
2.2.2d
The event ranking is “not
possible” with personnel present
being “not possible”.
The event ranking is “not
possible” with personnel present
being “not possible”.
The event ranking is “not
possible” with personnel present
being “not possible”.
The event ranking is “not
possible” with personnel present
being “not possible”.
2.2.2e
Ingestion of approximately 3
ounces of PMDMS/TMMS mixture
may cause blindness or death.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
Ingestion of approximately 3
ounces of Perficio fluid may cause
blindness or death. The
equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
Ingestion of approximately 4
ounces of Ultrinium fluid may
cause blindness or death. The
equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
Ingestion of approximately 4
ounces of Ultrinium fluid may
cause blindness or death. The
equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
Because of the extremely bitter
taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would
have to be suicidal and
Because of the extremely bitter
taste of Ultrinium fluid, one
would have to be suicidal and
Because of the extremely bitter
Because of the extremely bitter
taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would
taste of silanes, one would have
have to be suicidal and
to be suicidal and masochistic to
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
2.2.2f
30
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
choose this method of ending
one’s life. Methanol, which tastes
just like ethanol, is easily
available in windshield washer
fluid and when mixed with orange
juice would be a more palatable
option.
masochistic to choose this
method of ending one’s life.
Methanol, which tastes just like
ethanol, is easily available in
windshield washer fluid and when
mixed with orange juice would be
a more palatable option.
masochistic to choose this
method of ending one’s life.
Methanol, which tastes just like
ethanol, is easily available in
windshield washer fluid and when
mixed with orange juice would be
a more palatable option.
masochistic to choose this
method of ending one’s life.
Methanol, which tastes just like
ethanol, is easily available in
windshield washer fluid and
when mixed with orange juice
would be a more palatable
option.
2.2.2g
If ingested, rush to doctor, do not
induce vomiting. Treat with
ethanol and copious amounts of
water.
If ingested, rush to doctor, do not
induce vomiting. Treat with
ethanol and copious amounts of
water.
If ingested, rush to doctor, do not
induce vomiting. Treat with
ethanol and copious amounts of
water.
If ingested, rush to doctor, do
not induce vomiting. Treat with
ethanol and copious amounts of
water.
2.2.2h
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0
2.2.3
Chemical, Skin
Chemical, Skin
Chemical, Skin
Chemical, Skin
2.2.3a
Contact of CC3 fluid
(PMDMS/TMMS mixture) with
skin. While the IHA [8] identified
this risk, there was no discussion
provided in the 2001 document.
Contact of P011 fluid with skin.
Contact of U732 fluid with skin.
Contact of U732 fluid with skin.
2.2.3b
If PMDMS/TMMS mixture is in
contact with skin the fluid will
remove water and extract natural
oils from the skin, which may
cause irritation and some
redness.
If PMDMS mixture is in contact
with skin, some small amount of
benzene will diffuse into the
body. Benzene is a carcinogen
and male reproductive toxin. The
fluid will also remove water and
extract natural oils from the skin,
which may cause irritation and
some redness. All injection
equipment is of low drip design to
minimize the possibility of
contact.
If U732 fluid is in contact with
skin, water and natural oils will
be extracted from the skin, which
will likely cause irritation and
some redness. All injection
equipment is of low drip design to
minimize the possibility of
contact.
If U732 fluid is in contact with
skin, water and natural oils will
be extracted from the skin,
which will likely cause irritation
and some redness. All injection
equipment is of low drip design
to minimize the possibility of
contact.
2.2.3c
The author is not aware of any
documented cases of cancer or
male infertility, which have been
directly linked to dermal exposure
of PMDMS/TMMS. To the author’s
knowledge, all cases of skin
irritation have been temporary.
The interested reader should
inquire directly with the injection
service supplier.
The author is not aware of any
documented cases of cancer or
male infertility, which have been
directly linked to dermal exposure
of PMDMS. There have not been
any incidences of irritated skin.
There have not been any
incidences of irritated skin.
There have not been any
incidences of irritated skin.
2.2.3d
The event ranking is “very low”
with personnel present being
“certain”.
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
because of the elimination of the
soak period; personnel present
being “certain”.
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
because of the elimination of the
soak period; personnel present
being “certain”.
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
with personnel present being
“certain”.
2.2.3e
Consequences range from minor
Consequences range from minor
Minor skin irritation is possible.
Minor skin irritation is possible.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
31
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
skin irritation to male infertility to
contributory death by cancer.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
skin irritation to male infertility to
contributory death by cancer.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “low”.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “low”.
2.2.3f
Plastic or elastomeric gloves
should be worn when there is a
chance of contact with fluid.
Plastic or elastomeric gloves
should be worn when there is a
chance of contact with fluid.
Plastic or elastomeric gloves
should be worn when there is a
chance of contact with fluid.
Plastic or elastomeric gloves
should be worn when there is a
chance of contact with fluid.
2.2.3g
When dermal contact does occur,
wash with soap and warm water.
Apply moisturizing lotion to
prevent redness due to drying.
When dermal contact does occur,
wash with soap and warm water.
Apply moisturizing lotion to
prevent redness due to drying.
When dermal contact does occur,
wash with soap and warm water.
Apply moisturizing lotion to
prevent redness due to drying.
When dermal contact does
occur, wash with soap and warm
water. Apply moisturizing lotion
to prevent redness due to
drying.
2.2.3h
Risk (0,5000)
Requipment=0.005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.005●1.0●106=5000
Risk (0,500)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●106=500
Risk (0,5)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103=5
Risk (0,5)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103=5
2.2.4
Chemical, Eyes
Chemical, Eyes
Chemical, Eyes
Chemical, Eyes
2.2.4a
Contact of CC3 fluid with the
eyes. While the IHA [8] identified
this risk, there was no discussion
provided in the 2001 document.
Contact of P011 fluid with the
eyes.
Contact of U732 fluid with the
eyes.
Contact of U732 fluid with the
eyes.
2.2.4b
When CC3 fluid gets into the eyes
of personnel, it displaces tears
and creates an unpleasant, dry
feeling.
When P011 fluid gets into the
eyes of personnel it displaces
tears and creates an unpleasant,
dry feeling.
When U732 fluid gets into the
eyes of personnel it displaces
tears and creates an unpleasant,
dry feeling.
When U732 fluid gets into the
eyes of personnel it displaces
tears and creates an unpleasant,
dry feeling.
2.2.4c
The author is not aware of any
cases where fluid contact injured
the eyes of injection personnel.
The interested reader should
inquire directly with the injection
service supplier.
There have not been any
incidences of fluid in eyes.
There have not been any
incidences of fluid in eyes.
There have not been any
incidences of fluid in eyes.
2.2.4d
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
with personnel present being
“certain”.
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
with personnel present being
“certain”.
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
with personnel present being
“certain”.
The event ranking is “ultra-low”
with personnel present being
“certain”.
2.2.4e
Eyes can become very irritated.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “low”.
Eyes can become very irritated.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “low”.
Eyes can become very irritated.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “low”.
Eyes can become very irritated.
The equipment ranking is “not
possible”, the personnel ranking
is “low”.
2.2.4f
Safety glasses with side shields
should be worn at all times
around pressurized fluid.
Safety glasses with side shields
should be worn at all times
around pressurized fluid.
Safety glasses with side shields
should be worn at all times
around pressurized fluid.
Safety glasses with side shields
should be worn at all times
around pressurized fluid.
2.2.4g
A portable eye wash should be
nearby when working with
pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes
thoroughly if exposure occurs.
A portable eye wash should be
nearby when working with
pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes
thoroughly if exposure occurs.
A portable eye wash should be
nearby when working with
pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes
thoroughly if exposure occurs.
A portable eye wash should be
nearby when working with
pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes
thoroughly if exposure occurs.
2.2.4h
Risk (0,0.5)
Risk (0,0.5)
Risk (0,0.5)
Risk (0,0.5)
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
32
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5
2.3
Chemical, Fire/Explosion
Chemical, Fire/Explosion
Chemical, Fire/Explosion
Chemical, Fire/Explosion
2.3a
Incremental fire/explosion
hazards associated with cable
injection.
Incremental fire/explosion
hazards associated with cable
injection.
Incremental fire/explosion
hazards associated with cable
injection.
Incremental fire/explosion
hazards associated with cable
injection.
2.3b
There are three ingredients
required to experience fire or
explosion. They are a source of
ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a
component of air). Sources of
ignition abound in medium
voltage electrical environments.
Injection technology introduces a
fuel. There is a fourth
requirement to create an
explosion. Either the fuel and air
must be mixed in a sufficiently
large quantity that the flame
front has time to accelerate to
the speed of sound, or the
flammable mixture of fuel and air
must be confined. The ease with
which a fluid ignites is measured
by its flash point. The flash point
is the temperature of the fluid
where the vapor pressure of the
fluid is sufficiently high to provide
enough vapor to exceed the lower
flammability limit in air with an
ASTM prescribed geometry and
rate of temperature rise. The
lower the flash point the easier it
is to ignite and the more
dangerous the fluid.
As described in [8],
PMDMS/TMMS mixtures may be a
source of fuel. Injection
equipment is pressurized with
helium, so there is no oxygen
present. Injected cables are
flushed with nitrogen, so there is
no oxygen present. For a fire to
be possible, either air must leak
into the injection devices or fluid
must leak out.
Flash points from referenced
MSDSs of several materials are
listed in the table below:
There are three ingredients
required to experience fire or
explosion. They are a source of
ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a
component of air). Sources of
ignition abound in medium voltage
electrical environments. Injection
technology introduces a fuel.
There is a fourth requirement to
create an explosion. Either the
fuel and air must be mixed in a
sufficiently large quantity that the
flame front has time to accelerate
to the speed of sound, or the
flammable mixture of fuel and air
must be confined. The ease with
which a fluid ignites is measured
by its flash point. The flash point
is the temperature of the fluid
where the vapor pressure of the
fluid is sufficiently high to provide
enough vapor to exceed the lower
flammability limit in air with an
ASTM prescribed geometry and
rate of temperature rise. The
lower the flash point the easier it is
to ignite and the more dangerous
the fluid.
P011 fluids may be a source of
fuel. Within the injection
equipment and cables being
injected there is only carbon
dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert
and does not support combustion.
Either air must leak into the
injection devices or fluid must leak
out to create a potentially
flammable mixture. After the
injection is complete, the fluid is
sealed inside the cable in an
equipotential zone and no electrical
discharge is possible. If fluid leaks
from an injected cable, the spilled
There are three ingredients
required to experience fire or
explosion. They are a source of
ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a
component of air). Sources of
ignition abound in medium voltage
electrical environments. Injection
technology introduces a fuel.
There is a fourth requirement to
create an explosion. Either the
fuel and air must be mixed in a
sufficiently large quantity that the
flame front has time to accelerate
to the speed of sound, or the
flammable mixture of fuel and air
must be confined. The ease with
which a fluid ignites is measured
by its flash point. The flash point
is the temperature of the fluid
where the vapor pressure of the
fluid is sufficiently high to provide
enough vapor to exceed the lower
flammability limit in air with an
ASTM prescribed geometry and
rate of temperature rise. The
lower the flash point the easier it is
to ignite and the more dangerous
the fluid.
U732 fluids may be a source of
fuel. Within the injection
equipment and cables being
injected there is only carbon
dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert
and does not support combustion.
Either air must leak into the
injection devices or fluid must leak
out to create a potentially
flammable mixture. After the
injection is complete, the fluid is
sealed inside the cable in an
equipotential zone and no electrical
discharge is possible. If fluid leaks
from an injected cable, the spilled
There are three ingredients
required to experience fire or
explosion. They are a source of
ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a
component of air). Sources of
ignition abound in medium
voltage electrical environments.
Injection technology introduces
a fuel. There is a fourth
requirement to create an
explosion. Either the fuel and
air must be mixed in a
sufficiently large quantity that
the flame front has time to
accelerate to the speed of
sound, or the flammable mixture
of fuel and air must be confined.
The ease with which a fluid
ignites is measured by its flash
point. The flash point is the
temperature of the fluid where
the vapor pressure of the fluid is
sufficiently high to provide
enough vapor to exceed the
lower flammability limit in air
with an ASTM prescribed
geometry and rate of
temperature rise. The lower the
flash point the easier it is to
ignite and the more dangerous
the fluid.
U732 fluids may be a source of
fuel. Within the injection
equipment and cables being
injected there is only carbon
dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert
and does not support
combustion. Either air must leak
into the injection devices or fluid
must leak out to create a
potentially flammable mixture.
The Novinium SPR process is
applied to deenergized devices
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
33
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
Material
Flash
Unleaded
Gasoline
-49°F (-45°C)
CC/SD
32°F (0°C)
CC3
55°F (13°C)
Jet Fuel A
100°F (38°C)
P011 fluid
>142°F (61°C)
PMDMS
142°F (61°C)
U732 fluids
>144°F (62°C)
Hydrolyzed
U732 fluids
>212°F
(100°C)
CC3
hydrolyzate
>212°F
(100°C)
U733 fluid
>248°F
(120°C)
CC/SD (strand desiccant) does
not have a significant impact on
the potential post-failure
scenarios discussed in this
section, since it is flushed from
the cable during the injection
phase of the process. The CC3
fluid is made up primarily of two
components, PMDMS and TMMS.
TMMS is more volatile and causes
the initially low flash point of CC3
fluid. PMDMS has a flash point of
142°F. The more volatile TMMS
fluid diffuses quickly into the
insulation. The flash point of the
mixture in the strand interstices
increases to about the flash point
of PMDMS after a year or two
within typical cables. After the
TMMS has essentially exuded
from the cable, the flash point
continues to increase and
approaches 212°F as the PMDMS
monomer oligomerizes (reacts
with water and condenses in the
presence of a catalyst). In the
flash point table nearby, the
material, which is the end result
of this condensation process, is
referred to as “CC3 hydrolyzate.
In cables, both PMDMS and
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
fluid may be exposed to sources of fluid may be exposed to sources of and hence there is generally not
ignition.
ignition.
a source of ignition. After the
injection is complete, the fluid is
sealed inside the cable in an
Flash points of various materials
Flash points of various materials
equipotential zone and no
are listed in the table below:
are listed in the table below:
electrical discharge is possible.
Material
Flash
Material
Flash
If fluid leaks from an injected
Unleaded
-49°F (-45°C)
Unleaded
-49°F (-45°C)
cable, the spilled fluid may be
Gasoline
Gasoline
exposed to sources of ignition.
CC/SD
32°F (0°C)
CC/SD
32°F (0°C)
CC3
55°F (13°C)
CC3
55°F (13°C)
Jet Fuel A
100°F (38°C)
Jet Fuel A
100°F (38°C)
P011 fluid
>142°F (61°C)
P011 fluid
>142°F (61°C)
PMDMS
142°F (61°C)
PMDMS
142°F (61°C)
U732 fluids
>144°F (62°C)
U732 fluids
>144°F (62°C)
Hydrolyzed
U732 fluids
>212°F
(100°C)
Hydrolyzed
U732 fluids
>212°F
(100°C)
CC3
hydrolyzate
>212°F
(100°C)
CC3
hydrolyzate
U733 fluid
>248°F
(120°C)
U733 fluid
The flash point of Perficio fluid
increases toward that of CC3
hydrolyzate as the silane
monomer oligomerize in power
cables.
Flash points of various materials
are listed in the table below:
Material
Flash
Unleaded
Gasoline
-49°F (-45°C)
CC/SD
32°F (0°C)
CC3
55°F (13°C)
>212°F
(100°C)
Jet Fuel A
100°F (38°C)
P011 fluid
>142°F (61°C)
>248°F
(120°C)
PMDMS
142°F (61°C)
U732 fluids
>144°F (62°C)
Hydrolyzed
U732 fluids
>212°F
(100°C)
CC3
hydrolyzate
>212°F
(100°C)
U733 fluid
>248°F
(120°C)
The flash point of Ultrinium fluids
increases toward that of
hydrolyzed Ultrinium fluids as the
silane monomers oligomerize in
power cables.
The flash point of Ultrinium
fluids increases toward that of
hydrolyzed Ultrinium fluids as
the silane monomers oligomerize
in power cables.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
34
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
mixtures of PMDMS and TMMS
end up as the same mixture of
condensed PMDMS oligomers.
The resulting mixture of PMDMS
oligomers is realized about five to
twelve years after treatment.
The actual time depends upon the
cable geometry, the operating
temperature of the cable, and the
amount of water available inside
the cable.
2.3.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Storage
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Storage
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Storage
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Storage
2.3.1a
All storage of fluids is at service
supplier facilities.
All storage of fluids is at service
supplier facilities.
All storage of fluids is at service
supplier facilities.
All storage of fluids is at service
supplier facilities.
2.3.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Transportation
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Transportation
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Transportation
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Transportation
2.3.2a
All transfer and transport of fluids
to and from the job site is the
responsibility of the service
supplier.
All transfer and transport of fluids
to and from the job site is the
responsibility of the service
supplier.
All transfer and transport of fluids
to and from the job site is the
responsibility of the service
supplier.
All transfer and transport of
fluids to and from the job site is
the responsibility of the service
supplier.
2.3.2a
According to [8], cables or cable
accessories may fail during the
injection, soak, or post-soak.
URD circuits are typically injected
at 20 psig or less and soaked at
about 10 psig. After a soak
period of 60-90 days, the delivery
pressure is zero. The quantity of
fluid, which can leak and the flow
rate at which it leaks, is related
to 1) the feed or soak pressure,
2) head pressure from a change
in elevation, 3) the distance from
a pressurized feed tank, and 4)
the vapor pressure of the fluid in
the strands. Head pressure due
to elevation changes could be a
problem because of the pressure
limits on the elbow seal and the
splice seal. The distance from the
feed tank has a large impact,
because significant sustained flow
is unlikely on the vacuum end of
typical cable lengths. This slow
flow is a result of the resistance
to flow through the cable. The
total fluid available also varies
depending on the injection status
Cables or cable accessories may
fail during the injection or postinjection periods. URD circuits
are typically injected at 20 psig or
less. The quantity of fluid, which
can leak and the flow rate at
which it leaks, is related to 1) the
feed pressure, 2) head pressure
from a change in elevation, 3)
the distance from a pressurized
feed tank, and 4) the vapor
pressure of the fluid in the
strands. Head pressure due to
elevation changes could be a
problem because of the pressure
limits on elbow and splice seals.
The distance from the feed tank
has a large impact, because
significant sustained flow is
unlikely on the vacuum end of
typical cable lengths. This slow
flow is a result of the resistance
to flow through the cable. The
total fluid available also varies
depending on the injection status
and the length and geometry of
the cable. During the injection, a
reservoir of up to one-gallon of
Cables or cable accessories may
fail during the injection or postinjection periods. URD circuits
are typically injected at 20 psig or
less. The quantity of fluid, which
can leak and the flow rate at
which it leaks, is related to 1) the
feed pressure, 2) head pressure
from a change in elevation, 3)
the distance from a pressurized
feed tank, and 4) the vapor
pressure of the fluid in the
strands. Head pressure due to
elevation changes could be a
problem because of the pressure
limits on elbow and splice seals.
The distance from the feed tank
has a large impact, because
significant sustained flow is
unlikely on the vacuum end of
typical cable lengths. This slow
flow is a result of the resistance
to flow through the cable. The
total fluid available also varies
depending on the injection status
and the length and geometry of
the cable. During the injection, a
reservoir of up to one-gallon of
With the SPR injection paradigm,
fluid is not injected into
energized cables and hence the
injection, soak, and post-soak
periods do not apply. Fluid is
sealed inside the cable with
metallic pins. All pins are
inspected for leaks before
replacing elbows and splices.
Any head pressure due to
elevation will be contained by
the injection adaptors. Pressure
in the post injection period
decays exponentially as
generally suggested by the
graph below. The actual decay
rate is faster at higher
temperatures. The maximum
leak size is a fraction of the
injected fluid. NRI 99 available
at www.novinium.com provides
guidance on maximum spill
sizes.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
35
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
and the length and geometry of
the cable. During the injection
and soak phases, a reservoir of
up to one-gallon of fluid (more
typically half that amount) can
provide fluid for a leak. After the
feed or soak bottle is removed
(post-injection), there is typically
less than 1 gallon in the strand
interstices for every 1000 feet of
cable. The fluid reservoir in the
strands decreases continuously
after the injection soak bottles
are removed. In addition to the
injection pressure and head
pressure, the other source of
pressure is the fluid vapor
pressure. All materials exhibit
vapor pressure. As an example,
water has a vapor pressure,
which increases to 14.7 psia (1
atmosphere of pressure) at its
boiling point of 100°C (212°F).
According to [8], CC3 fluid has a
vapor pressure of 6.4 psia at
30°C, 9.5 psia at 60°C, and
about 21.7 psia at 90°C. The
TMMS component of CC3,
however, diffuses quite rapidly
out of the cable strands, and
once it is gone (6 to 30 months
depending upon temperature and
geometry); the vapor pressure of
the remaining fluid is less than
that of water. Note that all
pressures are in psia (pounds per
square inch, absolute) and hence
in the closed environment inside
a cable, there is effectively no
pressure until the vapor pressure
exceeds 14.7 psia, which is
typical atmospheric pressure at
sea level.
fluid (more typically half that
amount) can provide fluid for a
leak. After the feed bottle is
removed (post-injection), there is
typically less than 1 gallon in the
strand interstices for every 1000
feet of cable. The fluid reservoir
in the strands decreases
continuously after the injection
bottles are removed. In addition
to the injection pressure and
head pressure, the other source
of pressure is the fluid vapor
pressure. All materials exhibit
vapor pressure. As an example,
water has a vapor pressure,
which increases to 14.7 psia (1
atmosphere of pressure) at its
boiling point of 100°C (212°F).
P011 fluid has a vapor pressure
below 2 psia at 130°C.
fluid (more typically half that
amount) can provide fluid for a
leak. After the feed bottle is
removed (post-injection), there is
typically less than 1 gallon in the
strand interstices for every 1000
feet of cable. The fluid reservoir
in the strands decreases
continuously after the injection
bottles are removed. In addition
to the injection pressure and
head pressure, the other source
of pressure is the fluid vapor
pressure. All materials exhibit
vapor pressure. As an example,
water has a vapor pressure,
which increases to 14.7 psia (1
atmosphere of pressure) at its
boiling point of 100°C (212°F).
U732 fluid has a vapor pressure
below 2 psia at 130°C.
2.3.3
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection
2.3.3a
Ignition of leaking fluid from
injected distribution component
failure or fluid delivery systems.
Ignition of leaking fluid from
injected distribution component
failure or fluid delivery systems.
Ignition of leaking fluid from
injected distribution component
failure or fluid delivery systems.
Ignition of leaking fluid from
injected distribution component
failure or fluid delivery systems.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
36
SPR – U732
500
Pressure Decay (1/0 cable at 25°C)
30 psig
450
240 psig
400
480 psig
350
300
P re s s u re (p s ig )
Code
250
200
150
100
50
Elapsed Time (days)
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Besides the injection pressure
and pressure from hydrostatic
head changes, there is one other
source of pressure, which affects
the leak rate and leak
characteristics. Every liquid has
a characteristic vapor pressure.
Water, for example, has a vapor
pressure, which increases to
14.7 psia (1 bar or 1
atmosphere of pressure) at its
boiling point of 100°C (212°F).
U732 fluid has a vapor pressure
below 2 psia at 130°C.
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.3.3.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical failure
2.3.3.1a
When a cable or component fails,
a hole is blow in its side. If fluid
remains present in the cable or
cable component, some will leak.
When a cable fails, a hole is blow
in its side. If fluid is present in
the cable, some will leak.
When a cable fails, a hole is blow
in its side. If fluid is present in
the cable, some will leak.
When a cable fails, a hole is blow
in its side. If fluid is present in
the cable, some will leak.
2.3.3.1.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
Electrical Failure, Cable
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
Electrical Failure, Cable
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
Electrical Failure, Cable
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic Electrical
Failure, Cable
2.3.3.1.1a
When a cable fails, a hole is
blown in its side. If fluid remains
in the strands, some may leak.
When a cable fails, a hole is
blown in its side. If fluid remains
in the strands, some may leak.
When a cable fails, a hole is
blown in its side. If fluid remains
in the strands, some may leak.
When a cable fails, a hole is
blown in its side. If fluid remains
in the strands, some may leak.
2.3.3.1.1b
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried cable, a lack of oxygen will
preclude a fire. If the failure and
leak occur within a transformer,
fluid may leak within a confined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure
and an accompanying leak occur
on a riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.4)
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried cable, a lack of oxygen will
preclude a fire. If the failure and
leak occur within a transformer,
fluid may leak within a confined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure
and its accompanying leak occur
on a riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.4)
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried cable, a lack of oxygen will
preclude a fire. If the failure and
leak occur within a transformer,
fluid may leak within a confined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure
and its accompanying leak occur
on a riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.4)
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried cable, a lack of oxygen
will preclude a fire. If the failure
and leak occur within a
transformer, fluid may leak
within a confined space. (See
2.3.3.1.3) If a failure and its
accompanying leak occur on a
riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.3.3.1.4)
2.3.3.1.1c
There have been no reported
failures of cable, which have
resulted in chemical fires.
There have been no reported
failures of cable, which have
resulted in chemical fires.
There have been no reported
failures of cable, which have
resulted in chemical fires.
There have been no reported
failures of cable, which have
resulted in chemical fires.
2.3.3.1.1d
During the period encompassing
1985 to 2000, approximately
0.6% of over 7 million feet of
cables treated have failed for any
reason. Approximately 0.4% (2/3
of the total failures) are cable
failures.
The failure rate for this paradigm
is currently zero. It is anticipated
that the cable failure rate will be
superior to UPR with soak – CC3.
The failure rate for this paradigm
is currently zero. It is anticipated
that the cable failure rate will be
superior to UPR with soak – CC3.
The total SPR – U732 failure rate
is about half that for UPR – CC3.
2.3.3.1.1e
See subcategory detail below.
See subcategory detail below.
See subcategory detail below.
See subcategory detail below.
2.3.3.1.1f
CC3 imparts more rapid
improvement in dielectric
performance than PMDMS alone
reducing the possibility of
dielectric failure. (Author:
TMMS, which imparted the more
rapid improvement, was reduced
in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per
the supplier’s MSDS [14] and
[24]. Current PMDMS/TMMS
P011 fluids delivered with UPR
should enjoy superior postinjection reliability because of
improvements to the catalysis.
U732 fluids delivered with UPR
should enjoy superior postinjection reliability because of
improvements to the catalysis
and the presence of organic
functionality to add voltage, UV
and PD stabilizers.
U732 fluids delivered with SPR
increase dielectric strength 87
times faster than the pre-2005
PMDMS/TMMS mixture that is no
longer in use, greatly reducing
the possibility of dielectric
failure.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
37
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Cable, Direct buried
mixture will not enjoy the same
rate of dielectric improvement as
its predecessor fluid.)
2.3.3.1.1.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable, Direct
buried
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable, Direct
buried
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable, Direct
buried
2.3.3.1.1.1a
Treated direct buried cable fails.
Treated direct buried cable fails.
Treated direct buried cable fails.
Treated direct buried cable fails.
2.3.3.1.1.1b
Lack of oxygen precludes fire or
explosion.
Lack of oxygen precludes fire or
explosion.
Lack of oxygen precludes fire or
explosion.
Lack of oxygen precludes fire or
explosion.
2.3.3.1.1.1c
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.3.3.1.1.1d
Approximately 60 cables failed
during the period from 1985 to
2000. The probability that a cable
failure occurs in the direct buried
portion of the cable is
approximately 340/350 or 97%
as only 3% is typically exposed at
transformers or splice boxes. The
event ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
The probability that a cable
failure occurs in the direct buried
portion of the cable is
approximately 340/350 or 97%
as only 3% is typically exposed at
transformers or splice boxes. The
event ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
The probability that a cable
failure occurs in the direct buried
portion of the cable is
approximately 340/350 or 97%
as only 3% is typically exposed at
transformers or splice boxes. The
event ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
The probability that a cable
failure occurs in the direct buried
portion of the cable is
approximately 340/350 or 97%
as only 3% is typically exposed
at transformers or splice boxes.
The event ranking is “very low”;
the personnel present ranking is
“not possible”.
2.3.3.1.1.1e
System protection will trip when
a cable faults.
System protection will trip when
a cable faults.
System protection will trip when
a cable faults.
System protection will trip when
a cable faults.
2.3.3.1.1.1f
CC2 (PMDMS/TMMS) fluid
provides a more rapid
improvement in dielectric
performance than PMDMS alone,
reducing the possibility of
dielectric failure. (Author: The
TMMS ingredient, which imparted
the more rapid improvement, was
reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6
as per [14] and [24]. Post-2005
PMDMS/TMMS fluid will suffer a
slower rate of dielectric
improvement.)
P011 fluid provides a rapid
improvement in dielectric
performance, reducing the
possibility of dielectric failure.
U732 fluid provides a rapid
improvement in dielectric
performance, reducing the
possibility of dielectric failure.
U732 fluids delivered by SPR
increase dielectric strength 87
times faster than the CC2 fluid
that is no longer in use, greatly
reducing the possibility of
dielectric failure.
2.3.3.1.1.1g
No data available on repeat
failures. The interested reader
should inquire directly with the
injection service supplier.
There have been zero
occurrences of second faults with
this technology.
There have been zero
occurrences of second faults with
this technology.
There have been zero
occurrences of second faults with
this technology.
2.3.3.1.1.1h
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
38
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.3.3.1.1.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable, Duct
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable, Duct
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable, Duct
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Cable, Duct
2.3.3.1.1.2a
Treated cable in duct fails.
Treated cable in duct fails.
Treated cable in duct fails.
Treated cable in duct fails.
2.3.3.1.1.2b
A small fire at the failure site is
possible, but the fire should
extinguish itself as it will be
starved for oxygen. Fluid may
flow down the duct and
accumulate in a manhole or hand
hole. (See 2.3.3.1.3)
A small fire at the failure site is
possible, but the fire should
extinguish itself as it will be
starved for oxygen. Fluid may
flow down the duct and
accumulate in a manhole or hand
hole. The higher flashpoints of
P011 fluid reduce the probability
of ignition. (See 2.3.3.1.3)
A small fire at the failure site is
possible, but the fire should
extinguish itself as it will be
starved for oxygen. Fluid may
flow down the duct and
accumulate in a manhole or hand
hole. The higher flashpoints of
U732 fluids reduce the probability
of ignition. (See 2.3.3.1.3)
A small fire at the failure site is
possible, but the fire should
extinguish itself as it will be
starved for oxygen. Fluid may
flow down the duct and
accumulate in a manhole or
hand hole. The higher
flashpoints of U732 fluids reduce
the probability of ignition. (See
2.3.3.1.3)
2.3.3.1.1.2c
There are no known failures with
this scenario.
There have been no failures with
this scenario.
There have been no failures with
this scenario.
There have been no failures with
this scenario.
2.3.3.1.1.2d
The probability is assumed the
same as in the direct buried case.
(See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event
ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
The probability is assumed the
same as in the direct buried case.
(See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event
ranking is “very low” divided by
2; the personnel present ranking
is “not possible”.
The probability is assumed the
same as in the direct buried case.
(See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event
ranking is “very low” divided by
2; the personnel present ranking
is “not possible”.
The probability is assumed the
same as in the direct buried
case. (See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The
event ranking is “very low”
divided by 2; the personnel
present ranking is “not possible”.
2.3.3.1.1.2e
System protection will trip when
cable fails. Damage to the duct is
unlikely, but possible. The
equipment ranking is “medium”.
The personnel ranking is “none”.
System protection will trip when
cable fails. Damage to the duct is
unlikely, but possible. The
equipment ranking is “medium”.
The personnel ranking is “none”.
System protection will trip when
cable fails. Damage to the duct is
unlikely, but possible. The
equipment ranking is “medium”.
The personnel ranking is “none”.
System protection will trip when
cable fails. Damage to the duct
is unlikely, but possible. The
equipment ranking is “medium”.
The personnel ranking is “none”.
2.3.3.1.1.2f
PMDMS/TMMS mixtures impart
more rapid improvement in
dielectric performance than
PMDMS alone, reducing the
possibility of dielectric failure.
(Author: The TMMS ingredient in
PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which
imparted the more rapid
improvement, was reduced in
2005 by a factor of 6 as per the
supplier’s MSDS.)
P011 fluid has performance
advantages over the CC3 fluid.
Higher reliability reduces the
likelihood of a fluid leak.
U732 fluid has many performance
advantages over the CC3 fluid.
Higher reliability reduces the
likelihood of a fluid leak.
U732 fluids delivered with SPR
increase dielectric strength 87
times faster than the pre-2005
CC2 fluid that is no longer in
use. Current CC3 fluid will suffer
a slower rate of dielectric
improvement.
2.3.3.1.1.2g
The cable must be replaced.
Fluid is compatible with common
duct materials and common cable
jackets, so ducts do not have to
be replaced or cleaned.
The cable must be replaced.
Fluid is compatible with common
duct materials and common cable
jackets, so ducts do not have to
be replaced or cleaned.
The cable must be replaced.
Fluid is compatible with common
duct materials and common cable
jackets, so ducts do not have to
be replaced or cleaned.
The cable must be replaced.
Fluid is compatible with common
duct materials and common
cable jackets, so ducts do not
have to be replaced or cleaned.
2.3.3.1.1.2h
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●0=0
Risk (2.5,0)
Requipment=0.005/2●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.0●0=0
Risk (2.5,0)
Requipment=0.005/2●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.0●0=0
Risk (2.5,0)
Requipment=0.005/2●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.0●0=0
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
39
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.3.3.1.1.3
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable,
Manhole
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable,
Manhole
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Cable,
Manhole
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Cable, Manhole
2.3.3.1.1.3a
Treated cable within
manholes/handholes or near duct
ends fails.
Treated cable within
manholes/handholes or near duct
ends fails.
Treated cable within
manholes/handholes or near duct
ends fails.
Treated cable within
manholes/handholes or near
duct ends fails.
2.3.3.1.1.3b
A small fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
failure or another source of
ignition. For URD cables, the
amount of fluid, which can spill, is
typically less than 1 gallon (3.8
liters). For feeder cables, the spill
size may be up to five gallons
(18.9 liters).
A small fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
failure or another source of
ignition. For URD cables, the
amount of fluid, which can spill, is
typically less than 1 gallon (3.8
liters). For feeder cables, the spill
size may be up to five gallons
(8.9 liters). The high flash point
of P011 fluid makes ignition less
likely than with CC3 fluid
mixtures.
A small fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
failure or another source of
ignition. For URD cables, the
amount of fluid, which can spill, is
typically less than 1 gallon (3.8
liters). For feeder cables, the spill
size may be up to five gallons
(8.9 liters). The high flash point
of U732 fluids makes ignition less
likely than with CC3 fluid
mixtures.
A small fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
failure or another source of
ignition. For URD cables, the
amount of fluid, which can spill,
is typically less than 1 gallon
(3.8 liters). For feeder cables,
the spill size may be up to five
gallons (8.9 liters). The high
flash point of U732 fluids makes
ignition less likely than with CC3
fluid mixtures.
2.3.3.1.1.3c
There are no known failures with
this scenario.
There are no known failures with
this scenario.
There are no known failures with
this scenario.
There are no known failures with
this scenario.
2.3.3.1.1.3d
The event ranking is “ultra-low”;
the personnel present ranking is
“unlikely”.
Because of the higher flash points
the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of
flammable fluid. The personnel
present ranking is “unlikely”.
Because of the higher flash points
the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of
flammable fluid. The personnel
present ranking is “unlikely”.
Because of the higher flash
points the event ranking is at
least 2-times lower than that of
flammable fluid. The personnel
present ranking is “unlikely”.
2.3.3.1.1.3e
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment ranking
is “high”. The personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment ranking
is “high”. The personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment ranking
is “high”. The personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment
ranking is “high”. The personnel
ranking is “life threatening”.
2.3.3.1.1.3f
PMDMS/TMMS mixtures provide a
faster increase in dielectric
performance than PMDMS alone
reducing the possibility of
dielectric failure. (Author: The
TMMS ingredient in PMDMS/TMMS
mixture, which imparts the more
rapid improvement, was reduced
in 2005 by a factor of 6 per the
supplier’s MSDS.)
Ultrinium fluid provides a rapid
increase in dielectric
performance, reducing the
possibility of dielectric failure.
Ultrinium fluid provides a rapid
increase in dielectric
performance, reducing the
possibility of dielectric failure.
Ultrinium fluids increase
dielectric strength 87 times
faster than CC2 fluid that is no
longer in use. The current
PMDMS/TMMS mixture, CC3, has
a slower rate of dielectric
improvement.
2.3.3.1.1.3g
None.
None.
None.
None.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
40
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.3.3.1.1.3h
Risk (2.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (1.2,12.5)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=.0005/2●.05●106=12.5
Risk (1.2,12.5)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=.0005/2●.05●106=12.5
Risk (1.2,12.5)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=.0005/2●.05●106=12.5
2.3.3.1.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Splice
2.3.3.1.2a
When a splice fails a hole is blown
in its side or along an interface. If
fluid is present in the strands and
if no damming compound was
used, some may leak. Damming
compound is a cure-in-place
silicone gel, which is sometimes
used to block the strands and
keep the PMDMS/TMMS fluid from
coming in contact with splices,
particularly on larger conductor
sizes. This practice was largely
suspended in the late 1990’s.
When a splice fails a hole is blown
in its side or along an interface. If
fluid is present in the strands and
if the compression connector and
injection adaptor assembly are
also breached, fluid may leak.
When a splice fails a hole is blown
in its side or along an interface. If
fluid is present in the strands and
if the compression connector and
injection adaptor assembly are
also breached, fluid may leak.
When a splice fails a hole is
blown in its side or along an
interface. If fluid is present in
the strands and if the
compression connector and
injection adaptor assembly are
also breached, fluid may leak.
2.3.3.1.2b
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried splice, the lack of oxygen
will preclude a fire. If a failure
and a leak occur within an
enclosure, the fluid may leak
within a confined space. (See
2.2.2.1.3) If a failure and an
accompanying leak occur on a
riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.2.2.1.4)
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried splice, the lack of oxygen
will preclude a fire. If a failure
and a leak occur within an
enclosure, the fluid may leak
within a confined space. (See
2.2.2.1.3) If a failure and an
accompanying leak occur on a
riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.2.2.1.4)
If the leak occurs in a direct
buried splice, the lack of oxygen
will preclude a fire. If a failure
and a leak occur within an
enclosure, the fluid may leak
within a confined space. (See
2.2.2.1.3) If a failure and an
accompanying leak occur on a
riser pole, the fluid will be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.2.2.1.4)
For a leak to occur, the splice,
the steel injection adaptor, and
aluminum or copper
compression connector must be
breached. If such a breach
occurs in a direct buried splice,
the lack of oxygen will preclude
a fire. If a breach occurs within
an enclosure, fluid may leak
within a confined space. (See
2.2.2.1.3) If a breach occurs on
a riser pole fluid may be
released into an unconfined
space. (See 2.2.2.1.4)
2.3.3.1.2c
There have been no reported
failures of splices, which have led
directly to a fire.
There have been no failures or
breaches with this scenario.
There have been no failures or
breaches with this scenario.
There have been no failures or
breaches with this scenario.
2.3.3.1.2d
During the period encompassing
1985 to 2000, approximately
0.6% of over 7 million feet of
cables treated have failed for any
reason. Approximately 0.1% (or
1/6 of the total failures)
represent splice failures. (Author:
The service supplier in March
2008 claimed that 80 million feet
of cables have been treated.)
Because of the higher flash points
the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of
flammable CC3 fluid. The
personnel present ranking is
“unlikely”.
Because of the higher flash points
the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of
flammable CC3 fluid. The
personnel present ranking is
“unlikely”.
Because of the higher flash
points the event ranking is at
least 2-times lower than that of
flammable CC3 fluid. The
personnel present ranking is
“unlikely”.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
41
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
2.3.3.1.2e
See below.
See below.
See below.
SPR – U732
See below.
2.3.3.1.2f
Pressure testing procedures
promulgated in the CPM reduce
the possibility of the
contamination of splice
interfaces. Note: FPL and the
provider of UPR—CC3 to FPL
employed a practice, which
intentionally contaminated
splice/cable interface and directly
contradicted the CPM. This
practice was terminated in the fall
of 1997. (Author: Some users of
this injection paradigm report
50% splice failure rates.)
Pressure testing procedures
promulgated in the NRIs reduce
the possibility of the
contamination of splice
interfaces.
Pressure testing procedures
promulgated in the NRIs reduce
the possibility of the
contamination of splice
interfaces.
SPR utilizes resilient, robust, and
redundant seals designed for
pressures up to 1000 psig (69
bars) to assure that fluid in the
cable interstices never come in
contact with the splice body.
2.3.3.1.2.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice,
Direct buried
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice,
Direct buried
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice,
Direct buried
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Splice, Direct buried
2.3.3.1.2.1a
Direct buried, treated splice fails
with no damming compound.
Direct buried, treated splice fails.
Direct buried, treated splice fails.
Direct buried, treated splice fails
and injection adapter is
breached.
2.3.3.1.2.1b
Because there is no oxygen, a fire
or explosion is not possible.
Because there is no oxygen, a fire
or explosion is not possible.
Because there is no oxygen, a fire
or explosion is not possible.
Because there is no oxygen, a
fire or explosion is not possible.
2.3.3.1.2.1c
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.3.3.1.2.1d
The probability that the failure
occurs in the direct buried portion
of the cable is approximately
340/350 or 97% as only 3% is
typically exposed at transformers
or splice boxes. The event
ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
The probability that the failure
occurs in the direct buried portion
of the cable is approximately
340/350 or 97% as only 3% is
typically exposed at transformers
or splice boxes. The event
ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
The probability that the failure
occurs in the direct buried portion
of the cable is approximately
340/350 or 97% as only 3% is
typically exposed at transformers
or splice boxes. The event
ranking is “very low”; the
personnel present ranking is “not
possible”.
Because both the splice and
injection adaptor must fail, the
event ranking is “ultra-low”; the
personnel present ranking is
“not possible”.
2.3.3.1.2.1e
System protection should trip
when a cable fails.
System protection should trip
when a cable fails.
System protection should trip
when a cable fails.
System protection should trip
when a cable fails.
2.3.3.1.2.1f
Pressure testing procedures
promulgated in the CPM reduce
the possibility of the
contamination of splice
interfaces. (Author: Some users
of this injection paradigm report
50% splice failure rates.)
Pressure testing procedures
reduce the possibility of the
contamination of splice
interfaces.
Pressure testing procedures
reduce the possibility of the
contamination of splice
interfaces.
The sustained pressure
paradigm utilizes resilient,
robust, and redundant seals
designed for pressures up to
1000 psig to assure that fluid in
the cable interstices never
comes in contact with the splice
body. NRIs provide multiple
quality assurance checks to
minimize the chance of craft
error.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
42
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
2.3.3.1.2.1g
A failed splice must be replaced.
A failed splice must be replaced.
A failed splice must be replaced.
A failed splice must be replaced.
2.3.3.1.2.1h
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0
2.3.3.1.2.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice,
Manhole
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice,
Manhole
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Splice,
Manhole
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Splice, Manhole
2.3.3.1.2.2a
A splice in manhole or hand hole
on a treated cable fails. No
damming compound was used, or
the dam failed and fluid flows to
the failed splice.
A splice in manhole or hand hole
on a treated cable fails.
A splice in manhole or hand hole
on a treated cable fails.
A splice in manhole or hand hole
on a treated cable fails.
2.3.3.1.2.2b
A fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
arc from the failure, arcs from
subsequent thumping, or from
some other source of ignition. For
URD cables, the amount of fluid,
which can spill is typically less
than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For
feeder cables, the spill size may
be up to five gallons (18.9 liters).
A fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
arc from the failure, arcs from
subsequent thumping, or from
some other source of ignition. For
URD cables, the amount of fluid,
which can spill is typically less
than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For
feeder cables, the spill size may
be up to five gallons (18.9 liters).
A fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
arc from the failure, arcs from
subsequent thumping, or from
some other source of ignition. For
URD cables, the amount of fluid,
which can spill is typically less
than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For
feeder cables, the spill size may
be up to five gallons (18.9 liters).
A fire at the failure site is
possible. Fluid may spill onto the
floor and may be ignited by the
arc from the failure, arcs from
subsequent thumping, or from
some other source of ignition.
For URD cables, the amount of
fluid, which can spill is typically
less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters).
For feeder cables, the spill size
may be up to five gallons (18.9
liters).
There have been no incidents.
Two failures have been reported
NRIs provide multiple quality
with this scenario through 2000.
assurance checks to minimize the
In no case were there fires
chance of craft error. P011 fluid
created directly by the failure. In
has a flashpoint above the range
the first case at AEP’s
of materials defined by the U.S.
Appalachian Power (circa 1993)
DOT as flammable.
unit in Charleston, West Virginia,
no fire initiated. Line personnel
used appropriate ventilation and
did not introduce spurious
ignition sources until after the
fluid spill was terminated and the
spill was eliminated. In the
second case, at Detroit Edison
(summer 1997), Detroit Edison
line personnel cut out a failed
splice and two adjacent splices in
a three phase feeder circuit.
Fluid spilled from all open ends
onto the floor of the manhole. To
arrest the fluid flow, the DTE line
personnel applied heat shrink end
caps to the severed cables with a
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
There have been no incidents.
NRIs provide multiple quality
assurance checks to minimize the
chance of craft error. U732 fluids
have flashpoints above the range
of materials defined by the U.S.
DOT as flammable.
There have been no incidents.
The sustained pressure
paradigm utilizes resilient,
robust, and redundant seals
designed for pressures up to
1000 psig (69 bars) to assure
that fluid in the cable interstices
never come in contact with the
splice body. NRIs provide
multiple quality assurance
checks to minimize the chance of
craft error. U732 fluids have
flashpoints above the range of
materials defined by the U.S.
DOT as flammable.
2.3.3.1.2.2c
43
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
propane torch. The torch ignited
the dripping fluid, which then
ignited the fluid on the floor.
2.3.3.1.2.2d
The probability is assumed the
same as in the direct buried case.
(See 2.3.3.1.1.1(d).) The event
ranking is “ultra-low”; the
personnel present ranking is
“unlikely”.
Because of the leak-resistant
design and non-flammable fluid,
the event ranking is 5X lower
than with the UPR—CC3
paradigm. The personnel present
ranking is “unlikely”.
Because of the leak-resistant
design and non-flammable fluid,
the event ranking is 5X lower
than with the UPR—CC3
paradigm. The personnel present
ranking is “unlikely”.
Because of the leak-resistant
design and non-flammable fluid,
the event ranking is 10X lower
than with the UPR-CC3
paradigm. The personnel present
ranking is “unlikely”.
2.3.3.1.2.2e
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment ranking
is “high”. The personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment ranking
is “high”. The personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely, if a fire
develops. The equipment ranking
is “high”. The personnel ranking
is “life threatening”.
System protection will trip when
circuit fails. Damage to the
manhole and to other equipment
in the manhole is likely if a fire
develops. The equipment
ranking is “high”. The personnel
ranking is “life threatening”.
2.3.3.1.2.2f
Heat-shrink polyethylene sleeves
are utilized to make a leak-proof
injectable splice. According to
[8], “The injection technique
(injection with no damming) used
at Detroit Edison was an
experimental approach, which
was used only once and will
never be used again. Utility line
personnel require training in the
proper methods associated with
cable injection.” The service
supplier may provide a
procedure, which covers the
circumstances where a spill
occurs in a confined space.
Provisions should be made to
prevent fluid from dripping to the
floor when a circuit owner must
cut into a treated cable in a vault.
Reference [8] suggests that “the
fluid, which pours from such a
cut, should be collected by a
vacuum funnel, which is placed
below the cut. The vacuum
immediately removes the
dripping fluid through a tube out
to the surface.”
P011 fluid and the delivery
devices and methods were
designed from the beginning to
minimize potential fires. A
Novinium Rejuvenation
Instruction (NRI-99) provides
detailed instructions to mitigate
the risk of fluid leakage and fire.
U732 fluids and the delivery
devices and methods were
designed from the beginning to
minimize potential fires. A
Novinium Rejuvenation
Instruction (NRI-99) provides
detailed instructions to mitigate
the risk of fluid leakage and fire.
U732 fluid and the delivery
devices and methods were
designed from the beginning to
minimize potential fires. A
Novinium Rejuvenation
Instruction (NRI-99) provides
detailed instructions to mitigate
the risk of fluid leakage and fire.
2.3.3.1.2.2g
All line personnel should wear
flame-retardant clothing and
other PPE.
All line personnel should wear
flame-retardant clothing and
other PPE.
All line personnel should wear
flame-retardant clothing and
other PPE.
All line personnel should wear
flame-retardant clothing and
other PPE.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
44
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.3.3.1.2.2h
Risk (2.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel =0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (0.5,5)
Requipment=0.0005/5●5x103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005/5●0.05●106=5
Risk (0.5,5)
Requipment=0.0005/5●5x103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005/5●0.05●106=5
Risk (0.25,2.5)
Requipment=.0005/5●5x103=0.25
Rpersonnel=.0005/5●.05●106=2.5
2.3.3.1.3
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space)
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space)
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space)
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Termination
(enclosed space)
2.3.3.1.3a
A failure of a termination in a
transformer, switchgear or other
enclosure results in the spill of
injection fluid into an enclosed
space.
A failure of a termination in a
transformer, switchgear or other
enclosure results in the spill of
injection fluid into an enclosed
space.
A failure of a termination in a
transformer, switchgear or other
enclosure results in the spill of
injection fluid into an enclosed
space.
A failure of a termination in a
transformer, switchgear or other
enclosure results in the spill of
injection fluid into an enclosed
space.
2.3.3.1.3b
Because there is oxygen and very
often a source of ignition within
equipment enclosures, the
chances of ignition are quite high.
As described in [8], the most
important variables, which will
affect whether or not there is a
fire or explosion, are the amount
of fluid spilled, the flow rate and
spray characteristics of the leak,
and the nature of the floor below
the leak. For example, slow leaks
onto dirt floors are unlikely to
lead to conditions, which support
combustion. High pressure, high
flow rate leaks, which spray fluid
into the air creating a good fuelair mixture are more likely to
ignite and may even explode.
According to [8], with over 7
million feet of injection
experience at this paradigms
service supplier through about
1998, there had been only a
single incident of fire and
explosion on a live-front
transformer at FPL. A leak
developed in an Elastimold livefront adapter and fluid was
sprayed into the enclosure. An
unapproved injection tank
without a flow restricting orifice
and without an automatic shut-off
valve contributed to fluid being
sprayed into the pad-mount
While there is oxygen and very
often a source of ignition within
transformers and switchgear the
chances of ignition are quite low,
because the flash point of the
fluid is above the temperature
typically found in a transformer
or similar enclosure. There have
been no incidents of fire and
explosion on a live-front
transformer.
While there is oxygen and very
often a source of ignition within
transformers and switchgear the
chances of ignition are quite low,
because the flash point of the
fluid is above the temperature
typically found in a transformer
or similar enclosure. There have
been no incidents of fire and
explosion on a live-front
transformer.
While there is oxygen and very
often a source of ignition within
transformers and switchgear the
chances of ignition are quite low,
because the flash point of the
fluid is above the temperature
typically found in a transformer
or similar enclosure.
Furthermore, because the
injection is performed on
deenergized cables the enclosure
is generally open during the
injection process, which largely
eliminates the buildup of
flammable vapors and
temperatures above 40°C.
Novinium injection adapters are
specifically designed to operate
leak-free in even the most
demanding of circumstances.
Injection adapters typically
operate at one-third or less of
their design pressure.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
45
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
transformer. service supplier
approved designs would have a
lower fluid flow rate. (Author:
The author is aware of at least
several other fire and explosion
incidents, since the last update of
2.2.2.1.3b. See for example the
images below from a Midwestern
U.S. circuit owner in 2007.)
A 35kV Cooper elbow failed …
… and resulted in the loss of the
transformer.
2.3.3.1.3.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space), Pressurized
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space), Pressurized
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space), Pressurized
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized
2.2.2.1.3.1a
Leaks in a termination with feed
or soak pressure still applied.
Leaks in a termination with feed
pressure still applied.
Leaks in a termination with feed
pressure still applied.
Leaks in a termination while
injection is proceeding.
2.2.2.1.3.1b
The pressure impacts the
characteristics of a leak and the
resulting consequences.
The pressure impacts the
characteristics of a leak and the
resulting consequences.
The pressure impacts the
characteristics of a leak and the
resulting consequences.
Leaks are unlikely, but are
generally mitigated by an
attending injection technician.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
46
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Monitored
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Monitored
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Monitored
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Monitored
2.3.3.1.3.1.1a
Leaks in a termination during
injection at moderate to medium
pressure (i.e. in excess of 30
psig). These cables are typically
not energized.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
Leaks in a termination during
injection with moderate
sustained pressure in excess of
100 psig. These cables are
typically not energized.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1b
For some applications, pressure
in excess of that used for lowpressure injection is utilized by
injection crews. These procedures
are normally performed with the
cable de-energized and
monitored by injection personnel.
In the event or a leak, the
injection pressure can be reduced
to zero by the injection crew to
minimize the size and
consequences of a leak.
Monitored sustained pressure
injection is the design norm for
this paradigm. If a leak
develops, the injection pressure
can be reduced to zero by the
injection team to minimize the
size of a leak and any
consequences.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1c
At least through 2002 the service
supplier of this injection paradigm
had had no experience where
leaks that developed during
moderate or medium pressure
injections resulted in a fire or
explosion.
There have been no examples
where leaks that developed
during moderate pressure
injections resulted in a fire. This
paradigm is utilized, because it
has been demonstrably safer.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1d
Since there are no energized
components that can ignite a
leak, the probability of a fire is
“ultra-low” and the probability
that personnel will be present is
“likely”.
Because of the higher flash
point, the probability that a leak
will ignite is half that of the
flammable fluid. Because the
injection equipment is all
designed to operate at moderate
pressure, the probability of
developing a leak is half that of
the unsustained pressure
paradigm. The probability that
personnel will be present is
“likely”.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1e
Because of the flow rates possible
at these pressures a resulting fire
would do a “high” amount of
damage to equipment and would
create a “life threatening” threat
to personnel.
Flow rates are limited in feed
equipment by 1/8” (1.25 mm)
tubing vs. ¼” (2.5 mm) tubing
utilized by the older paradigm.
This reduces the flow rate about
4-fold over the methods
employed by the other
paradigm. The equipment and
personnel threat are half or less
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
47
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
that of the other injection
paradigm, because of the nonflammable fluids, monitored
injection, and flow restrictions.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1f
As per the CPM, all fittings are
pressure checked. The injection is
generally monitored and pressure
is removed at first sign of leak.
Check all fittings as per the
NRIs. Monitor injection and vent
CO2 pressure at first sign of leak.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1g
Injection crews should wear
flame retardant clothing, safety
glasses, and other PPE.
Injection crews should wear
flame retardant clothing, safety
glasses, and other PPE.
2.3.3.1.3.1.1h
Risk (2.5,375)
Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106=375
Risk (0.3,47)
Requipment=.0005/4●5x103/2=0.3
Rpersonnel=.0005/4●.75●106/2=47
2.3.3.1.3.1.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Low pressure
injection
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Low pressure
injection
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Low pressure
injection
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Low pressure
injection
2.3.3.1.3.1.2a
Leaks in a termination during the
injection phase while utilizing the
unsustained pressure injection
paradigm. (Typically, less than 30
psig.)
Leaks in a termination during
injection while utilizing the
unsustained pressure injection
paradigm. (Typically, less than 30
psig.)
Leaks in a termination during
injection while utilizing the
unsustained pressure injection
paradigm. (Typically, less than 30
psig.)
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
2.3.3.1.3.1.2b
Injection at low-pressure is
accomplished with a specially
designed PVC feed tank that
includes the following safety
features: (1) The PVC tank has a
35 psig pressure relief valve. (2)
The PVC tank has a flowrestricting orifice to limit the
maximum flow rate in the event
of a leak. (3) The PVC tank has
an automatic shut-off valve to
prevent two-phase helium-fluid
mixture from being vented from a
leak. Two-phase flow may result
in atomization of the fluid and
may create a condition ideal for
vapor cloud explosions.
Injection at low-pressure is
accomplished with a specially
designed metallic feed tank that
includes the following safety
features: (1) The tank has a 35
psig pressure relief valve. (2) The
tank has flow-restricting features
to limit the maximum flow rate in
the event of a leak. (3) The tank
has dielectric shielding.
Injection at low-pressure is
accomplished with a specially
designed metallic feed tank that
includes the following safety
features: (1) The tank has a 35
psig pressure relief valve. (2) The
tank has flow-restricting features
to limit the maximum flow rate in
the event of a leak. (3) The tank
has dielectric shielding.
2.3.3.1.3.1.2c
Where approved low-pressure
feed tanks have been in use,
there have been no explosions.
According to [8], there was a
Where low-pressure feed tanks
have been in use, there have
been no fires or explosions.
Where low-pressure feed tanks
have been in use, there have
been no fires or explosions.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
48
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
The event probability is “ultralow”. Elbows are more likely to
fail while they are being
operated; the probability that
personnel may be present during
this failure is “likely”. The same is
not true for live front devices.
The probability is “unlikely” for
these devices. A middle-ground
probability of “quite likely” is
used below.
The event probability is “ultralow”. Elbows are more likely to
fail while they are being
operated; the probability that
personnel may be present during
this failure is “likely”. The same is
not true for live front devices.
The probability is “unlikely” for
these devices. A middle-ground
probability of “quite likely” is
used below.
single explosion at FPL when a
subcontractor used a tank, which
lacked the three previously
described safety features. Also
according to [8], a fire at a
Detroit Edison pad mounted,
URD, dead-front transformer
occurred when an Elastimold
168AELR injection elbow failed.
According to [8], the elbow failed
as a result of improper
installation by Detroit Edison line
personnel. The elbow failed
catastrophically during a close on
a fault. The resulting fluid
stream was ignited by the
unavoidable arc. The feed tank
emptied its entire contents slowly
through the flow restricting orifice
and the hole in the elbow. The
feed tank shut-off valve operated
when the fluid was near the
bottom of the tank, avoiding the
formation of an atomized mist,
and the fire self-extinguished.
There were black smoke stains on
the transformer, but no
substantive damage. Another
potential source of leaks is a
failing o-ring on an elbow probe.
Groove tolerances, o-ring design,
and faulty manufacturing at
Elastimold have been identified as
the primary causes for such
leaks.
2.3.3.1.3.1.2d
According to [8], two such cases
have been documented and two
or three others have been
described anecdotally before
2000. This represents an “ultralow” event probability. Elbows are
more likely to fail while they are
being operated; the probability
that personnel may be present
during this failure is “likely”. The
same is not true for live front
devices. The probability is
“unlikely” for these devices. A
middle-ground probability of
“quite likely” is used below.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
49
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
2.3.3.1.3.1.2e
A fire fed by a low flammable
fluid flow rate at low pressures
through a flow restricting orifice
would likely do a “medium”
amount of damage to equipment
and would create a “medium”
threat to personnel.
A fire fed by a low non-flammable
fluid flow rate at low pressures
through flow restricting tubing
would likely do a “medium”
amount of damage to equipment
and would create a “medium”
threat to personnel.
A fire fed by a low non-flammable
fluid flow rate at low pressures
through flow restricting tubing
would likely do a “medium”
amount of damage to equipment
and would create a “medium”
threat to personnel.
2.3.3.1.3.1.2f
According to [8], “Work is
underway to improve the leak
resistance of all injection fittings.
In addition to the traditionally
available Elastimold injection
devices, new live-front injection
devices are available from
Raychem and new injection
elbows are available from Cooper.
These new designs have
improved leak resistance
features. Use of all of the
equipment and procedures of the
CPM are a must to prevent the
circumstances where an
explosion can occur.” Injection
teams should monitor the
injection where possible and cutoff pressure at the first sign of
leak. Interested readers should
check with the service supplier on
the status of the design changes
suggested above.
P011 is not flammable and is less
likely to ignite, by at least a
factor of 2 compared to CC3.
U732 is not flammable and is less
likely to ignite, by at least a
factor of 2 compared to CC3.
2.3.3.1.3.1.2g
Injection crews should wear
flame retardant clothing, safety
glasses, and other PPE.
Injection crews should wear
flame retardant clothing, safety
glasses, and other PPE.
Injection crews should wear
flame retardant clothing, safety
glasses, and other PPE.
2.3.3.1.3.1.2h
Risk (0.5,1.8)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●104=1.8
Risk (0.25,0.9)
Requipment=.0005/2●103=0.025
Rpersonnel=.0005÷2● 0.35●104=0.9
Risk (0.25,0.9)
Requipment=.0005/2●103=0.025
Rpersonnel=.0005÷2● 0.35●104=0.9
2.3.3.1.3.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Soak Period
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Soak Period
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Soak Period
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Termination
(enclosed space),
Pressurized, Soak Period
2.3.3.1.3.2a
Leaks in a termination during the
soak phase of a low-pressure
injection. (Typically 5-10 psig at
the feed tank, plus head pressure
and vapor pressure.)
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
50
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
2.3.3.1.3.2b
The pressure used to soak is
generally less than the pressure
used to inject. This reduces the
possibility of a leak. However, the
soak time is typically 60-120+
days compared to the 1-3 days
typical of injection times.
2.3.3.1.3.2c
At least as of 2000, the service
supplier has not experienced any
fires or explosions during the
soak period from a termination
leak. Interested readers should
check with the service supplier
for post-2000 performance as
there may have been such
incidents.
2.3.3.1.3.2d
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1d
2.3.3.1.3.2e
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1e.
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.3.3.1.3.2f
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f.
2.3.3.1.3.2g
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g.
2.3.3.1.3.2h
Risk (1,1.8)
Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●104=1.8
2.3.3.1.4
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(riser)
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(riser)
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Catastrophic
electrical failure, Termination
(riser)
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection,
Catastrophic electrical
failure, Termination (riser)
2.3.3.1.4a
A failure of an injection
termination in an unenclosed
environment such as a substation
or riser pole results in the spill of
injection fluid.
A failure of an injection
termination in an unenclosed
environment such as a substation
or riser pole results in the spill of
injection fluid.
A failure of an injection
termination in an unenclosed
environment such as a substation
or riser pole results in the spill of
injection fluid.
A failure of an injection
termination and an injection
adaptor in an unenclosed
environment such as a
substation or riser pole results in
the spill of injection fluid.
2.3.3.1.4b
Oxygen and a source of ignition
are generally present and hence
the possibility of a fire exists.
Because leaking fluid has little
time to vaporize before it impacts
the ground, unless the fluid is
sprayed directly onto a source of
ignition, a flame is unlikely.
Unconfined vapor cloud
explosions are unlikely due to the
small quantity of fluid available
versus the quantity required to
Oxygen and a source of ignition
are generally present and hence
the possibility of a fire exists.
Because leaking fluid has little
time to vaporize before it impacts
the ground, unless the fluid is
sprayed directly onto a source of
ignition, a flame is unlikely. The
higher flash point of P011 fluid
reduces the probability of
ignition. Unconfined vapor cloud
explosions are virtually
Oxygen and a source of ignition
are generally present and hence
the possibility of a fire exists.
Because leaking fluid has little
time to vaporize before it impacts
the ground, unless the fluid is
sprayed directly onto a source of
ignition, a flame is unlikely. The
higher flash point of U732 fluids
reduces the probability of
ignition. Unconfined vapor cloud
explosions are virtually
Oxygen and a source of ignition
are generally present and hence
the possibility of a fire exists.
Because leaking fluid has little
time to vap-orize before it
impacts the ground, unless the
fluid is sprayed directly onto a
source of ignition, a flame is
unlikely. The higher flash point
of U732 fluids used in this
paradigm reduces the probability
of ignition. Unconfined vapor
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
51
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
create a flame front, which
propagates faster than the speed
of sound.
impossible due to: (1) the small
quantity of fluid available versus
the quantity required to create a
flame front, which propagates
faster than the speed of sound,
and (2) the high flash point.
impossible due to: (1) the small
quantity of fluid available versus
the quantity required to create a
flame front, which propagates
faster than the speed of sound,
and (2) the high flash point.
cloud explosions are virtually
impossible due to (1) the small
quantity of fluid available versus
the quantity required to create a
flame front, which propagates
faster than the speed of sound,
(2) the high flash point, and (3)
the lack of an ignition source
during injection into a
deenergized cable.
2.3.3.1.4c
With over 25 million feet and 15
years of injection experience with
this paradigm as of 2000, there
has not been a single incident of
fire or explosion in unconfined
environments.
This injection paradigm has not
suffered any incidents in this
category.
This injection paradigm has not
suffered any incidents in this
category.
This injection paradigm has not
suffered any incidents in this
category.
2.3.3.1.4d
The probability that conditions
required for starting a fire on a
riser pole is “ultra-low”. The
probability that personnel will be
present during the event is
“unlikely”.
The probability that conditions
required for starting a fire on a
riser pole is “ultra-low”. The
probability that personnel will be
present during the event is
“unlikely”.
The probability that conditions
required for starting a fire on a
riser pole is “ultra-low”. The
probability that personnel will be
present during the event is
“unlikely”.
Because the lower flammability
and injection devices designed to
sustain moderate pressures, the
probability of events to
equipment or personnel is 2
times lower with this paradigm.
2.3.3.1.4e
A fire on a pole top may damage
the pole. The equipment
consequence rating is “high”. The
consequence to a line worker in
close proximity to the fault and
flame could be “high”.
A fire on a pole top may damage
the pole. The equipment
consequence rating is “high”. The
consequence to a line worker in
close proximity to the fault and
flame could be “high”.
A fire on a pole top may damage
the pole. The equipment
consequence rating is “high”. The
consequence to a line worker in
close proximity to the fault and
flame could be “high”.
A fire on a pole top may damage
the pole. The equipment
consequence rating is “high”.
The consequence to a line
worker in close proximity to the
fault and flame could be “high”.
2.3.3.1.4f
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f.
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f.
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f.
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f.
2.3.3.1.4g
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g.
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g.
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g.
Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g.
2.3.3.1.4h
Risk (2.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (1.2,12)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12
Risk (1.2,12)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12
Risk (1.2,12)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12
2.3.3.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak
A fitting, a tank, or the tubing,
A fitting, a feed or vacuum tank,
which deliver injection fluid to the
or tubing used to connect feed or
cable fails mechanically and
vacuum tanks to a cable end,
allows fluid to be spilled or
which deliver injection fluid or
atomized.
allow contaminated excess fluid
to exit the cable fails either
mechanically or electrically
(leading to a coincident
mechanical failure) and allows
fluid to be spilled.
2.3.3.2b
Fluid delivery equipment is overFluid delivery equipment is overThe primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
A fitting, a tank, or the tubing,
which deliver injection fluid to the
cable fails mechanically and
allows fluid to be spilled or
atomized.
A fitting, a tank, or the tubing,
which deliver injection fluid to
the cable fails mechanically and
allows fluid to be spilled or
atomized.
Fluid delivery equipment is over-
The equipment, which delivers
2.3.3.2a
52
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
designed to prevent leaky
conditions. For example, the
tubing used to transport fluid
from the feed tank to the
termination has a burst pressure
greater than 1000 psig, quickconnect fittings operate at up to
120 psi. A feed tank includes a 35
psig pressure relief valve;
assuring attached components do
not reach their design
constraints. Current generation
injection elbows and their caps
operate at up to 40 psig, so there
is little margin of error with these
devices. In addition to outright
injection equipment failure
caused by a design or a
manufacturing, catastrophic
electrical failures of components
(discussed in 2.3.3.1) or
operationally induced mechanical
damage are examples of
incidents that might create leaks.
designed to prevent leaky
conditions. For example, the
tubing used to transport fluid
from the feed tank to the
termination has a burst pressure
greater than 1000 psig, quickconnect fittings are operate at up
to 120 psi. A feed tank includes a
35 psig pressure relief valve;
assuring attached components do
not reach their design
constraints. Advanced injection
elbow seals and their caps
operate at up to 50 psig providing
a greater margin of error than
first generation UPR separable
connectors. In addition to
outright injection equipment
failure caused by a design or a
manufacturing, catastrophic
electrical failures of components
(discussed in 2.3.3.1) or
operationally induced mechanical
damage are examples of
incidents that might create leaks.
designed to prevent leaky
conditions. For example, the
tubing used to transport fluid
from the feed tank to the
termination has a burst pressure
greater than 1000 psig, quickconnect fittings are operate at up
to 120 psi. A feed tank includes a
35 psig pressure relief valve;
assuring attached components do
not reach their design
constraints. Advanced injection
elbow seals and their caps
operate at up to 50 psig providing
a greater margin of error than
first generation UPR separable
connectors. In addition to
outright injection equipment
failure caused by a design or a
manufacturing, catastrophic
electrical failures of components
(discussed in 2.3.3.1) or
operationally induced mechanical
damage are examples of
incidents that might create leaks.
fluid to cables, is significantly
over-designed to prevent leaks.
For example, the tubing burst
pressure is in excess of 2600 psi
(179 bars) and the fittings are
designed to operate up to 1000
psi (69 bars). The feed tanks
have pressure relief valves,
which operates at about 33% of
burst pressure.
2.3.3.2.1
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Mechanical
Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Mechanical
Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Mechanical
Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Mechanical
Cause
2.3.3.2.1a
A mechanical failure of injection
equipment releases fluid.
A mechanical failure of injection
equipment releases fluid.
A mechanical failure of injection
equipment releases fluid.
A mechanical failure of injection
equipment releases fluid.
2.3.3.2.1b
According to [8] and at least
through 2000, Elastimold
injection fittings have been the
primary source of injection
equipment leaks. Mechanical
failures in the delivery system
and electrical failures elsewhere
in the enclosure are other
potential leak sources. An arc or
explosive percussion resulting
from such failures may damage
injection equipment.
Elastimold injection fittings have
been the primary source of
injection equipment leaks with
UPR with soak paradigm.
Improvements in the elbow
sealing system mitigate this risk.
Mechanical failures in the delivery
system and electrical failures
elsewhere in the enclosure are
other potential leak sources. An
arc or explosive percussion
resulting from such failures may
damage injection equipment.
Elastimold injection fittings have
been the primary source of
injection equipment leaks with
UPR with soak paradigm.
Improvements in the elbow
sealing system mitigate this risk.
Mechanical failures in the delivery
system and electrical failures
elsewhere in the enclosure are
other potential leak sources. An
arc or explosive percussion
resulting from such failures may
damage injection equipment.
The plumbing, which connects
the feed tank to the injection
adaptors, may leak if improperly
installed, or may be pulled off by
improper handling. Injection
generally is monitored, so a leak
can be observed and a shut-off
valve closed to arrest leaking.
The connected equipment is
deenergized and the fluid is nonflammable, so the probability of
ignition in the event of a leak is
extremely low.
2.3.3.2.1c
According to [8] and through
2000, no service supplierapproved fluid delivery devices
have ever contributed to a fire.
This injection paradigm has
enjoyed a fire-free history.
Cooper 35kV large interface
injection elbows have a more
This injection paradigm has
enjoyed a fire-free history.
Cooper 35kV large interface
injection elbows have a more
This injection paradigm has
enjoyed a fire-free history.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
53
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
Elastimold elbows utilized and
approved by the service supplier
have been known to leak,
particularly at the o-ring probe
seal. Elastimold TFIC-FX live-front
injection adapters have leaked
due to manufacturing defects and
installation mistakes. (Author:
The author is aware of at least
several other fire and explosion
incidents, since the last update of
2.3.3.2.1c.)
robust probe seal design than the
Elastimold design and are used
without modification. High
performance injection adapters
are utilized for live-front
terminations.
robust probe seal design than the
Elastimold design and are used
without modification. High
performance injection adapters
are utilized for live-front
terminations.
2.3.3.2.1d
Currently available designs
exhibit a “very low” probability of
leaks. The probability that
personnel will be present when a
leak occurs is “unlikely”.
Currently available designs
exhibit a “very low” probability of
leaks. The probability that
personnel will be present when a
leak occurs is “unlikely”.
Currently available designs
exhibit a “very low” probability of
leaks. The probability that
personnel will be present when a
leak occurs is “unlikely”.
There is an “ultra-low”
probability of leaks and
subsequent ignition. The
probability that personnel will be
present when a leak occurs is
“quite likely”.
2.3.3.2.1e
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
2.3.3.2.1f
According to [8], “An alternate
heat-shrink design for live-front
adapters is in development at
Raychem and [at the service
supplier]. Elastimold is
performing 100% quality testing
on all of TFIC-LX devices. The
service supplier has informed
Elastimold of a series of
manufacturing defects, which can
lead to leaks at the o-ring seal of
the injection elbow probe. Cooper
Power Systems has developed an
alternate elbow with an improved
seal. An injection device
specification was written to
include a leak-proof requirement.
This specification has been
integrated into all service supplier
injection equipment purchases.”
(Author: design changes have
been implemented to improve the
leak resistance of these injection
devices. The Elastimold design,
utilizes a rigid probe support ring,
which is subject to flashing
For live-front terminations,
special metallic injection adaptors
are utilized, so that fluid does not
come in contact with component
parts. For separable connectors,
the Elastimold seals are utilized.
Cooper injection elbows for 35kV
large interface are utilized
without improvement, because
they use a double-D-ring design
seated in a brass probes support,
which does not suffer the flashing
problems of the Elastimold
design.
P011 fluid is not flammable
reducing the chance of ignition by
at least a factor of 2.
For live-front terminations,
special metallic injection adaptors
are utilized, so that fluid does not
come in contact with component
parts. For separable connectors,
the Elastimold seals are utilized.
Cooper injection elbows for 35kV
large interface are utilized
without improvement, because
they use a double-D-ring design
seated in a brass probes support,
which does not suffer the flashing
problems of the Elastimold
design.
U732 fluid is not flammable
reducing the chance of ignition by
at least a factor of 2.
Special metallic injection
adaptors are utilized, so that
fluid does not come in contact
with component parts.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
54
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
contamination during molding.
To find and correct these
manufacturing defects, Elastimold
applies an air test to 100% of its
injection elbow production.
Flashing discovered in this way is
corrected and the seal is
retested.)
2.3.3.2.1g
Injection equipment includes a
flow restricting orifice to reduce
the maximum flow rate of any
leak. This reduced flow rate
limits the potential fire size and
prevents explosive spraying of
fluid into an enclosed space. Use
appropriate PPE.
Injection equipment includes flow
restricting features to reduce the
maximum flow rate of any leak.
This reduced flow rate limits the
potential fire size and prevents
explosive spraying of fluid into an
enclosed space. Use appropriate
PPE.
Injection equipment includes flow
restricting features to reduce the
maximum flow rate of any leak.
This reduced flow rate limits the
potential fire size and prevents
explosive spraying of fluid into an
enclosed space. Use appropriate
PPE.
Special injection adaptors are
rated at over three times the
maximum operating pressure.
Always wear appropriate PPE.
2.3.3.2.1h
Risk (25,250)
Requipment=0.005●5x103=25
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●106=250
Risk (12.5,125)
Requipment=0.005/2●5x103=12.5
Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.05● 106=125
Risk (12.5,125)
Requipment=0.005/2●5x103=12.5
Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.05● 106=125
Risk (2.5,175)
Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175
2.3.3.2.2
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Electrical Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Electrical Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Electrical Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Electrical Cause
2.3.3.2.2a
An electrical failure of the
injection equipment tied to an
energized circuit may puncture
delivery devices and may release
fluid.
An electrical failure of the
injection equipment tied to an
energized circuit may puncture
delivery devices and may release
fluid.
An electrical failure of the
injection equipment tied to an
energized circuit may puncture
delivery devices and may release
fluid.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
2.3.3.2.2b
The electrical failure is not within
the scope of 2.3.3.2.2b as these
risks were described in 1.2 and
1.3. This section assesses the
additional risks associated with
leaking fluid, which results from
the electrical fault. Whenever
there is an arc-flash, a flammable
fluid, and air, there is a possibility
of fire and/or explosion.
The electrical failure is not within
the scope of 2.3.3.2.2b as these
risks were described in 1.2 and
1.3. This section assesses the
additional risks associated with
leaking fluid, which results from
the electrical fault. Whenever
there is an arc-flash, a
combustible fluid, and air, there
is a possibility of fire and/or
explosion.
The electrical failure is not within
the scope of 2.3.3.2.2b as these
risks were described in 1.2 and
1.3. This section assesses the
additional risks associated with
leaking fluid, which results from
the electrical fault. Whenever
there is an arc-flash, a
combustible fluid, and air, there
is a possibility of fire and/or
explosion.
2.3.3.2.2c
According to [8], the design goal
of the service supplier was to
isolate potentially energized fluids
at the vacuum and feed sides of
cable. This approach enjoyed a
perfect record at least through
2000. FPL, a customer of the
service supplier, desired to ignore
this goal and create an electrical
Potentially energized fluids are
electrically isolated from grounds.
This approach has enjoyed a
perfect safety record.
Potentially energized fluids are
electrically isolated from grounds.
This approach has enjoyed a
perfect safety record.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
55
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
failure point. FPL had proposed
two different methods to provide
a ground to the fluid or fluid
delivery devices. To address
these two divergent approaches
and the two FPL proposed
methods, each is discussed below
and labeled as “Isolate” (Case A),
“Hard Ground” (Case B), and
“Soft Ground” (Case C).
2.3.3.2.2d
The event probability with the
“Isolate” approach is “ultra-low”.
The probability that personnel will
be present is “quite likely”. The
event probability with the “Hard
Ground” approach is “low” and
the personnel ranking is the same
as the “Isolate” approach. The
event probability with the “Soft
Ground” approach is “very low”
and the personnel ranking is the
same as the “Isolate” approach.
P011 fluid is not flammable. The
event probability is “ultra-low”
divided by 2. The probability that
personnel will be present is “quite
likely”.
U732 fluid is not flammable. The
event probability is “ultra-low”
divided by 2. The probability that
personnel will be present is “quite
likely”.
2.3.3.2.2e
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
A fire or explosion may have
“high” consequences to the
equipment and may be “life
threatening” to any nearby
personnel.
2.3.3.2.2f
Strand desiccant use decreases
the conductivity of fluid exiting
the cable mitigating the
probability of an electrical failure.
Thick-walled ¼” PE tubing with a
smaller inside diameter than offthe-shelf ¼” tubing. The smaller
cross sectional area reduces the
maximum current flow, if
conductive fluid is in the tubing
(See the discussion under 1.2(f)).
Improved vacuum tanks,
improved tubing, and an
improved feed tank were
implemented to improve
withstand voltages. There is no
plan to mitigate the probability of
incidents with the “Ground”
approach and this approach has
not been implemented.
P011 fluid is not flammable.
Thick-walled 1/4” PE tubing with
a smaller inside diameter is used.
The smaller cross section area
reduced the maximum current
flow, if conductive fluid is in the
tubing (See the discussion under
1.2(f)).
U732 fluid is not flammable.
Thick-walled 1/4” PE tubing with
a smaller inside diameter is used.
The smaller cross section area
reduced the maximum current
flow, if conductive fluid is in the
tubing (See the discussion under
1.2(f)).
2.3.3.2.2g
The flow restricting orifice of the
injection equipment reduces the
Flow restricting system design
elements reduce the maximum
Flow restricting system design
elements reduce the maximum
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
56
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
maximum flow rate for any leak.
Lower flow rates limit the
potential fire size and reduced
the probability of explosive
spraying of fluid into an enclosed
space. Use PPE.
flow rate for any leak. Lower
flow rates and higher flash point
limit the potential fire size and
reduced the probability of
explosive spraying of fluid into an
enclosed space. Use PPE.
flow rate for any leak. Lower
flow rates and higher flash point
limit the potential fire size and
reduced the probability of
explosive spraying of fluid into an
enclosed space. Use PPE.
2.3.3.2.2h
Case A: Base case--Isolation
Approach (2.5,175)
Requipment= 0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175
Case B: Hard Grounding
Approach (250,17500)
Requipment=0.05●5x103=250
Rpersonnel=0.05●0.35●106=17500
Case C: Soft Grounding Approach
(25,1750)
Requipment=0.005●5x103=25
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.35●106=1750
Risk (1.25,175)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.25
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.35●106=87
Risk (1.25,175)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.25
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.35●106=87
2.3.3.2.3
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Procedural Error
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Procedural Error
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Procedural Error
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Procedural
Error
2.3.3.2.3a
A utility line-person or an injector
may open a valve or damage
injection equipment allowing fluid
to leak.
A utility line-person or an injector
may open a valve or damage
injection equipment allowing fluid
to leak.
A utility line-person or an injector
may open a valve or damage
injection equipment allowing fluid
to leak.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
2.3.3.2.3b
An injector is likely to
immediately shut off fluid flow to
minimize such a leak. If a noninjection utility line person
mistakenly opens a valve or cuts
a tube, the individual may not
know immediately how to halt the
flow of fluid.
An injector is likely to
immediately shut off fluid flow to
minimize such a leak. If a noninjection utility line person
mistakenly opens a valve or cuts
a tube, the individual may not
know immediately how to halt the
flow of fluid.
An injector is likely to
immediately shut off fluid flow to
minimize such a leak. If a noninjection utility line person
mistakenly opens a valve or cuts
a tube, the individual may not
know immediately how to halt the
flow of fluid.
2.3.3.2.3c
According to [8] and at least
through 2000, there have not
been any fires or explosions from
this scenario. Flow rates are
limited to low rates by a flow
restricting orifice in the feed tank.
All ports with valves are required
to be plugged, so that two actions
(i.e. remove the plug and open
the valve) are required to initiate
such a leak.
There have not been any fires or
explosions from this scenario.
Flow rates are limited to low rates
by flow restricting design
elements in the feed system. All
ports with valves are required to
be plugged, so that two actions
(i.e. remove the plug and open
the valve) are required to initiate
such a leak. The fluid is noncombustible. Because there is no
soak period the likelihood that
There have not been any fires or
explosions from this scenario.
Flow rates are limited to low rates
by flow restricting design
elements in the feed system. All
ports with valves are required to
be plugged, so that two actions
(i.e. remove the plug and open
the valve) are required to initiate
such a leak. The fluid is noncombustible. Because there is no
soak period the likelihood that
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
57
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
non-injection personnel will
inadvertently operate a feed tank
is 60-100 times less likely than
when a soak period is employed.
non-injection personnel will
inadvertently operate a feed tank
is 60-100 times less likely than
when a soak period is employed.
SPR – U732
2.3.3.2.3d
According to [8], the probability
that a leak and a source of
ignition occur concurrently is
“ultra-low”. The probability that
personnel will be present is
“certain”.
The probability that a leak and a
source of ignition occur
concurrently is “ultra-low”.
Because of high P011 flash point
the probability of ignition is
decreased, by at least a factor of
2. The probability that personnel
will be present is “certain”.
The probability that a leak and a
source of ignition occur
concurrently is “ultra-low”.
Because of high U732 flash point
the probability of ignition is
decreased, by at least a factor of
2. The probability that personnel
will be present is “certain”.
2.3.3.2.3e
The equipment damage
consequences may be “very high”
and the personnel consequences
are “life threatening”.
The equipment damage
consequences may be “very high”
and the personnel consequences
are “life threatening”.
The equipment damage
consequences may be “very high”
and the personnel consequences
are “life threatening”.
2.3.3.2.3f
The aforementioned use of
automatically closing disconnect
devices (i.e. quick disconnect
connections), flow restricting
orifices, and providing plugs for
all open ports reduces the chance
and magnitude of procedural
spills.
2.3.3.2.3g
Injection employees should utilize
PPE, including safety glasses and
flame-retardant clothing.
The aforementioned use of
automatically closing disconnect
devices (i.e. quick disconnect
connections), flow restricting
design elements, and providing
plugs for all open ports reduces
the chance and magnitude of
procedural spills. Taken
together, the reduced flash point
and the elimination of the soak
period reduce the probability by a
factor of 100.
Injection employees should utilize
PPE, including safety glasses and
flame-retardant clothing.
The aforementioned use of
automatically closing disconnect
devices (i.e. quick disconnect
connections), flow restricting
design elements, and providing
plugs for all open ports reduces
the chance and magnitude of
procedural spills. Taken
together, the reduced flash point
and the elimination of the soak
period reduce the probability by a
factor of 100.
Injection employees should utilize
PPE, including safety glasses and
flame-retardant clothing.
2.3.3.2.3h
Risk (5,500)
Requipment = 0.0005 x 104 = 5
Rpersonnel = 0.0005 x 1 x 106 = 500
Risk (0.05,5)
Requipment=0.0005/100●104=0.05
Rpersonnel=0.0005/100●1●106=5
Risk (0.05,5)
Requipment=0.0005/100●104=0.05
Rpersonnel=0.0005/100●1●106=5
2.3.3.2.4
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Thermal Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Thermal Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or
Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Thermal Cause
Chemical, Fire/Explosion,
Injection, Soak, Post-Soak,
or Post-Injection, Delivery
System Leak, Thermal Cause
2.3.3.2.4a
High temperatures, especially in
an enclosure such as a
transformer, weaken the
mechanical properties of the
plastic (PVC) bottles through
which fluid is delivered to the
cable.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm, because
aluminum feed vessels are
utilized and there are no soak
periods.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm, because
aluminum feed vessels are
utilized and there are no soak
periods.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm.
2.3.3.2.4b
Clear PVC, which forms the body
of injection tanks, is rated for use
up to 140°F. Testing at the
Aluminum and high temperature
plastic feed vessels will not
deform from thermal exposure
Aluminum and high temperature
plastic feed vessels will not
deform from thermal exposure
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
58
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
service supplier indicates that
deformation of the vessels begins
at 167°F. Temperatures inside
transformers may exceed 167°F.
found in transformers.
found in transformers.
2.3.3.2.4c
At least in one case in a
hypothermic region of North
America, a vacuum tank
deformed at the peak of summer
temperatures from overheating.
No risk.
No risk.
2.3.3.2.4d
According to [8], at least through
about 2000 a single instance
suggests that the event
probability is “ultra-low” overall,
but can obviously be higher
during the summer season in hot
climates or where cables are
heavily loaded. The probability
that personnel will be present
when this occurs is “quite likely”.
The event probability is “not
possible”. The probability that
personnel would be present if the
event where to occur is “quite
likely”.
The event probability is “not
possible”. The probability that
personnel would be present if the
event where to occur is “quite
likely”.
2.3.3.2.4e
A collapsing or a ballooning tank
may leak fluid into an enclosure.
Corona discharges or other
sources of ignition are a likely
source of ignition. Fluid spills onto
soil are not likely to create a fire.
A spray of fluid is possible. The
consequences to the equipment
are “high” and the consequences
to personnel are “life
threatening”.
Not possible.
Not possible.
2.3.3.2.4f
According to [8], the “[service
supplier] Engineering service
bulletin issued 8/7/95 provides
for installation of external
cabinets with ventilation in hot
environments to house
injection/vacuum tanks.”
No probability mitigation is
required as feed equipment is
designed to operate above any
conceivable operating
temperature.
No probability mitigation is
required as feed equipment is
designed to operate above any
conceivable operating
temperature.
2.3.3.2.4g
Fire retardant clothing and safety
glasses.
Fire retardant clothing and safety
glasses.
Fire retardant clothing and safety
glasses.
2.3.3.2.4h
Risk (2.5,175)
Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●5x103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.35●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●5x103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.35●106=0
2.4
Chemical, Compatibility
Chemical, Compatibility
Chemical, Compatibility
Chemical, Compatibility
2.4a
Injection fluids may damage
materials or devices.
Injection fluids may damage
materials or devices.
Injection fluids may damage
materials or devices.
Injection fluids may damage
materials or devices.
2.4b
The injection fluid comes in direct
contact with the inside of the
cable, splice interiors, live-front
The injection fluid comes in direct
contact with the inside of the
cable, splice interiors, and
The injection fluid comes in direct
contact with the inside of the
cable, splice interiors, and
The injection fluid comes in
direct contact with the inside of
the cable. The fluid is compatible
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
59
SPR – U732
Code
2.4c
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
termination seals (not the
terminations themselves), and
elbows. The fluid is compatible
with all cable materials and most
rubbers used to make splices and
elbows at modest temperatures.
The exceptions are worthy of
note.
1. Silicone rubber utilized in cold
shrink devices including coldshrink terminations and coldshrink splices swells substantially
in contact with PMDMS/TMMS.
There are cold shrink devices,
which are not made of silicone
including EPDM and EPR
components. (Author: The
question of fluid compatibility
with EPR and EPDM components
is more complicated than thought
when the author first penned
2.4b. A thorough discussion of
the issues is presented in [18].
In short, (1) 5% to 15% or more
of the treatment fluid is lost on all
cable injections, because PMDMS
is several times more soluble in
EPDM and EPR rubbers than in
PE, and (2) at conductor
temperatures above about 50°C,
some component damage may
occur from excessive swelling.)
2. Buna-rubber seal used in many
porcelain potheads,
3. Hand-taped splices, and
4. Dielectric gloves.
elbows. The fluid is compatible
with all cable materials and most
rubbers used to make splices and
elbows at modest temperatures.
The exceptions are worthy of
note.
1. Silicone rubber utilized in cold
shrink devices including coldshrink terminations and coldshrink splices swells substantially
in contact with P011 fluid. There
are cold shrink devices, which are
not made of silicone including
EPDM and EPR components.
Fluid compatibility with EPR and
EPDM components is discussed in
[18] and applies to P011 in the
same way as it applies to CC3.
In short, (1) 5% to 15% or more
of the treatment fluid is lost on all
cable injections, because P011
fluid is several times more soluble
in EPDM and EPR rubbers than in
PE, and (2) at conductor
temperatures above about 50°C,
some component damage may
occur from excessive swelling.
2. Buna-rubber seal used in many
porcelain potheads,
3. Hand-taped splices, and
4. Dielectric gloves.
elbows. The fluid is compatible
with all cable materials and most
rubbers used to make splices and
elbows at modest temperatures.
The exceptions are worthy of
note.
1. Silicone rubber utilized in cold
shrink devices including coldshrink terminations and coldshrink splices swells substantially
in contact with U732 fluid. There
are cold shrink devices, which are
not made of silicone including
EPDM and EPR components.
Fluid compatibility with EPR and
EPDM components is discussed in
[18] and applies to U732 in the
same way as it applies to CC3.
In short, (1) 5% to 15% or more
of the treatment fluid is lost on all
cable injections, because U732
fluid is several times more soluble
in EPDM and EPR rubbers than in
PE, and (2) at conductor
temperatures above about 50°C,
some component damage may
occur from excessive swelling.
2. Buna-rubber seal used in many
porcelain potheads,
3. Hand-taped splices, and
4. Dielectric gloves.
with all cable materials. The
silanes uses for injection cause
the swelling of dielectric gloves.
The procedures promulgated by
the service supplier preclude
contact of the fluid from potheads
or terminators and anything other
than the insides of cables,
splices, and dead-front
terminations. According to [8],
“Contact of the fluid as prescribed
by the CPM with the conductor
and insulation systems of soliddielectric cables does not …”
(Author: The original text simply
ends with the word “not”. There
There have been no known issues
with this paradigm to date. The
paradigm should only be applied
when the temperature is modest.
There have been no known issues
with this paradigm to date. The
paradigm should only be applied
when the temperature is modest.
This injection paradigm does not
put fluid into contact with
anything other than the strands
of the cables.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
60
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
are dozens of cases documented
in [18] and elsewhere of fluid
compatibility issues with splices
and elbows. The interested
reader should request a complete
accounting of all of the incidents
from the service supplier.)
2.4.1
Chemical, Compatibility,
Termination (riser)
Chemical, Compatibility,
Termination (riser)
Chemical, Compatibility,
Termination (riser)
Chemical, Compatibility,
Termination (riser)
2.4.1a
A live-front adapter leaks onto a
pothead.
A live-front adapter leaks onto a
pothead.
A live-front adapter leaks onto a
pothead.
An injection adapter leaks on a
live-front termination.
2.4.1b
When PMDMS/TMMS fluid
contacts a silicone cold-shrink
pothead, the silicone rubber
swells and loses much of its
mechanical strength.
When Perficio™ fluid contacts a
silicone cold-shrink pothead, the
silicone rubber swells and loses
much of its mechanical strength.
When Ultrinium™ fluid contacts a
silicone cold-shrink pothead, the
silicone rubber swells and loses
much of its mechanical strength.
When silane fluids contact a
silicone cold-shrink termination,
the silicone rubber swells and
loses much of its mechanical
strength.
2.4.1c
According to [8], such potheads
typically do not fail. Rather they
are observed by injection crews
at the end of the injection or soak
period and may be replaced.
Modest quantities of spillage
appear not to have an adverse
impact.
With no soak period, such spills
cause no damage to the
potheads, because the spill can
be wiped from the surface before
the silicone termination suffers a
multi-day exposure. Injection
adaptors are inspected for leaks
before reinstallation of
terminations. No such incident
has ever occurred.
With no soak period, such spills
cause no damage to the
potheads, because the spill can
be wiped from the surface before
the silicone termination suffers a
multi-day exposure. Injection
adaptors are inspected for leaks
before reinstallation of
terminations. No such incident
has ever occurred.
With monitored injection, such
spills cause no damage to the
potheads, because the spill can
be wiped from the surface before
the silicone termination is
reinstalled. All injection
adaptors are inspected for leaks
before reinstallation of
terminations. No such incident
has ever occurred.
2.4.1d
According to [8], the probability
of this happening with the
obsolete Elastimold design (TFIC)
is “very low”. The TFIC live-front
injection adaptor has been
replaced with a heat-shrink livefront design (service supplier p/n
11030-1), which has over four
times the pressure withstand
capability of the TFIC device and
a new Elastimold molded device.
There is an “unlikely” possibility
that any of the devices could fail
catastrophically when line
personnel are nearby. If the linepersonnel were nearby, they
would most likely be eight feet
away in a bucket.
Injection adaptor design
pressures are generally greater
than 30-times the injection
pressure. There is an “ultra-low”
probability that such a leak would
occur. It is “unlikely” that
personnel will be in the
immediate vicinity.
Injection adaptor design
pressures are generally greater
than 30-times the injection
pressure. There is an “ultra-low”
probability that such a leak would
occur. It is “unlikely” that
personnel will be in the
immediate vicinity.
Injection adaptor design
pressures are generally greater
than 3-times the injection
pressure. There is an “ultra-low”
probability that such a leak
would occur. It is “unlikely” that
personnel will be in the
immediate vicinity.
2.4.1e
The equipment impact is “low”
and the personnel ranking is
“high”.
The equipment impact is “low”
and the personnel ranking is
“high”.
The equipment impact is “low”
and the personnel ranking is
“high”.
The equipment impact is “low”
and the personnel ranking is
“high”.
2.4.1f
See 2.3.3.2.1f.
See 2.3.3.2.1f.
See 2.3.3.2.1f.
See 2.3.3.2.1f.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
61
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.4.1g
Avoid the use of silicone rubber
components. Use molded-rubber
or heat-shrink potheads. Use
appropriate PPE.
Use appropriate PPE.
Use appropriate PPE.
Utilize appropriate PPE.
2.4.1h
Risk (5,25)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●5x105=25
Risk (0.5,2.5)
Requipment=.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=.0005●0.05●5x105=2.5
Risk (0.5,2.5)
Requipment=.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=.0005●0.05●5x105=2.5
Risk (0.5,2.5)
Requipment=.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=.0005●0.05●5x105=2.5
2.4.2
Chemical, Compatibility, Coldshrink Splices
Chemical, Compatibility, Coldshrink Splices
Chemical, Compatibility, Coldshrink Splices
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cold-shrink Splices
2.4.2a
A 3M silicone cold-shrink splice is
inadvertently injected with
PMDMS/TMMS fluid.
A 3M silicone cold-shrink splice is
inadvertently injected with U732
fluid.
A 3M silicone cold-shrink splice is
inadvertently injected with U732
fluid.
2.4.2b
When PMDMS/TMMS fluid
contacts a silicone splice, the
silicone rubber swells, it may lose
its mechanical strength, and
because the geometry is distorted
may lose its electrical integrity.
When P011 fluid contacts a
silicone splice, the silicone rubber
swells, it may lose its mechanical
strength, and because the
geometry is distorted may lose its
electrical integrity.
When U732 fluid contacts a
silicone splice, the silicone rubber
swells, it may lose its mechanical
strength, and because the
geometry is distorted may lose its
electrical integrity.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm, because no
injection fluid ever comes in
contact with any splice.
2.4.2c
According to [8] and at least
through 2000, while actual
testing has not occurred, it is the
service supplier’s belief that the
3M silicone cold-shrink splice or
equivalents from other
manufacturers are not compatible
with PMDMS/TMMS fluid.
3M silicone cold-shrink splice or
equivalents from other
manufacturers are not compatible
with direct contact of P011 fluid.
3M silicone cold-shrink splice or
equivalents from other
manufacturers are not compatible
with direct contact of U732 fluid.
2.4.2d
The probability that this will occur
depends on the prevalence of
cold-shrink splices used to repair
cable failures.
The probability that this will occur
depends on the prevalence of
cold-shrink splices used to repair
cable failures.
The probability that this will occur
depends on the prevalence of
cold-shrink splices used to repair
cable failures.
2.4.2e
The splice will fail and a fault will
occur.
The splice will fail and a fault will
occur.
The splice will fail and a fault will
occur.
2.4.2f
Do not use silicone splices on
cables which may be treated with
UPR.
Do not use silicone splices on
cables, which may be treated
with UPR.
Do not use silicone splices on
cables, which may be treated
with UPR.
2.4.2g
The service has a kit, which
intersperses a heat-shrink
polyethylene layer to separate
fluid from 3M cold-shrink splice.
Circuit owners are advised to use
molded rubber splices or
injectable heat-shrink splices
from the service or Raychem.
A flow-through injection kit is
available for use with any splice.
The kit uses two metallic injection
adaptors to eliminate fluid
interaction with the splice.
A flow-through injection kit is
available for use with any splice.
The kit uses two metallic injection
adaptors to eliminate fluid
interaction with the splice.
2.4.2h
(Author: Clearly there is a risk
that silicone splices will be
inadvertently treated, because
there is no way to identify the
Risk (10,0)
Requipment=0.005●2x103=10
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●104=0
Risk (10,0)
Requipment=0.005●2x103=10
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●104=0
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
62
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
elastomeric material in an
existing direct buried splice.
Such exposed splices will likely
fail. See [18] for a complete
explanation.)
Risk (10,0)
Requipment=0.005●2x103=10
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●104=0
2.4.3
Chemical, Compatibility,
Dielectric Gloves
Chemical, Compatibility,
Dielectric Gloves
Chemical, Compatibility,
Dielectric Gloves
Chemical, Compatibility,
Dielectric Gloves
2.4.3a
CC3 fluid causes swelling of
dielectric gloves when fluid is
spilled on the gloves.
P011 fluids cause swelling of
dielectric gloves upon contact.
U732 fluids cause swelling of
dielectric gloves upon contact.
U732 fluids cause swelling of
dielectric gloves upon contact.
2.4.3b
The silicone fluids used for
rejuvenation are highly soluble in
the rubber of dielectric gloves.
Visible swelling is apparent after
fluid contacts a glove.
The silicone fluids used for
rejuvenation are highly soluble in
the rubber of dielectric gloves.
Visible swelling is apparent after
fluid contacts a glove.
The silicone fluids used for
rejuvenation are highly soluble in
the rubber of dielectric gloves.
Visible swelling is apparent after
fluid contacts a glove.
The silicone fluids used for
rejuvenation are highly soluble
in the rubber of dielectric gloves.
Visible swelling is apparent after
fluid contacts a glove.
2.4.3c
According to [8], FPL has tested
the performance of gloves after
contact with PMDMS/TMMS fluid.
Even in worst-case scenarios (i.e.
24 hours of exposure to droplets
of fluid), the gloves performance
met the gloves voltage withstand
requirement.
The same PMDMS monomer is
utilized for over 90% of CC3 and
P011 fluids (i.e. meet a 24 hour
exposure to droplets of fluid and
then have the gloves meet the
glove voltage withstand
requirement).
Alkoxysilanes of the type utilized
for injection would be expected to
perform similarly as described in
UPR with soak – CC3 (i.e. meet a
24 hour exposure to droplets of
fluid and then have the gloves
meet the glove voltage withstand
requirement).
Alkoxysilanes of the type utilized
for injection would be expected
to perform similarly as described
in the other injection paradigm
(i.e. meet a 24 hour exposure to
droplets of fluid and then have
the gloves meet the glove
voltage withstand requirement).
2.4.3d
Injection equipment and tools are
designed to minimize leaks.
Leather glove protectors are
required to protect dielectric
gloves from incidental fluid
contact. The probability of getting
fluid on the dielectric gloves is
“ultra-low”. If the gloves do come
in contact with the fluid, they will
“very likely” be worn at the time.
Injection equipment and injection
tools are designed to minimize
the probability of leaks. Leather
glove protectors are required to
protect dielectric gloves. The
probability of getting fluid on the
dielectric gloves is “ultra-low”. If
the gloves do come in contact
with the fluid, they will “very
likely” be worn at the time.
Injection equipment and injection
tools are designed to minimize
the probability of leaks. Leather
glove protectors are required to
protect dielectric gloves. The
probability of getting fluid on the
dielectric gloves is “ultra-low”. If
the gloves do come in contact
with the fluid, they will “very
likely” be worn at the time.
Injection equipment and
injection tools are designed to
minimize the probability of
leaks. Leather glove protectors
are required to protect dielectric
gloves. The probability of getting
fluid on the dielectric gloves is
“ultra-low”. If the gloves do
come in contact with the fluid,
they will “very likely” be worn at
the time.
2.4.3e
It is unlikely that there is any
adverse dielectric effect upon the
gloves. The impact is “none” for
equipment and “none” for
personnel.
It is unlikely that there is any
adverse dielectric effect upon the
gloves. The impact is “none” for
equipment and “none” for
personnel.
It is unlikely that there is any
adverse dielectric effect upon the
gloves. The impact is “none” for
equipment and “none” for
personnel.
It is unlikely that there is any
adverse dielectric effect upon
the gloves. The impact is “none”
for equipment and “none” for
personnel.
2.4.3f
Quick disconnect fittings reduce
the likelihood and quantity of
accidental spills during handling
when dielectric gloves are
required.
Equipment is designed to
minimize the chance of fluid
leaks.
Equipment is designed to
minimize the chance of fluid
leaks.
Injection is done deenergized,
there is no reason that fluid
should ever be near dielectric
gloves.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
63
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.4.3g
Except for aesthetics, there does
not appear to be any adverse
consequence.
Except for aesthetics, there does
not appear to be any adverse
consequence.
Except for aesthetics, there does
not appear to be any adverse
consequence.
Except for aesthetics, there does
not appear to be any adverse
consequence.
2.4.3h
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0
2.4.4
Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM
Components
Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM
Components
Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM
Components
Chemical, Compatibility,
EPDM Components
2.4.4a
PMDMS/TMMS fluids are more
soluble in EDPM and EPR rubbers
than they are in PE. The
introduction of PMDMS/TMMS
fluids into components such as
splices and elbow terminations
will lead to changes in the
physical and electrical properties
of component materials.
P011 fluid components are more
soluble in EDPM and EPR rubbers
than they are in PE. The
introduction of P011 fluids into
components such as splices and
elbow terminations will lead to
changes in the physical and
electrical properties of component
materials.
U732 fluids are more soluble in
EDPM and EPR rubbers than they
are in PE. The introduction of
U732 fluids into components such
as splices and elbow terminations
will lead to changes in the
physical and electrical properties
of component materials.
This risk is not applicable to this
injection paradigm, because the
injection fluid never comes in
contact with EDPM components.
2.4.4b
According to [8], silicone fluids
used for rejuvenation are very
soluble in EPDM and EPR.
Measurements made by
component manufactures indicate
the solubility at room
temperature is from 5% to 10%
by volume. At higher
temperatures the solubility
increases to as high as 40%.
(Author: More recent
measurements in [18] show even
higher swell.)
P011 fluid is very soluble in EPDM
and EPR. Measurements made by
component manufactures indicate
the solubility at room
temperature is from 5% to 10%
by volume. At higher
temperatures the solubility
increases to 50% or more.
U732 fluids are very soluble in
EPDM and EPR. Measurements
made by component
manufactures indicate the
solubility at room temperature is
from 5% to 10% by volume. At
higher temperatures the solubility
increases to 50% or more.
In excess of 24 million feet of
The experience is expected to be
cable had been injected during
slightly better than with the UPR
the period spanning 1986 to
with soak – CC3 paradigm
2000. During that period,
because the soak period has been
approximately 121,200 injectable
eliminated.
EPDM elbows and 57,100 splices
have come in direct contact with
PMDMS/TMMS fluids. Over that
time period 0.1% had failed.
(Author: Apparently there is at
least a 0.1% probability that
EPDM elbows or splices would
fail. See “Improving Posttreatment Reliability: Eliminating
Fluid-Component compatibility
Issues”, Bertini, ICC DG C26D,
Nov. 1, 2005 available at
http://www.novinium.com/pdf/pa
pers/ICCThe primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
The experience is expected to be
slightly better than with the UPR
with soak – CC3 paradigm
because the soak period has been
eliminated.
2.4.4c
64
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Fluid%20Component%20Interacti
ons.pdf and 2.3.3.1.3b for
documented cases. It has also
been reported that in hotter soils,
splices become soft and spongy.
Some utilities report much higher
splice failure rates.)
2.4.4d
According to [8], there is an
“ultra-low” probability of failure
based upon 14 years of field
experience. It is “unlikely” that
there would be any personnel
present, if a splice or an elbow
where to fail due to a
compatibility problem as the time
it would take for the material to
swell significantly would be
measured in days. (Author: My
earlier assessment in [8] was too
optimistic. The “ultra-low”
probability has been adjusted to
“very low”.)
Approximately 30% less than the
UPR with Soak – CC3 paradigm.
Approximately 30% less than the
UPR with Soak – CC3 paradigm.
2.4.4e
The equipment consequences are
“low” for direct buried splices and
“high” for elbows.
The equipment consequences are
“low” for direct buried splices and
“high” for elbows.
The equipment consequences are
“low” for direct buried splices and
“high” for elbows.
2.4.4f
Where operating temperatures
may escalate well above the
ambient soil temperature,
injectable splices with metallic or
PE layers should be installed to
prevent fluid from coming in
direct contact with the
component.
Where operating temperatures
may escalate well above the
ambient soil temperature,
injectable splices with metallic or
PE layers should be installed to
prevent fluid from coming in
direct contact with the
component.
Where operating temperatures
may escalate well above the
ambient soil temperature,
injectable splices with metallic or
PE layers should be installed to
prevent fluid from coming in
direct contact with the
component.
2.4.4g
Eye protection and flame
retardant clothing should be worn
near all energized rubber
components. A hot stick should
be utilized to operate energized
components to provide separation
between the component and the
operator.
Eye protection and flame
retardant clothing should be worn
near all energized rubber
components. A hot stick should
be utilized to operate energized
components to provide separation
between the component and the
operator.
Eye protection and flame
retardant clothing should be worn
near all energized rubber
components. A hot stick should
be utilized to operate energized
components to provide separation
between the component and the
operator.
2.4.4h
Risk (5,25)
Requipment=0.005●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●105=25
Risk (3.5,18)
Requipment=.005●70%●103=3.5
Rpersonnel=.005●70%●.05●105=18
Risk (3.5,18)
Requipment=.005●70%●103=3.5
Rpersonnel=.005●70%●.05●105=18
2.4.5
Chemical, Compatibility, Cable
Chemical, Compatibility, Cable
Chemical, Compatibility, Cable
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable
2.4.5a
By design, PMDMS/TMMS fluids
come into direct contact with
By design, P011 fluids come into
direct contact with cable
By design, U732 fluids come into
direct contact with cable
By design, fluids utilized by this
paradigm come into intimate
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
65
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
cable conductors and conductor
shields or screens. PMDMS/TMMS
fluid diffuses into the insulation,
the insulation shield, and jackets
(if present). (Author: The IHA
did not include an analysis of the
compatibility of fluids with
conductors. New analysis is
included as 2.4.5.6)
conductors and conductor shields
or screens. P011 fluid diffuses
into the insulation, the insulation
shield, and jackets (if present).
conductors and conductor shields
or screens. U732 fluid diffuses
into the insulation, the insulation
shield, and jackets (if present).
contact with cable conductors
and conductor shields or
screens, and conductor strands.
Fluid diffuses into the insulation
and, at low concentrations, into
insulation shields and jackets (if
present).
2.4.5b
PMDMS/TMMS fluid is soluble in
all polymeric insulations and
polymeric shields. The solubility
varies from 0.5% at ambient
temperatures to as high as 10%
for some materials. As the
silicone fluid components diffuse
into polymeric materials, they
change the electrical and physical
properties of the polymer. As the
temperature rises, the solubility
increases too. Silicone fluids flow
through the cable strands
interstices and make intimate
contact with electrical-mechanical
compression connectors in splices
and terminations. When applied
as required by the CPM, there are
no significant adverse effects.
P011 fluid is soluble in all
polymeric insulations and
polymeric shields. The solubility
varies from 0.5% at ambient
temperatures to as high as 10%
for some materials. As the
silicone fluid components diffuse
into polymeric materials, they
change the electrical and physical
properties of the polymer. As the
temperature rises, the solubility
increases too. Silicone fluids flow
through the cable strands
interstices and make intimate
contact with electrical-mechanical
compression connectors in splices
and terminations. When applied
as required by the NRIs, there
are no significant adverse effects.
U732 fluids are soluble in all
polymeric insulations and
polymeric shields. The solubility
varies from 0.5% at ambient
temperatures to as high as 10%
for some materials. As the
silicone fluid components diffuse
into polymeric materials, they
change the electrical and physical
properties of the polymer. As the
temperature rises, the solubility
increases too. Silicone fluids flow
through the cable strands
interstices and make intimate
contact with electrical-mechanical
compression connectors in splices
and terminations. When applied
as required by the NRIs, there
are no significant adverse effects.
The silicone dielectric
enhancement fluids used for
rejuvenation are soluble in
polymeric insulations and
polymeric shields. The solubility
at ambient temperatures varies
from 0.5% to as high as 10% for
some materials. As the silicone
enhancement fluid components
diffuse into polymeric materials,
they change the electrical and
physical properties of the
polymer. As the temperature
rises, the solubility increases
too. Silicone and organic fluids
flow through the cable strand
interstices and make intimate
contact with electricalmechanical compression
connectors in splices and
terminations. When applied as
required by the NRIs, there are
no significant adverse effects.
2.4.5c
According to [8], over 25 million
feet of cable had been injected
during the period spanning 1986
to 2000. There had been no
failures or performance deratings of cable except for a
single case at Arizona Public
Service described in section
2.4.5.4 during that time period.
(Author: Circa 2001 a series of
failures in Germany occurred as a
result of the incompatibility of the
injection fluid and aluminum
conductors. For a partial
discussion of the issues see
[2.4.5.6].
There have been no compatibility
issues.
There have been no compatibility
issues.
There have been no
compatibility issues.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
66
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
2.4.5.1
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Connectivity &
Ampacity
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Connectivity &
Ampacity
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Connectivity &
Ampacity
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Connectivity &
Ampacity
2.4.5.1a
Fluid in the conductor interstices
or in electrical-mechanical
connectors interferes with heat
transfer or conductivity at an
electrical-mechanical interface.
Fluid in the conductor interstices
or in electrical-mechanical
connectors interferes with heat
transfer or conductivity at an
electrical-mechanical interface.
Fluid in the conductor interstices
or in electrical-mechanical
connectors interferes with heat
transfer or conductivity at an
electrical-mechanical interface.
Fluid in the conductor interstices
or in electrical-mechanical
connectors interferes with heat
transfer or conductivity at an
electrical-mechanical interface.
2.4.5.1b
PMDMS/TMMS fluid flows through
cable interstices and comes in
direct contact with electricalmechanical connectors in
terminations and splices. There
are no known adverse effects
when applied as required by the
CPM. The thermal conductivity of
PMDMS/TMMS fluid is much
greater than the air, which it
displaces. The heat dissipation
from the conductor is slightly
improved. According to [8], in a
test (ANSI C119.4-1986)
performed by Hendrix Wire and
Cable and reported in [25], the
temperature of the conductor of
an injected cable was measurably
less than the temperature of an
otherwise identical unfilled
conductor.
P011 fluid flows through cable
interstices and comes in direct
contact with electrical-mechanical
connectors in terminations and
splices. There are no known
adverse effects when applied as
required by the NRIs. The
thermal conductivity of P011 fluid
is much greater than the air,
which it displaces. The heat
dissipation from the conductor is
slightly improved.
U732 fluids flow through cable
interstices and comes in direct
contact with electrical-mechanical
connectors in terminations and
splices. There are no known
adverse effects when applied as
required by the NRIs. The
thermal conductivity of U732 fluid
is much greater than the air,
which it displaces. The heat
dissipation from the conductor is
slightly improved.
The silicone and organic fluids
flow through the interstices of
cable strands and come in direct
contact with electricalmechanical connectors in splices
and terminations. When applied
as required by the Novinium
rejuvenation instructions, there
are no known adverse
consequences. Terminations and
joints enjoy improved ampacity
utilizing a patented injection
adaptor and a 360°
circumferential swage. Testing
at NEETRAC (utilizing ANSI
C119.4-2004) demonstrated a
connection superior to
conventional compression
techniques.
2.4.5.1c
According to [8], over 25 million
feet of cable were injected
between 1986 and 2000. There
are no known performance deratings of treated cables.
There are no known performance
deratings of treated cables.
There are no known performance
deratings of treated cables.
The ampacity of a treated cable
is greater than before treatment,
because of superior compression
connections.
2.4.5.1d
It is “not possible” that the
presence of fluid in the strands of
a cable will adversely affect the
ampacity of a cable or
compression connector. In fact,
the opposite effects have been
measured. It is “not possible”
that there would be any adverse
impact on personnel.
It is “not possible” that the
presence of fluid in the strands of
a cable will adversely affect the
ampacity of a cable or
compression connector. In fact,
the opposite effects have been
measured. It is “not possible”
that there would be any adverse
impact on personnel.
It is “not possible” that the
presence of fluid in the strands of
a cable will adversely affect the
ampacity of a cable or
compression connector. In fact,
the opposite effects have been
measured. It is “not possible”
that there would be any adverse
impact on personnel.
It is “not possible” that the
presence of fluid in the strands
of a cable will adversely affect
the ampacity of a cable or
compression connector. In fact,
the opposite effects have been
measured. It is “Not possible”
that there would be any adverse
impact on personnel.
2.4.5.1e
The equipment and personnel
consequence are “none”.
The equipment and personnel
consequence are “none”.
The equipment and personnel
consequence are “none”.
The equipment and personnel
consequence are “none”.
Explicit rejuvenation instructions
provide assurance that installed
components do not compromise
Explicit rejuvenation instructions
provide assurance that installed
components do not compromise
Explicit rejuvenation instructions
The service supplier has a set of
proprietary craft standards, which provide assurance that installed
components do not compromise
provides assurance that an
installed component enjoys its
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
2.4.5.1f
67
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
design ampacity.
connectivity or circuit ampacity.
connectivity or circuit ampacity.
connectivity or circuit ampacity.
2.4.5.1g
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
2.4.5.1h
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0.000=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0.000=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0.000=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●0.000=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0
2.4.5.2
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation
2.4.5.2a
PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses into
polymeric solid-dielectric
insulations and alters the
electrical and mechanical
properties. As long as the fluid
persists in the insulation in
meaningful quantities dielectric
reliability remains high.
Persistence is determined by the
combination of stoichiometric
efficiency, catalytic efficiency,
and in some cases the presence
of persistent co-products. See
[30].
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse into polymeric soliddielectric insulations and alter the
electrical and mechanical
properties. As long as the fluid
persists in the insulation in
meaningful quantities dielectric
reliability remains high.
Persistence is determined by the
combination of stoichiometric
efficiency, catalytic efficiency,
and in some cases the presence
of persistent co-products. See
[30].
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse into polymeric soliddielectric insulations and alter the
electrical and mechanical
properties. As long as the fluid
persists in the insulation in
meaningful quantities dielectric
reliability remains high.
Persistence is determined by the
combination of stoichiometric
efficiency, catalytic efficiency,
and in some cases the presence
of persistent co-products. See
[30].
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse into polymeric soliddielectric insulations and alter
the electrical and mechanical
properties. As long as the fluid
persists in the insulation in
meaningful quantities dielectric
reliability remains high.
Persistence is determined by the
combination of stoichiometric
efficiency, catalytic efficiency,
and in some cases the presence
of persistent co-products. See
[30].
The formulation of fluids used by
this paradigm is tailored to the
anticipated temperature profile of
the cable to be treated. For a
complete discussion of the
mechanisms of dielectric
enhancement, please see [17]. To
view the instructions for the fluid
selection process see NRI-20
available online at:
The formulation of fluids used by
this paradigm is tailored to the
anticipated temperature profile
of the cable to be treated. For a
complete discussion of the
mechanisms of dielectric
enhancement, please see [17].
To view the instructions for the
fluid selection process see NRI20 available online at:
P011 PMDMS fluid is designed to
PMDMS/TMMS fluid is designed to
diffuse through conductor shields
diffuse through conductor shields
and into PE solid-dielectric
and into PE solid-dielectric
insulation systems. While the
insulation systems. While the
fluid was not designed to treat
fluid was not designed to treat
EPR cables there are some results EPR cables there are some results
which demonstrate reasonable
which demonstrate reasonable
efficacy without any observed
efficacy without any observed
adverse consequences. PMDMS
adverse consequences.
fluid reacts (hydrolyzes) with
PMDMS/TMMS fluid reacts
water that is in the insulation,
(hydrolyzes) with water that is in
particularly the water associated
the insulation, particularly the
with water trees. The hydrolysis
water associated with water
reaction together with a
trees. The hydrolysis reaction
subsequent condensation reaction
together with a subsequent
in the presence of a DDBSA
condensation reaction in the
catalyst yields a short chain linear
presence of a titanium catalyst
oligomer, which has an average
yields a short chain linear
degree of polymerization (dp) of
oligomer, which has an average
six. This typical reaction is
degree of polymerization (dp) of
illustrated below. As the
six. This typical reaction is
condensation proceeds, the
illustrated below. As the
solubility values of the larger
condensation proceeds, the
oligomers are lower than the
solubility values of the larger
monomer and smaller oligomers.
oligomers are lower than the
Put another way, the solubility of
monomer and smaller oligomers.
the monomer is greater than the
Put another way, the solubility of
solubility of the dimer, which is
the monomer is greater than the
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
2.4.5.2b
68
www.novinium.com/instructions.aspx
The table below summarizes and
compares the stoichiometric
efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic
efficiency (Cat.) and the overall
efficiency from [37] and [38] of
U732 DDBSA catalyzed and
PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed
silane rejuvenation technology.
Efficiency
U732
DDBSA
PMDMS
TIPT
Stoich.
72%
68%
Cat.
98%
61%
Overall
71%
41%
SPR – U732
www.novinium.com/instructions.aspx
The table below summarizes and
compares the stoichiometric
efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic
efficiency (Cat.) and the overall
efficiency from [37] and [38] of
U732 DDBSA catalyzed and
PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed
silane rejuvenation technology.
Efficiency
U732
DDBSA
PMDMS
TIPT
Stoich.
72%
68%
Cat.
98%
61%
Overall
71%
41%
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
solubility of the dimer, which is
greater than the solubility of the
trimer, which is greater than the
solubility of the tetramer, which
is greater than the solubility of
the pentamer, which is greater
than the solubility of the
hexamer. As the condensation
reactions proceed and the
average solubility of the mixture
decreases, fluid accumulates in
the micro-voids characteristic of
water trees and other dielectric
defects. The net effect is an
increase in dielectric breakdown
strength.
greater than the solubility of the
trimer, which is greater than the
solubility of the tetramer, which
is greater than the solubility of
the pentamer, which is greater
than the solubility of the
hexamer. As the condensation
reactions proceed and the
average solubility of the mixture
decreases, fluid accumulates in
the micro-voids characteristic of
water trees and other dielectric
defects. The net effect is an
increase in dielectric breakdown
strength.
6 phenylmethyldimethoxysilane + 7 water  Hydroxyendblocked phenylmethylsiloxane (dp=6) + 7 methanol
According to [8], “Injection in
field and laboratory environments
have taken place with a wide
variety of solid dielectric
insulating materials including
high-molecular weight
polyethylene (HMWPE), crosslinked polyethylene (XLPE),
various polyethylene copolymer
blends, various (both pink and
black) ethylene propylene-rubber
(EPR) formulations, and butylrubber.” In one experiment
performed by CTL for Orange &
Rockland Utilities, a polyethylene
insulated URD cable was provided
with a reservoir of PMDMS fluid
and the temperature was cycled
from ambient (~25°C) to 90°C.
The solubility of all materials is
temperature dependent. The
severe thermal cycling together
with the reservoir of fluid created
supersaturation. In extreme
cases of supersaturation such as
the O&R experiment, the
insulation may swell to
6 phenylmethyldimethoxysilane + 7 water  Hydroxyendblocked phenylmethylsiloxane (dp=6) + 7 methanol
According to [8], “Injection in
field and laboratory environments
have taken place with a wide
variety of solid dielectric
insulating materials including
high-molecular weight
polyethylene (HMWPE), crosslinked polyethylene (XLPE),
various polyethylene copolymer
blends, various (both pink and
black) ethylene propylene-rubber
(EPR) formulations, and butylrubber.” In one experiment
performed by CTL for Orange &
Rockland Utilities, a polyethylene
insulated URD cable was provided
with a reservoir of PMDMS fluid
and the temperature was cycled
from ambient (~25°C) to 90°C.
The solubility of all materials is
temperature dependent. The
severe thermal cycling together
with the reservoir of fluid created
supersaturation. In extreme
cases of supersaturation such as
the O&R experiment, the
insulation may swell to
mechanical burst.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
69
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
mechanical burst.
The table below summarizes and
compares the stoichiometric
efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic
efficiency (Cat.) and the overall
efficiency from [37] and [38] of
U732 DDBSA catalyzed and
PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed
silane rejuvenation technology.
The table below summarizes and
compares the stoichiometric
efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic
efficiency (Cat.) and the overall
efficiency from [37] and [38] of
P011 DDBSA catalyzed and PMDMS
(CC3) TIPT catalyzed silane
rejuvenation technology.
Efficiency
2.4.5.2c
2.4.5.2d
Efficien- PMDMS
cy
DDBSA
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
There have been no incidents
with this paradigm as the fluid
formulation is tailored for each
application to avoid such a result.
A fluid reservoir is not attached to
the cable for a soak period.
The overall failure rate with this
paradigm since becoming
commercially available in 2008 is
0%, but is likely to be marginally
poorer than the when the same
fluid is applied with SPR and
substantially better than PMDMSbased CC3 and P011 fluids. The
failure rate is expected to be
between 0.5% and 1%.
There have been no incidents
with this paradigm as the fluid
formulation is tailored for each
application to avoid such a
result.
The overall failure rate with this
paradigm since becoming
commercially available in 2006 is
less than 0.5%.
The tailoring process inherently
minimizes this risk without the
introduction of diluting
compounds. All fluids injected
are designed to add reliable life
to the treated cable. There is an
“ultra-low” probability that the
presence of fluid in the strands of
a cable will create a condition
where failure due to over
saturation might occur. The
probability that personnel might
be adjacent to a fault, if such a
The tailoring process inherently
minimizes this risk without the
introduction of diluting
compounds. All fluids injected
are designed to add reliable life
to the treated cable. There is an
“ultra-low” probability that the
presence of fluid in the strands
of a cable will create a condition
where failure due to over
saturation might occur. The
probability that personnel might
be adjacent to a fault, if such a
PMDMS
TIPT
U732
DDBSA
PMDMS
TIPT
Stoich.
68%
68%
Stoich.
72%
68%
Cat.
98%
61%
Cat.
98%
61%
Overall
67%
41%
Overall
71%
41%
According to [8], over 25 million
feet of cable have been injected
during the period spanning 1986
to 2000. During that time period,
there was a single documented
case of supersaturation. There
were no other known problems
with insulation compatibility. The
single failure was a feeder circuit
in West Texas. The treated cable
belonged to Texas Utilities, now
Oncor. In [8], it was observed,
“A combination of unusually high
temperatures over a long period
of time along with excess fluid in
the strands was identified as the
cause of supersaturation and a
subsequent failure.”
The overall failure rate with this
paradigm is reported by the
supplier is “less than 1%.”
There have been no incidents
with this paradigm as a fluid
reservoir is not attached to the
cable for a soak period.
Procedural changes adopted after
the TU failure yield an “ultra-low”
probability that the presence of
fluid in the strands of a cable will
create a condition where failure
due to supersaturation may
occur. The probability that
personnel might be present when
such failures were to occur is
“unlikely”.
Having no connected reservoir
during a soak period yields an
“ultra-low” probability that the
presence of fluid in the strands of
a cable will create a condition
where failure due to supersaturation may occur. The probability
that personnel might be present
when such failures were to occur
is “unlikely”.
The overall failure rate with this
paradigm since becoming
commercially available in 2008 is
0%, but is likely to be only
slightly better than that
experienced by UPR with soak –
CC3 paradigm.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
70
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
failure were to occur, is “not
possible”
failure were to occur, is “not
possible”
2.4.5.2e
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
person-nel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will blow a fuse
or trip a breaker. The personnel
consequence rating is “life
threatening”, if the failure occurs
while a person is next to the
failure.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will blow a fuse
or trip a breaker. The personnel
consequence rating is “life
threatening”, if the failure occurs
while a person is next to the
failure.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will blow a fuse
or trip a breaker. The personnel
consequence rating is “life
threatening”, if the failure occurs
while a person is next to the
failure site.
2.4.5.2f
The injection service supplier filed
[4], U.S. patent 6,162,491, and
foreign equivalents on a method
to reduce the probability of
supersaturation. There are low
solubility non-functional
materials, which when added to
the PMDMS/TMMS fluid, dilute the
fugacity of the mixture to a point
where damaging supersaturation
is less likely. This fugacity
suppression material is a
dimethyl siloxane mixture, which
cross-links in situ, or CB fluid. CB
fluid has been in commercial use
since 1998 on cables where the
volume of the fluid in the cable’s
interstices might provide a
sufficient volume of
PMDMS/TMMS fluid to lead to
supersaturation with severe
temperature cycling.
When followed, NRIs eliminate
the possibility of over-saturation
without any dilution.
When followed, NRIs eliminate
the possibility of over-saturation
without any dilution.
When followed, NRIs eliminate
the possibility of over-saturation
without any dilution.
2.4.5.2g
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.4.5.2h
Risk (0.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
2.4.5.3
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor Shield
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor Shield
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor Shield
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor Shield
2.4.5.3a
PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses into
polymeric conductor shields and
may alter its electrical and
mechanical properties.
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse into polymeric conductor
shields and may alter its electrical
and mechanical properties.
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse into polymeric conductor
shields and may alter its electrical
and mechanical properties.
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse into polymeric conductor
shields and may alter its
electrical and mechanical
properties.
2.4.5.3b
PMDMS/TMMS fluid was designed
to diffuse through conductor
shields and into solid-dielectric
insulation systems. The
monomers hydrolyze with water
in the conductor shield. The
Dielectric enhancement fluids are
designed to diffuse through
conductor shields and into soliddielectric insulation systems. The
silane portion of the fluid reacts
with water that is present in the
Dielectric enhancement fluids are
designed to diffuse through
conductor shields and into soliddielectric insulation systems. The
silane portion of the fluid reacts
with water that is present in the
Dielectric enhancement fluids
are designed to diffuse through
conductor shields and into soliddielectric insulation systems. The
silane portion of the fluid reacts
with water that is present in the
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
71
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
resistivity of the conductor shield
is typically increased as the semiconductive carbon black is coated
with the dielectric silane.
conductor shield. The resistivity
of the conductor shield may
increase slightly as the semiconductive carbon black is coated
with the dielectric materials in the
formulation.
conductor shield. The resistivity
of the conductor shield may
increase slightly as the semiconductive carbon black is coated
with the dielectric materials in the
formulation.
conductor shield. The resistivity
of the conductor shield may
increase slightly as the semiconductive carbon black is
coated with the dielectric
materials in the formulation.
2.4.5.3c
According to [8], over 25 million
feet of cable have been injected
during the period spanning 1986
to 2001. During that period there
were no know failures caused by
alteration of the physical or
electrical properties of the
conductor shield. In laboratory
experiments, an increase in
conductor shield resistivity is
noted, but in no case has the
resistivity exceeded the value
allowed by the AEIC specification.
The increase in volume resistivity
is likely caused by the adsorption
of the PMDMS/TMMS fluid onto
the surfaces of the carbon black
agglomerates.
Over 90% of the P011 fluid used
in this injection paradigm is
identical to the monomer used by
the UPR with soak – CC3
paradigm. There have been no
failures attributable to a
conductor shield.
Fluids used in this injection
paradigm are similar to those
used by the UPR with soak – CC3
paradigm. There have been no
failures attributable to a
conductor shield.
Fluids used in this injection
paradigm are similar to those
used by the UPR with soak –
CC3 paradigm. There have been
no failures attributable to a
conductor shield.
2.4.5.3d
It is “not possible” to have a
materially negative impact on the
cable performance as
PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses
through the conductor shield.
According to [8], an experiment
undertaken for Entergy’s New
Orleans Metro unit, demonstrated
the AC breakdown performance
of a cable increased by 30% after
just 7 days. After 7 days, the
affect of the fluid on the
conductor shield is greatest and
the affect of the fluid on the
adjacent insulation has just
begun. It is “unlikely” that there
would be any personnel present
adjacent to a failure site.
It is “not possible” to have a
materially negative impact on
cable performance as
rejuvenation fluids permeate
through the conductor shield. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
failure site.
It is “not possible” to have a
materially negative impact on
cable performance as
rejuvenation fluids permeate
through the conductor shield. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
failure site.
It is “not possible” to have a
materially negative impact on
cable performance as
rejuvenation fluids permeate
through the conductor shield. It
is “unlikely” that there would be
any personnel present adjacent
to a failure site. As shown in
[22], AC breakdown strength
after 7 days is greater than 16
kV/mm (400 v/mil).
2.4.5.3e
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow
a fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
72
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
2.4.5.3f
None required.
None required.
None required.
None required.
2.4.5.3g
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.4.5.3h
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
Risk (0,0)
Requipment=0.0●103=0
Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0
2.4.5.4
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation Shield
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation Shield
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation Shield
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Insulation Shield
2.4.5.4a
PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuse
through conductor shields,
insulation, and finally to the
insulation shield. PMDMS/TMMS
fluid may change the electrical
and mechanical properties of the
shield. For out-side in injections
sometimes used on jacketed
cables, which have solid
conductors, or on jacketed
transmission cables, the
PMDMS/TMMS fluid will come in
direct contact with the insulation
shield.
PMDMS diffuses through
polymeric conductor shields,
insulation, and finally to the
insulation shield. The fluid may
change the electrical and
mechanical properties of the
shield. For outside-in injections
sometimes used on jacketed
cables, which have solid
conductors, or on jacketed
transmission cables, the fluid(s)
will come in direct contact with
the insulation shield.
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse through polymeric
conductor shields, insulation, and
finally to the insulation shield.
The fluid may change the
electrical and mechanical
properties of the shield. For
outside-in injections sometimes
used on jacketed cables, which
have solid conductors, or on
jacketed transmission cables, the
fluid(s) will come in direct contact
with the insulation shield.
Dielectric enhancements fluids
diffuse through polymeric
conductor shields, insulation,
and finally to the insulation
shield. The fluid may change the
electrical and mechanical
properties of the shield. For
outside-in injections sometimes
used on jacketed cables, which
have solid conductors, or on
jacketed transmission cables,
the fluid(s) will come in direct
contact with the insulation
shield.
2.4.5.4b
PMDMS/TMMS fluid was designed
to diffuse through the conductor
shield and through the insulation.
Normally, a very low
concentration of fluid will reach
the insulation shield where it may
hydrolyze with water present in
the insulation shield, if any
alkoxy functionality survives. The
resistivity of the insulation shield
may increase slightly. This
section 2.4.5.4 does not cover
any risks associated with this
normal case (99.99% of all
injections), but rather deals with
the unusual cases where
PMDMS/TMMS fluid comes into
direct contact with the insulation
shield, whether intentionally or
unintentionally. Most insulation
shield formulations in which
PMDMS/TMMS fluid has come in
direct contact behave similarly to
the conductor shields described in
2.4.5.3.
Dielectric enhancement fluids are
designed to diffuse through
conductor shields and through
insulation. A very small
concentration of fluid will reach
the insulation shield where it may
hydrolyze with water present in
the insulation shield, if any
alkoxysilane functionality
remains. The resistivity of the
insulation shield may increase
slightly. This section 2.4.5.4 does
not cover any risks associated
with this normal case (99.99% of
all injections), but rather deals
with the unusual cases where
fluid comes into direct contact
with the insulation shield whether
intentionally or unintentionally.
Most insulation shield
formulations in which fluid has
come in direct contact behave
similarly to the conductor shields
described in 2.4.5.3.
Dielectric enhancement fluids are
designed to diffuse through
conductor shields and through
insulation. A very small
concentration of fluid will reach
the insulation shield where it may
hydrolyze with water present in
the insulation shield, if any
alkoxysilane functionality
remains. The resistivity of the
insulation shield may increase
slightly. This section 2.4.5.4 does
not cover any risks associated
with this normal case (99.99% of
all injections), but rather deals
with the unusual cases where
fluid comes into direct contact
with the insulation shield whether
intentionally or unintentionally.
Most insulation shield
formulations in which fluid has
come in direct contact behave
similarly to the conductor shields
described in 2.4.5.3.
Dielectric enhancement fluids
are designed to diffuse through
conductor shields and through
insulation. A very small
concentration of fluid will reach
the insulation shield where it
may hydrolyze with water
present in the insulation shield,
if any alkoxysilane functionality
remains. The resistivity of the
insulation shield may increase
slightly. This section 2.4.5.4
does not cover any risks
associated with this normal case
(99.99% of all injections), but
rather deals with the unusual
cases where fluid comes into
direct contact with the insulation
shield whether intentionally or
unintentionally. Most insulation
shield formulations in which fluid
has come in direct contact
behave similarly to the
conductor shields described in
2.4.5.3.
2.4.5.4c
According to [8] and at least
through 2000, there had been
No such cases have occurred.
No such cases have occurred.
This paradigm does not inject
through splices, nor does the
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
73
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
fluid come in contact with elbows
or terminations. The probability
that dielectric enhancement fluid
will come in direct contact with
the insulation shield during
inside-out injection is very close
to zero. No such cases have
occurred.
only a single documented set of
case of damage to the insulation
shield. The incident occurred at
Arizona Public Service (APS)
when fluid inadvertently leaked
through a 750 kcm molded splice
interface and came into direct
contact with the insulation shield.
The insulation shield swelled, and
in several cases puckered up and
separated from the insulation.
Such a condition is unacceptable
and lead to rapid failure as partial
discharges undoubtedly occurred
in the bubbles under the shield.
2.4.5.4d
According to [8], there is an
“ultra-low” possibility that fluid
will come in intimate contact with
insulation shield material and
that there will be an
incompatibility between the fluid
and the shield material. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
failure site.
There is an “ultra-low” possibility
that fluid will come in intimate
contact with insulation shield
material and that there will be an
incompatibility between the fluid
and the shield material. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
failure site.
There is an “ultra-low” possibility
that fluid will come in intimate
contact with insulation shield
material and that there will be an
incompatibility between the fluid
and the shield material. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
failure site.
Because of the injection
paradigm, the scenario is at
least two times less likely that
fluid will come in intimate
contact with insulation shield
material and that there will be
an incompatibility between the
fluid and the shield material.
2.4.5.4e
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow
a fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening”, if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
2.4.5.4f
For outside-in injections, where
fluid is intentionally put into
direct contact with the insulation
shield, a fluid compatibility test
must be run on a sample of the
cable. Fluid is only injected under
the jacket after successful
completion of the compatibility
test. As a result of the APS
experience detailed in 2.4.5.4c,
injectable splice and termination
designs on feeder cables were
improved to hold pressure in
excess of the injection pressure
or the vapor pressure at elevated
temperatures. For conductors 4/0
and smaller (or smaller than 108
For outside-in injections, where
fluid is intentionally put into
direct contact with the insulation
shield, a fluid compatibility test
must be run on a sample of the
cable. Fluid is only injected under
the jacket after successful
completion of the compatibility
test. Injectable adaptors at
splices and terminations are
designed to hold pressure 5-10X
in excess of the injection
pressure. Vapor pressure is
negligible with P011 fluid used,
even at elevated temperatures.
For outside-in injections, where
fluid is intentionally put into
direct contact with the insulation
shield, a fluid compatibility test
must be run on a sample of the
cable. Fluid is only injected under
the jacket after successful
completion of the compatibility
test. Injectable adaptors at
splices and terminations are
designed to hold pressure 5-10X
in excess of the injection
pressure. Vapor pressure is
negligible with U732 fluids used,
even at elevated temperatures.
For outside-in injections, where
fluid is intentionally put into
direct contact with the insulation
shield, a fluid compatibility test
must be run on a sample of the
cable. Fluid is only injected
under the jacket after successful
completion of the compatibility
test. Injectable adaptors at
splices and terminations are
designed to hold pressure 5-10X
in excess of the injection
pressure. Vapor pressure is
negligible with U732 fluids used,
even at elevated temperatures.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
74
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
mm2), procedures require that air
pressure tests first confirm
components can withstand
pressures at least 10% higher
than those pressure to which they
will be subjected before being
injected.
2.4.5.4g
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
2.4.5.4h
Risk (0.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (0.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (0.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (0.25,12.2)
Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=25
2.4.5.5
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Jacket
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Jacket
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Jacket
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Jacket
2.4.5.5a
PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses
through the conductor shields,
through the insulation, and
through the insulation shield. If a
cable is jacketed, some small
concentration of fluid will diffuse
into the jacket and may alter its
electrical and mechanical
properties. For outside-in
injections which are occasionally
used on jacketed cables with solid
conductors or on jacketed
transmission cables, the
PMDMS/TMMS and/or CB fluid(s)
will come in direct contact with
the jacket interior.
Dielectric enhancement fluid
diffuses through the conductor
shields, through the insulation,
and through the insulation shield.
If a cable is jacketed, some small
concentration of fluid will diffuse
into the jacket and may alter its
electrical and mechanical
properties. For outside-in
injections which are occasionally
used on jacketed cables with solid
conductors or on jacketed
transmission cables, the
enhancement fluids will come in
direct contact with the jacket
interior.
Dielectric enhancement fluid
diffuses through the conductor
shields, through the insulation,
and through the insulation shield.
If a cable is jacketed, some small
concentration of fluid will diffuse
into the jacket and may alter its
electrical and mechanical
properties. For outside-in
injections which are occasionally
used on jacketed cables with solid
conductors or on jacketed
transmission cables, the
enhancement fluids will come in
direct contact with the jacket
interior.
Dielectric enhancement fluid
diffuses through the conductor
shields, through the insulation,
and through the insulation
shield. If a cable is jacketed,
some small concentration of fluid
will diffuse into the jacket and
may alter its electrical and
mechanical properties. For
outside-in injections which are
occasionally used on jacketed
cables with solid conductors or
on jacketed transmission cables,
the enhancement fluids will
come in direct contact with the
jacket interior.
Dielectric enhancement fluid
diffuses through conductor
shields, through the insulation,
and through the insulation shield.
The fluid then diffuse into the
jacket annulus. If there is any
alkoxy functionality remaining,
there will be some additional
hydrolysis with water in the
jacket annulus and the jacket as
it diffuses outward. 2.4.5.5 does
not cover any risks associated
with this normal case
(encompassing 99.99% of all
injections), but rather deals with
the unusual case where fluids
comes into intimate contact with
the jacket, whether intentionally
or unintentionally. Most PVC and
PE jackets are compatible with
Dielectric enhancement fluid
diffuses through conductor
shields, through the insulation,
and through the insulation
shield. The fluid then diffuse into
the jacket annulus. If there is
any alkoxy functionality
surviving, there will be some
additional hydrolysis with water
in the jacket annulus and the
jacket as it diffuses outward.
2.4.5.5 does not cover any risks
associated with this normal case
(encompassing 99.99% of all
injections), but rather deals with
the unusual case where fluids
comes into intimate contact with
the jacket, whether intentionally
or unintentionally. Most PVC and
PE jackets are compatible with
PMDMS fluid diffuses through
PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses
conductor shields, through the
through conductor shields,
insulation, and through the
through the insulation, and
insulation shield. The fluid then
through the insulation shield. The
diffuse into the jacket annulus. If
fluid then diffuse into the jacket
there is any alkoxy functionality
annulus. If there is any alkoxy
remaining, there will be some
functionality remaining, there will
additional hydrolysis with water
be some additional hydrolysis
in the jacket annulus and the
with water in the jacket annulus
jacket as it diffuses outward.
and the jacket as it diffuses
2.4.5.5 does not cover any risks
outward. 2.4.5.5 does not cover
associated with this normal case
any risks associated with this
(encompassing 99.99% of all
normal case (encompassing
injections), but rather deals with
99.99% of all injections), but
the unusual case where PMDMS
rather deals with the unusual
fluid comes into intimate contact
case where PMDMS/TMMS and/or
with the jacket, whether
CB fluid(s) comes into intimate
intentionally or unintentionally.
contact with the jacket, whether
Most PVC and PE jackets are
intentionally or unintentionally.
compatible with dielectric
Most PVC and PE jackets in which
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
2.4.5.5b
75
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
PMDMS/TMMS and/or CB fluid
has come in direct contact have
not had any material change to
their performance.
enhancements fluids utilized
within this paradigm.
dielectric enhancements fluids
utilized within this paradigm.
dielectric enhancements fluids
utilized within this paradigm.
2.4.5.5c
According to [8], a single case, at
Kassel (Germany) where a
transmission cable was treated
from the outside-in by injecting
the annular space between the
insulation shield and the PVC
jacket. Where the jacket was
unconstrained by the surrounding
soil, the jacket noticeably swelled
and created concern for the postinjection performance of the
jacket and cable. This injection
occurred in 1998 and no failures
have occurred at least through
2002. The cable had failed
repeatedly prior to treatment.
The issues would be the same as
with the UPR soak – CC3
paradigm. No instances of jacket
swelling have been reported.
The issues would be the same as
with the UPR soak – CC3
paradigm. No instances of jacket
swelling have been reported.
The issues would be the same as
with the UPR soak – CC3
paradigm. No instances of
jacket swelling have been
reported.
2.4.5.5d
According to [8], there is an
“ultra-low” possibility that fluid
will come in direct contact with
jacket material, which has not
previously been compatibility
tested. It is “unlikely” that there
would be any personnel present
adjacent to a jacket breach site.
There is an “ultra-low” possibility
that fluid will come in direct
contact with jacket material,
which has not previously been
compatibility tested. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
jacket breach site. Because there
is no soak period the probability
is reduced by at least a factor of
2.
There is an “ultra-low” possibility
that fluid will come in direct
contact with jacket material,
which has not previously been
compatibility tested. It is
“unlikely” that there would be any
personnel present adjacent to a
jacket breach site. Because there
is no soak period the probability
is reduced by at least a factor of
2.
There is an “ultra-low” possibility
that fluid will come in direct
contact with jacket material,
which has not previously been
compatibility tested. It is
“unlikely” that there would be
any personnel present adjacent
to a jacket breach site. Because
there is no soak period the
probability is reduced by at least
a factor of 2.
2.4.5.5e
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening” if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening” if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow a
fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening” if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
The equipment consequence is
“low” as a failure will likely blow
a fuse or trip a breaker. The
personnel consequence rating is
“life threatening” if the failure
occurs while a person is next to
the failure site.
2.4.5.5f
Procedures require the performance of a fluid compatibility test
on jacketing and insulation shield
materials before fluid is placed in
direct contact with those materials in field applications. Injectable splice and termination
designs on feeder cables are
intended to hold pressure in
excess of the injection pressure
or any fluid vapor pressure at
Procedures require the
performance of a fluid
compatibility test on jacketing
and insulation shield materials
before fluid is placed in direct
contact with those materials in
field applications. Injectable
splice and termination designs on
feeder cables are designed to
hold 5-10X of the injection
pressure. Vapor pressure, even
Procedures require the
performance of a fluid
compatibility test on jacketing
and insulation shield materials
before fluid is placed in direct
contact with those materials in
field applications. Injectable
splice and termination designs on
feeder cables are designed to
hold 5-10X of the injection
pressure. Vapor pressure, even
Procedures require the
performance of a fluid
compatibility test on jacketing
and insulation shield materials
before fluid is placed in direct
contact with those materials in
field applications. Injectable
splice and termination designs
on feeder cables are designed to
hold 5-10X of the injection
pressure. Vapor pressure, even
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
76
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
temperatures above ambient. For
cables with conductors 4/0 and
smaller (or smaller than 108
mm2), air pressure tests confirm
components can withstand
pressures at least 10% higher
than those pressure to which they
will be subjected.
at maximum cable design
temperatures, is
inconsequentially low.
at maximum cable design
temperatures, is
inconsequentially low.
at maximum cable design
temperatures, is
inconsequentially low.
2.4.5.5g
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
2.4.5.5h
Risk (0.5,25)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25
Risk (0.25,12.25)
Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.25
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12
Risk (0.25,12.25)
Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.25
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12
Risk (0.25,12.25)
Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.25
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12
2.4.5.6
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor
Chemical, Compatibility,
Cable, Conductor
2.4.5.6a
(Author: The IHA did not include
an analysis of the compatibility of
fluids with conductors. The
entirety of this section 2.4.5.6 is
a new contribution and is in italics
to designate it as such.) The
PMDMS/TMMS fluid comes into
direct contact with stranded
conductors. In addition to the
injected fluids, reaction products
and by-products (esp. methanol)
also come into direct contact with
the aluminum or copper
conductor strands. This section
explores the compatibility of
these chemicals with the
conductor.
P011 fluids come into direct
contact with stranded conductors.
In addition to the injected fluids,
reaction products and byproducts (esp. methanol) also
come into direct contact with the
aluminum or copper conductor
strands. This section explores
the compatibility of these
chemicals with the conductor.
U732 fluids come into direct
contact with stranded conductors.
In addition to the injected fluids,
reaction products and byproducts (esp. methanol) also
come into direct contact with the
aluminum or copper conductor
strands. This section explores
the compatibility of these
chemicals with the conductor.
U732 fluids come into direct
contact with stranded
conductors. In addition to the
injected fluids, reaction products
and by-products (esp. methanol)
also come into direct contact
with the aluminum or copper
conductor strands. This section
explores the compatibility of
these chemicals with the
conductor.
U732 fluids utilized with this
paradigm include methoxy-silanes.
When these silanes mix with water
dispersed in the strands, the
strand shield, and insulation of a
cable, they react (hydrolyze) with
the water and liberate methanol as
a by-product. Methanol is a known
corrosive agent to aluminum.
Copper does not suffer the same
issue. The total methanol
produced is 25% or less of the unit
mass of dielectric enhancement
fluid supplied to the strands
compared to CC3. Methanol is a
relatively small molecule and
hence it diffuses quite rapidly from
the cable interior into the
U732 fluids utilized with this
paradigm include methoxysilanes. When these silanes mix
with water dispersed in the
strands, the strand shield, and
insulation of a cable, they react
(hydrolyze) with the water and
liberate methanol as a byproduct. Methanol is a known
corrosive agent to aluminum.
Copper does not suffer the same
issue. The total methanol
produced is 25% or less of the
unit mass of dielectric
enhancement fluid supplied to
the strands compared to CC3.
Methanol is a relatively small
molecule and hence it diffuses
The PMDMS component of P011 is
PMDMS and TMMS are methoxya methoxy-silane. When this
silane. When they mix with water
silane mixes with water dispersed
dispersed in the strands, the
in the strands, the strand shield,
strand shield, and insulation of a
and insulation of a cable, they
cable, the silanes react
react (hydrolyze) with the water
(hydrolyze) with the water and
and liberate methanol as a byliberate methanol as a byproduct. Methanol is a known
product. Methanol is a known
corrosive agent to aluminum.
corrosive agent to aluminum.
Copper does not suffer the same
Copper does not suffer the same
issue. The total methanol
issue. The total methanol
produced is 7% or less of the unit
produced is about 30% of the
mass of dielectric enhancement
unit mass of PMDMS/TMMS
fluid supplied to the strands
mixture supplied to the strands.
compared to CC3. Methanol is a
Methanol is a relatively small
relatively small molecule and
molecule and hence it diffuses
hence it diffuses quite rapidly from
quite rapidly from the cable
the cable interior into the
interior into the surrounding
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
2.4.5.6b
77
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
environment. Aluminum
corrosion occurs whenever
methanol and aluminum are
together in an anhydrous (i.e.
water-free) environment.
PMDMS/TMMS create an
anhydrous environment shortly
after injection. This corrosion is
accelerated by three factors:
surrounding environment.
Aluminum corrosion occurs
whenever methanol and aluminum
are together in an anhydrous (i.e.
water-free) environment. The
PMDMS of P011 creates an
anhydrous environment shortly
after injection. This corrosion is
accelerated by two factors:
surrounding environment.
Aluminum corrosion occurs
whenever methanol and aluminum
are together in an anhydrous (i.e.
water-free) environment. The
methoxy silanes of U732 fluid
create an anhydrous environment
shortly after injection. This
corrosion is accelerated by two
factors:
quite rapidly from the cable
interior into the surrounding
environment. Aluminum
corrosion occurs whenever
methanol and aluminum are
together in an anhydrous (i.e.
water-free) environment. The
methoxy silanes of U732 fluid
create an anhydrous
environment shortly after
injection. This corrosion is
accelerated by two factors:
1. Higher concentrations of
methanol in the strands
2. Higher temperatures
3. The presence of certain
organometallic catalysts
including titanium (IV)
isopropoxide, which is the
catalyst utilized in all
variations of PMDMS/TMMS
mixtures used for over two
decades.
Higher concentrations of
methanol are possible when there
is a lot of water near the
conductor (in the conductor
shield) or when there are
characteristics of the cable
design, which slow the exudation
of methanol such as jackets. The
existence of methanol in the
cable interior is transient, since
the methanol is ultimately
fugitive, and the total quantity of
methoxy ligand supplied by the
fluid is finite.
Higher temperatures have two
accelerating effects. First, higher
temperatures accelerate all
chemical reactions. Second,
volatile components can begin to
boil. This boiling mechanically
scours surfaces and may remove
the protective patina (selfforming protective coating on
aluminum surface of oxides and
hydroxides). Both the TMMS
component of the flammable
silane mixture and the methanol
by-product have boiling points
1. Higher concentrations of
methanol in the strands
2. Higher temperatures
Higher concentrations of methanol
are possible when there is a lot of
water near the conductor or when
there are characteristics of the
cable design, which slow the
exudation of methanol such as
jackets. The existence of
methanol in the cable interior is
transient, since the methanol is
ultimately fugitive, and the total
quantity of methoxy ligand
supplied by the fluid is finite.
Higher temperatures have two
accelerating effects. First, higher
temperature accelerates all
chemical reactions. Second, the
methanol by-product is volatile
and can begin to boil. This
boiling can mechanically scours
surfaces and may remove the
protective patina (self-forming
protective coating on aluminum
surface of oxides and hydroxides)
if no steps are taken to stabilize
the patina. The methanol byproduct has a boiling point well
below the 90°C maximum
operating temperature of most
medium voltage power cables.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
78
1. Higher concentrations of
methanol in the strands
2. Higher temperatures
Higher concentrations of methanol
are possible when there is a lot of
water near the conductor or when
there are characteristics of the
cable design, which slow the
exudation of methanol such as
jackets. The existence of
methanol in the cable interior is
transient, since the methanol is
ultimately fugitive, and the total
quantity of methoxy ligand
supplied by the fluid is finite.
Higher temperatures have two
accelerating effects. First, higher
temperature accelerates all
chemical reactions. Second, the
methanol by-product is volatile
and can begin to boil. This
boiling can mechanically scours
surfaces and may remove the
protective patina (self-forming
protective coating on aluminum
surface of oxides and hydroxides)
if no steps are taken to stabilize
the patina. The methanol byproduct has a boiling point well
below the 90°C maximum
operating temperature of most
medium voltage power cables.
1. Higher concentrations of
methanol in the strands
2. Higher temperatures
Higher concentrations of
methanol are possible when
there is a lot of water near the
conductor or when there are
characteristics of the cable
design, which slow the exudation
of methanol such as jackets.
The existence of methanol in the
cable interior is transient, since
the methanol is ultimately
fugitive, and the total quantity of
methoxy ligand supplied by the
fluid is finite.
Higher temperatures have two
accelerating effects. First,
higher temperature accelerates
all chemical reactions. Second,
the methanol by-product is
volatile and can begin to boil.
This boiling can mechanically
scours surfaces and may remove
the protective patina (selfforming protective coating on
aluminum surface of oxides and
hydroxides) if no steps are taken
to stabilize the patina. The
methanol by-product has a
boiling point well below the 90°C
maximum operating temperature
of most medium voltage power
cables.
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
well below the 90°C maximum
operating temperature of most
medium voltage power cables.
Titanium (IV) isopropoxide (a.k.a.
tetraisopropyl-titanate or TIPT),
even in catalytic quantities,
accelerates this corrosion.
2.4.5.6c
References [3] and [16] provide a
public case history of significant
cable failures due to methanolic
corrosion of aluminum at the
German utility E.On.
There is no evidence of
methanolic corrosion in treated
cables.
There is no evidence of
methanolic corrosion in treated
cables.
There is no evidence of
methanolic corrosion in treated
cables.
2.4.5.6d
There is an “ultra-low” possibility
that the conditions for significant
methanolic corrosion will occur. It
is “unlikely” that there would be
any personnel present adjacent
to a fault.
Due to the absence of corrosion
catalyst, the lower concentration
of methanol and the addition of
corrosion inhibitors, the “ultralow” possibility that the
conditions for significant
methanolic corrosion will occur is
at least half that of the CC3 fluid.
It is “unlikely” that there would
be any personnel present
adjacent to a fault.
Due to the absence of corrosion
catalyst, the lower concentration
of methanol, and the addition of
corrosion inhibitors, the “ultralow” possibility that the
conditions for significant
methanolic corrosion will occur is
at least half that of the CC3 fluid.
It is “unlikely” that there would
be any personnel present
adjacent to a fault.
Due to the absence of corrosion
catalyst and the addition of
corrosion inhibitors, the “ultralow” possibility that the
conditions for significant
methanolic corrosion will occur is
at least half that of the
flammable silane fluid. It is
“unlikely” that there would be
any personnel present adjacent
to a fault.
2.4.5.6e
The equipment consequence is
“high” as a failure will destroy the
cable. The personnel
consequence rating is “none”.
The equipment consequence is
“high” as a failure will destroy the
cable. The personnel
consequence rating is “none”.
The equipment consequence is
“high” as a failure will destroy the
cable. The personnel
consequence rating is “none”.
The equipment consequence is
“high” as a failure will destroy
the cable. The personnel
consequence rating is “none”.
2.4.5.6f
In 2005, the injection service
supplier reduced the
concentration of TMMS six-fold to
reduce the boiling point of the
fluid as described in [15] and
[24]. Future publications from
the authors will provide further
insight. The interested reader
may inquire with the author or
with the service supplier.
P011 fluids used in this paradigm
have no organo-metallic catalysts
which may contribute to
methanolic corrosion and include
specific corrosion inhibitors.
U732 fluids used in this paradigm
have no organo-metallic catalysts
which may contribute to
methanolic corrosion and include
specific corrosion inhibitors.
U732 fluids used in this
paradigm have no organometallic catalysts which may
contribute to methanolic
corrosion and include specific
corrosion inhibitors.
2.4.5.6g
The service supplier provides a
conditional money back
guarantee.
The service supplier provides an
unconditional money back
guarantee.
The service supplier provides an
unconditional money back
guarantee.
The service supplier provides an
unconditional money back
guarantee.
2.4.5.6h
Risk (2.5,0)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=2.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0
Risk (1.2,0)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0
Risk (1.2,0)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0
Risk (1.2,0)
Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2
Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0
3
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
3a
Everyday hazards continue to be
the most prevalent risks for
injection crews. Operational risks
include all non-electrical and non-
Everyday hazards continue to be
the most prevalent risks for
injection crews. Operational risks
include all non-electrical and non-
Everyday hazards continue to be
the most prevalent risks for
injection crews. Operational risks
include all non-electrical and non-
Everyday hazards continue to be
the most prevalent risks for
injection crews. Operational risks
include all non-electrical and
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
79
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
chemical risks.
chemical risks.
chemical risks.
non-chemical risks.
3.1
Operational, Dig-ins
Operational, Dig-ins
Operational, Dig-ins
Operational, Dig-ins
3.1a
Splice excavation with a backhoe
or a shovel may damage another
utility.
Splice excavation with a backhoe
or a shovel may damage another
utility.
Splice excavation with a backhoe
or a shovel may damage another
utility.
Splice excavation with a backhoe
or a shovel may damage another
utility.
3.1b
Injection has a much lower
incidence of dig-ins than
replacement utilizing trenching or
guided tunneling.
Injection has a much lower
incidence of dig-ins than
replacement utilizing trenching or
guided tunneling.
Injection has a much lower
incidence of dig-ins than
replacement utilizing trenching or
guided tunneling.
Injection has a much lower
incidence of dig-ins than
replacement utilizing trenching
or guided tunneling.
3.1c
According to [8] in a 12 month
period in 1996-97, the service
supplier experienced the
following: mismarked hits were 0,
unmarked hits were 3, and
marked hits were 4. The
following 9 month period included
the following: mismarked hits
were 0, unmarked hits were 1,
and marked hits were 0.
Hits of all types are zero after
over 40 months of operation.
Hits of all types are zero after
over 40 months of operation.
Hits of all types are zero after
over 40 months of operation.
3.1d
According to [8], the probability
is “ultra-low” and the presence of
personnel near the utility strike is
“very likely”.
This paradigm requires the same
number of pits dug as UPR with
soak – CC3.
This paradigm requires the same
number of pits dug as UPR with
soak – CC3.
This paradigm generally requires
twice as many spices to be dug.
The teams performing the work
are more practiced at the art. It
is believed that these two effects
cancel each other out. The
probability is “ultra-low” times 2,
divided by 2, while the presence
of personnel near the utility
strike is “very likely”.
3.1e
The equipment consequences are
“very high” while the personnel
ranking varies from “none” to
“life-threatening” depending on
the utility struck.
The equipment consequences are
“very high” while the personnel
ranking varies from “none” to
“life-threatening” depending on
the utility struck.
The equipment consequences are
“very high” while the personnel
ranking varies from “none” to
“life-threatening” depending on
the utility struck.
The equipment consequences
are “very high” while the
personnel ranking varies from
“none” to “life-threatening”
depending on the utility struck.
3.1f
Use a utility locating service,
hand dig within 18” of known
utilities. Dig slowly with
mechanized equipment.
Use a utility locating service,
hand dig within 18” of known
utilities. Dig slowly with
mechanized equipment. Use
vacuum excavation equipment or
other soft-dig technology
wherever possible. Maximize the
use of SPR to minimize the use of
UPR.
Use a utility locating service,
hand dig within 18” of known
utilities. Dig slowly with
mechanized equipment. Use
vacuum excavation equipment or
other soft-dig technology
wherever possible. Maximize the
use of SPR to minimize the use of
UPR.
Use a utility locating service,
hand dig within 18” of known
utilities. Dig slowly with
mechanized equipment. Use
vacuum excavation equipment
or other soft-dig technology
wherever possible.
3.1g
Keep all unnecessary personnel
and the public away from the
excavation.
Keep all unnecessary personnel
and the public away from the
excavation.
Keep all unnecessary personnel
and the public away from the
excavation.
Keep all unnecessary personnel
and the public away from the
excavation.
Risk (5,450)
Requipment=0.0005●104=5
Risk (5,450) (prob. adjust cancel)
Requipment=0.0005●104=5
Risk (5,450)
Risk (5,450)
Requipment=0.0005●104=5
Requipment=0.0005●104=5
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
3.1h
80
SPR – U732
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450
3.2
Operational, Driving Accidents
Operational, Driving Accidents
Operational, Driving Accidents
Operational, Driving
Accidents
3.2a
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock a traffic accident
occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock a traffic accident
occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock a traffic accident
occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock a traffic
accident occurs.
3.2b
Probably because of the smaller
equipment sizes and typically
better trained operators, injection
crews have a much lower
incidence of traffic accidents than
conventional replacement crews
or guided tunneling crews.
Probably because of the smaller
equipment sizes and typically
better trained operators, injection
crews have a much lower
incidence of traffic accidents than
conventional replacement crews
or guided tunneling crews.
Probably because of the smaller
equipment sizes and typically
better trained operators, injection
crews have a much lower
incidence of traffic accidents than
conventional replacement crews
or guided tunneling crews.
Smaller vehicles, because of the
elimination of 2 tanks for each
segment and lightweight and
portable equipment, reduce the
likelihood of traffic accidents in
this paradigm beyond the
already low rate enjoyed by the
other paradigm.
3.2.1
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Job Site
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Job Site
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Job Site
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Job Site
3.2.1a
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock to and from job
sites a traffic accident occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock to and from job
sites a traffic accident occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock to and from job
sites a traffic accident occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock to and from job
sites a traffic accident occurs.
3.2.1b
See 3.2b.
See 3.2b.
See 3.2b.
See 3.2b.
3.2.1c
According to [8], the service
supplier experienced 2 nonpreventable vehicle accidents and
1 preventable vehicle accidents
during the 12 months in 1996-97.
During the next 9 months, there
were 2 non-preventable and 0
preventable vehicle accidents.
Zero traffic incidents after over
40 months of operation.
Zero traffic incidents after over
40 months of operation.
Zero traffic incidents after over
40 months of operation.
3.2.1d
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”.
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”. Because of the
elimination of the soak period at
least 1/3 of the site visits are
eliminated, the total driving
required is about 2/3-times the
UPR with soak – CC3 injection
paradigm.
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”. Because of the
elimination of the soak period at
least 1/3 of the site visits are
eliminated, the total driving
required is about 2/3-times the
UPR with soak – CC3 injection
paradigm.
Because of the single visit
injection paradigm, the total
driving required is about 3-times
less than the UPR with soak –
CC3 injection paradigm.
3.2.1e
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
3.2.1f
Drive carefully.
Value-based safety culture;
“How’s my driving?” program;
GPS exception monitoring for
speeding; employee background
checks; zero alcohol and drug
Value-based safety culture;
“How’s my driving?” program;
GPS exception monitoring for
speeding; employee background
checks; zero alcohol and drug
Value-based safety culture;
“How’s my driving?” program;
GPS exception monitoring for
speeding; employee background
checks; zero alcohol and drug
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
81
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
policy.
policy.
SPR – U732
policy.
3.2.1g
Drive carefully.
Equipment and fluids in separate
compartment from personnel;
non-flammable fluids only.
Equipment and fluids in separate
compartment from personnel;
non-flammable fluids only.
Equipment and fluids in separate
compartment from personnel;
non-flammable fluids only.
3.2.1h
Risk (0,500)
Requipment = 0.0005 x 0 = 0
Rpersonnel = 0.0005 x 1 x 106 = 500
Risk (0,333)
Requipment=0.0005●2/3●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●2/3●1●106=333
Risk (0,333)
Requipment=0.0005●2/3●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●2/3●1●106=333
Risk (0,167)
Requipment=0.0005/3●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005/3●1●106=167
3.2.2
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Non-Job Site
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Non-Job Site
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Non-Job Site
Operational, Driving
Accidents, Non-Job Site
3.2.2a
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock for purposed
outside of work, a traffic accident
occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock for purposed
outside of work, a traffic accident
occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock for purposed
outside of work, a traffic accident
occurs.
When driving trucks, cars and
other fleet stock for purposed
outside of work, a traffic
accident occurs.
3.2.2b
See 3.2b.
See 3.2b.
See 3.2b.
See 3.2b.
3.2.2c
No data available.
Novinium has suffered a single
incident where an employee
drove a company vehicle after
hours and after consuming
alcohol against company policy.
The vehicle was totaled the driver
and passenger were unhurt.
Novinium has suffered a single
incident where an employee
drove a company vehicle after
hours and after consuming
alcohol against company policy.
The vehicle was totaled the driver
and passenger were unhurt.
Novinium has suffered a single
incident where an employee
drove a company vehicle after
hours and after consuming
alcohol against company policy.
The vehicle was totaled the
driver and passenger were
unhurt.
3.2.2d
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”.
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”.
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”.
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
during a traffic accident is
“certain”.
3.2.2e
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” while the
personnel ranking is “life
threatening”.
3.2.2f
Drive carefully.
Value-based safety culture;
“How’s my driving?” program;
GPS exception monitoring for
speeding; employee background
checks; zero alcohol and drug
policy.
Value-based safety culture;
“How’s my driving?” program;
GPS exception monitoring for
speeding; employee background
checks; zero alcohol and drug
policy.
Value-based safety culture;
“How’s my driving?” program;
GPS exception monitoring for
speeding; employee background
checks; zero alcohol and drug
policy.
3.2.2g
Drive carefully.
Equipment and fluids in separate
compartment from personnel;
non-flammable fluids only.
Equipment and fluids in separate
compartment from personnel;
non-flammable fluids only.
Equipment and fluids in separate
compartment from personnel;
non-flammable fluids only.
3.2.2h
Risk (0,500)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500
Risk (0,500)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500
Risk (0,500)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500
Risk (0,500)
Requipment=0.0005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500
3.3
Operational, Mechanical
injuries (sprains, strains,
cuts, bruises, etc.)
Operational, Mechanical
injuries (sprains, strains,
cuts, bruises, etc.)
Operational, Mechanical
injuries (sprains, strains,
cuts, bruises, etc.)
Operational, Mechanical
injuries (sprains, strains,
cuts, bruises, etc.)
3.3a
Miscellaneous.
Miscellaneous.
Miscellaneous.
Miscellaneous.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
82
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
3.3b
Nothing specific.
Nothing specific.
Nothing specific.
Nothing specific.
3.3c
For 12 months in 1996-1998, the
service supplier reported OSHA
injuries/illnesses were 8. For the
following 9 months ending
12/1997, there were 2.
Zero incidents after over 40
months of operation.
Zero incidents after over 40
months of operation.
Zero incidents after over 40
months of operation.
3.3d
The probability is “very low”,
while the presence of personnel is
“certain”.
The probability is “very low”,
while the presence of personnel is
“certain”.
The probability is “very low”,
while the presence of personnel is
“certain”.
The probability is “very low”,
while the presence of personnel
is “certain”.
3.3e
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” and the
personnel rankings are “low”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” and the
personnel rankings are “low”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” and the
personnel rankings are “low”.
The equipment consequences to
the utility are “none” and the
personnel rankings are “low”.
3.3f
Be careful.
Below zero safety culture.
Below zero safety culture.
Below zero safety culture.
3.3g
Be careful.
Below zero safety culture.
Below zero safety culture.
Below zero safety culture.
3.3h
Risk (0,5)
Requipment=0.005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5
Risk (0,5)
Requipment=0.005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5
Risk (0,5)
Requipment=0.005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5
Risk (0,5)
Requipment=0.005●0=0
Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5
3.4
Operational, Hydraulic failure
Operational, Hydraulic failure
Operational, Hydraulic failure
Operational, Hydraulic failure
3.4a
Pressures used to inject cable
may exceed the hoop strength of
a circuit component. Circuit
components include the cable and
attached accessories such as
elbows and splices. (Author:
The IHA did not identify this risk,
there was no discussion provided
in the 2001 document.
Accordingly, the entirety of this
section 3.4 is in italics to identify
the source of the discussion as
the work of the current author at
the published date of this entire
document.)
This risk is not encountered with
this injection paradigm, as
moderate pressure injection is
not practiced within this
paradigm.
This risk is not encountered with
this injection paradigm, as
moderate pressure injection is
not practiced within this
paradigm.
Pressures used to inject cable
may exceed the hoop strength of
a cable. All cable accessories
are separated from the fluid
pressure by stainless steel
injection adaptors.
A pressure difference between
two cable ends is used to
provide the driving force for fluid
to be injected into the tiny
interstitial spaces between the
strands. The greater the
pressure difference, the faster
the fluid will flow. There are two
phases of the injection which are
referred to as “feed” and
“decay.” During the feed phase,
fluid is injected at moderate
pressures of 100 to 400 psig for
XLPE cable. A vacuum of about
10 psig may be applied to the
3.4b
A pressure difference between
two cable ends is used to provide
the driving force for fluid to be
injected into the tiny interstitial
spaces between the strands. The
greater the pressure difference,
the faster the fluid will flow.
There are two phases of the
injection, which are referred to as
“feed” and “soak.” During the
feed phase, fluid is injected at
either medium pressures of 250
to 500 psig, as for example in
[26] and [27], or at low pressure,
which is typically about 18 psig.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
83
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
outlet end for longer cable
lengths. At the end of the feed
phase, any vacuum, if used, is
removed, the outlet end is
sealed, and fluid is fed into the
feed end of the cable until the
cable is uniformly pressurized to
the target injection pressure.
The actual pressure at any point
along a circuit’s length is
determined by five factors.
1. The flow rate from the
feed to the outlet.
2. The feed pressure.
3. The outlet pressure.
4. The change in height or
head along the circuit
length from the feed tank.
5. The vapor pressure of the
fluid in the strands, which
is a function of the
temperature of the
conductor and the
concentrations of the feed
ingredients and reactive
by-products in the cable
strands.
The maximum pressure at any
point along a circuit’s length is
determined by items 2, 4, and 5
from the list above.
In either case, a vacuum of about
10 psig is applied to the outlet
end. At the end of the feed
phase, the vacuum is removed
and pressure at the feed end is
reduced to the soak pressure,
typically 10-12 psig. The actual
pressure at any point along a
circuit’s length is determined by
five factors.
1. The flow rate from the feed
to the outlet.
2. The feed pressure.
3. The outlet pressure.
4. The change in height or head
along the circuit length from
the feed tank.
5. The vapor pressure of the
fluid in the strands, which is
a function of the temperature
of the conductor and the
concentrations of the feed
ingredients and reactive byproducts in the cable strands.
The maximum pressure at any
point along a circuit’s length is
determined by items 2, 4, and 5
from the list above.
Pure Component Vapor Pressure (volatile components)
100.00
Pure Component Vapor Pressure (volatile components)
100.00
1.00
10.00
Vapor Pressure (psig)
Vapor Pressure (psig)
10.00
0.10
TMMS model
TMMS data
max operating temp
Temperature °C
0.01
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
1.00
0.10
130
The feed pressure (2) is set by
the INJECTION SERVICE
SUPPLIER... The density of
flammable silane mixture is
approximately 1 g/cm3 and hence
the head pressure (4) at any
point can be approximated:
Head pressure is the product of
height below (above) fluid supply
(ft) and 0.4335 psi/fthead. The
maximum vapor pressure as a
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
acetophenone
max operating temp
Temperature °C
0.01
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
The feed pressure (2) is set by
Novinium to the tailored
injection pressure plus 10%.
The feed pressure decays when
the injection is completed as
described by 2.3.3b. The
density of U732 is approximately
1 g/cm3 and hence the head
pressure (4) at any point can be
84
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
approximated: Head pressure is
the product of height below
(above) fluid supply (ft) and
0.4335 psi/fthead. The maximum
vapor pressure as a function of
temperature can be
approximated from the figure
nearby. An fatty acid is the
most volatile component in
flammable silane mixture, so the
maximum system vapor
pressure will be less than the
pure component value for the
mixture. Less than 2 psig for
any conductor temperature up to
130°C.
function of temperature can be
approximated from the figure
nearby. TMMS is the most
volatile component in the
PMDMS/TMMS mixture, so the
maximum system vapor pressure
will be less than the pure
component value for the mixture.
The interested reader should seek
more refined values from the
supplier for PMDMS/TMMS.
The yield point (the internal
pressure where the cable
irreversibly expands) for 7-strand
and 19-strand cables is about 50
psig for EPR, 650 psig for HMWPE
and about 650 psig for XLPE and
TRXLPE cables at 25°C. The burp
point (the internal pressure
where a component (elbow or
splice) expands and allows fluid
to leak across an interface) varies
from 20 to 120 psig at 25°C.
Most EPDM molded splices and
elbows are limited to 30 to 35
psig.
The yield point (the internal
pressure where the cable
irreversibly expands) for 7strand and 19-strand cables is
about 50 psig for EPR, 650 psig
for HMWPE and about 650 psig
for XLPE and TRXLPE cables at
25°C.
3.4.1
Operational, Hydraulic failure,
Cable
Operational, Hydraulic failure,
Cable
Operational, Hydraulic failure,
Cable
Operational, Hydraulic
failure, Cable
3.4.1a
Pressures used to inject cable
may exceed the hoop strength of
a circuit component.
(Author: The IHA did not identify
this risk, there was no discussion
provided in the 2001 document.
Accordingly, the entirety of this
section 3.4.1 is in italics to
identify the source of the
discussion as the work of the
current author at the published
date of this entire document.)
This risk is not possible with this
paradigm.
This risk is not possible with this
paradigm.
Pressures used to inject cable
may exceed the hoop strength of
a cable.
3.4.1b
See 3.4b.
See 3.4b.
3.4.1c
The authors are unaware of any
hydraulic failures of cables. The
interested reader should inquire
with the service supplier.
On three occasions cables have
burst adjacent to the feed point.
In all cases, cable was repaired,
injected, and put back in service.
In all three cases, there were
mechanical abnormalities to the
cable associated with the burst
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
85
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
point. Abnormalities observed
include non-concentric insulation
and severe bending beyond the
minimum bending radius.
3.4.1d
The probability is “ultra-low”
where medium pressure is used,
while the presence of personnel is
“likely”. Because medium
pressure is used on a fraction of
treated cables the probability is
reduced by a factor of 10
compared to the SPR injection
paradigm.
The probability is “ultra-low”,
while the presence of personnel
is “likely”.
3.4.1e
If pressure in a cable exceeds the
yield point, the cable will likely
fail hydraulically. The equipment
consequences to the utility are
“low” and the personnel
consequences are “low”.
If pressure in a cable exceeds
the yield point, the cable will
likely fail hydraulically. The
equipment consequences to the
utility are “low” and the
personnel consequences are
“low”.
3.4.1f
Interested readers should inquire
with service supplier to identify
probability mitigation tactics.
Execute NRI 20 and NRI-25
available at:
www.novinium.com/instructions.
aspx. See especially NRI 20
step 18. A tool to identify cables
bent beyond their minimum
bending radius is utilized. Either
the portion of cables so
identified is replaced or the
entire cable is not injected. A
tool to measure the circularity or
eccentricity of insulation was
implemented in 2008.
3.4.1g
Interested readers should inquire
with the injection service supplier
to identify consequence
mitigation tactics.
Safety glasses with side shields
are required to protect eyes
from hydraulic failure. Hydraulic
failures are a diagnostic for
electrical-mechanical defects in
the insulation. Such failures
occur while the cable is not
energized. Circuit owners may
exercise their unconditional
money-back warranty.
3.4.1h
Risk (0.05,0.045)
Requipmen=0.0005/10●103=0.05
Rpersonnel=0.0005/10●0.9●103=.05
Risk (0.5,0.45)
Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5
Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●103=0.45
3.4.2
Operational, Hydraulic failure,
Component
Operational, Hydraulic failure,
Component
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
86
Operational, Hydraulic failure,
Component
Operational, Hydraulic
failure, Component
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
SPR – U732
3.4.2a
Pressures used to inject cable
exceed the hoop strength of a
circuit component. (e.g. splices
and terminations) (Author: The
IHA did not identify this risk,
there was no discussion provided
in the 2001 document.
Accordingly, the entirety of this
section 3.4.1 is in italics to
identify the source of the
discussion as the work of the
current author at the published
date of this entire document.)
Pressures used to inject cable
exceed the hoop strength of a
circuit component.
Pressures used to inject cable
exceed the hoop strength of a
circuit component.
This risk does not apply to this
injection paradigm.
3.4.2b
See 3.4b.
See 3.4b.
See 3.4b.
3.4.2c
The author is aware of many (i.e.
100’s) component failures that
are consistent with this risk.
Without careful study of an
individual failure these types of
failures are easily confounded
with failures discussed in section
2.4 of this document. The
interested reader should inquire
with service supplier.
There have been no component
failures with this paradigm.
Operations commenced in the fall
of 2008.
There have been no component
failures with this paradigm.
Operations commenced in the fall
of 2008.
3.4.2d
The probability is “low”, while the
presence of personnel is “not
possible”.
The probability is “low”, while the
presence of personnel is “not
possible”.
The probability is “low”, while the
presence of personnel is “not
possible”.
3.4.2e
If pressure in a component
exceeds the burp point, fluid and
contaminants will leak across the
component interface. The
component may fail immediately
or the burp may deposit
contaminants along the
component-cable interface. Such
contamination may contribute to
future interfacial tracking. The
equipment consequences to the
utility are “medium” and the
personnel ranking is “high”.
If pressure in a component
exceeds the burp point, fluid and
contaminants will leak across the
component interface. The
component may fail immediately
or the burp may deposit
contaminants along the
component-cable interface. Such
contamination may contribute to
future interfacial tracking. The
equipment consequences to the
utility are “medium” and the
personnel ranking is “high”.
If pressure in a component
exceeds the burp point, fluid and
contaminants will leak across the
component interface. The
component may fail immediately
or the burp may deposit
contaminants along the
component-cable interface. Such
contamination may contribute to
future interfacial tracking. The
equipment consequences to the
utility are “medium” and the
personnel ranking is “high”.
3.4.2f
Interested readers should inquire
with the injection service supplier
to identify probability mitigation
tactics.
Air testing described in NRI 50 is
used to confirm that splices can
hold the required pressure. The
elimination of the soak phase
reduces the exposure of splices to
transient over pressurizations by
60 to 100 times. UPR without
soak is used as a backup to the
more robust SPR paradigm
Air testing described in NRI 50 is
used to confirm that splices can
hold the required pressure. The
elimination of the soak phase
reduces the exposure of splices to
transient over pressurizations by
60 to 100 times. UPR without
soak is used as a backup to the
more robust SPR paradigm
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
87
Code
UPR with soak – CC3
UPR without soak – P011
UPR without soak – U732
reducing the number of exposed
splices by about a factor of 2-5
depending upon the circuit
owner’s propensity to remove
aged splices. Taken together,
these probability mitigation
techniques decrease the
probability of occurrence by a
factor of 10.
reducing the number of exposed
splices by about a factor of 2-5
depending upon the circuit
owner’s propensity to remove
aged splices. Taken together,
these probability mitigation
techniques decrease the
probability of occurrence by a
factor of 10.
3.4.2g
Interested readers should inquire
with the injection service supplier
to identify consequence
mitigation tactics.
N/A
N/A
3.4.2h
Risk (50,0)
Requipment=0.05●103=50
Rpersonnel=0.05●0●105=0
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.05/10●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.05/10●0●105=0
Risk (5,0)
Requipment=0.05/10●103=5
Rpersonnel=0.05/10●0●105=0
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
88
SPR – U732
Addendum D. Revision History
Rev Date
Revision Notes
2011-01-19
Updated Figure 1 with 2010 data
Added HVFI device (High Voltage Fluidic Interface) as Hazard 1.5.
The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8].
89
`